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Abstract 
Environmental problems can often not be solved in isolation and need to be solved in a 
cooperative manner, sometimes even by collaborating with competitors. The coopetition body of 
literature would be ideal to address this need, but this body of literature has, historically, 
considered only a relatively narrow interpretation of what value is created and to whom such value 
is appropriated. Furthermore, multiple authors in the coopetition field have noted the need for 
research dealing with the dynamics of value creation and appropriation.  
This dissertation addresses the need for understanding the dynamics of value in an expanded view 
of value creation and appropriation. It does so by introducing stakeholder theory into the 
coopetition field to create a typology of value creation and appropriation, referred to as the 
Coopetition Value Matrix (CVM). 
The CVM serves as both a diagnostic tool and an instrument to better articulate and understand 
value creation, value appropriation, and the interaction of different types of value. 
The dissertation applied the CVM to ten cases of environmental coopetition in the wine industry. 
Environmental coopetition can be defined as actions of competitors to cooperate to reduce 
environmental impact and/or create environmental value.  
The methodology was based on qualitative interviews with partners and stakeholders in the cases 
of environmental coopetition. 
Applying the CVM to the cases led to some interesting observations, including the identification of 
three generic dynamics in the creation and appropriation of value. The dissertation represents an 
extension and refinement of some elements of coopetition literature, while it also introduces new 
theory in other aspects.  
Even though the ten cases in the study were from the wine industry, the findings are of much 
broader implication. Ultimately, the study calls for a broadening of the understanding of how value 
is created in coopetition and how it may be appropriated. The findings should therefore be of 
interest to a much broader group of researchers than those who are only interested in solving 
environmental problems. 
Keywords:  
Coopetition, environmental coopetition, socio-environmental value, Coopetition Value Matrix 
Alternative search items: 
Coopertition, co-opertition 
Coalitions, collaboration 
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Opsomming 
Omgewingsprobleme kan selde in isolasie opgelos word en kan gewoonlik net opgelos word op ‘n 
samewerkende wyse, partymaal selfs deur met mededingers saam te werk. Die samedinging 
(coopetition) literatuur sou ideaal wees om hierdie behoefte aan te spreek, maar hierdie literatuur 
het histories slegs ‘n eng interpretasie gehandhaaf van watter waarde geskep word, en aan wie 
hierdie waarde toegedeel word. Verder het verskeie skrywers in die samedinging-veld reeds die 
behoefte uitgewys vir navorsing wat handel oor die dinamika van waardeskepping en 
waardetoedeling. 
Hierdie verhandeling fokus op die behoefte om die dinamika van waarde te begryp binne ‘n 
uitgebreide siening van waardeskepping en -toedeling. Die verhandeling doen dit deur 
belangehouer-teorie te betrek in die veld van samedinging om sodoende uit te kom by ‘n tipologie 
van waardeskepping en toedeling, waarna verwys word as die Samedinging Waarde Matriks 
(Coopetition Value Matrix of CVM). 
Die CVM dien as beide ‘n diagnostiese instrument en ‘n instrument om waardeskepping en 
waardetoedeling, asook die interaksie tussen verskillende tipes waarde, beter te artikuleer. 
In die verhandeling word die CVM toegepas op tien gevalle van omgewing-samedinging in die 
wynbedryf. Omgewing-samedinging kan gedefinieer word as die optrede van mededingers deur 
saam te werk om omgewingsimpak te verminder en/of omgewingswaarde te skep. 
Die metodologie was gebaseer op kwalitatiewe onderhoude met vennote en belanghebbendes in 
die gevallestudies van omgewing-samedinging. 
Die toepassing van die CVM op die gevallestudies het gelei tot 'n paar interessante waarnemings, 
insluitend die identifisering van drie generiese dinamika in die skepping en toedeling van waarde. 
Die verhandeling verteenwoordig 'n uitbreiding en verfyning van sommige elemente van die 
samedinging literatuur, terwyl dit ook nuwe teorie voorstel in ander opsigte. 
Alhoewel die tien gevallestudies uit die wynindustrie kom, het die bevindinge van die studie veel 
groter implikasie. Uiteindelik is die studie ‘n oproep tot die verbreding van begrip oor hoe waarde 
geskep word wanneer samedinging plaasvind en hoe die waarde toegedeel word. Die bevindinge 
behoort dus van belang te wees vir 'n veel wyer groep navorsers as diegene wat slegs belangstel 
in die oplossing van omgewingsprobleme. 
Sleutelwoorde: 
Samedinging, omgewing-samedinging, sosio-omgewingswaarde, Samedinging Waarde Matriks 
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CHAPTER 1 
ORIENTATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The win-lose paradigm inherent to competitive strategies has been perpetuated by, and is 
dominant in, much of the management literature of the last few decades (Barney, 1986; Porter & 
Kramer, 2011: 66, Porritt, 2007: 103). This is mostly because to be uncompetitive is to fail (Porritt, 
2007: 102). The position of firms that fail to innovate are eroded by competitors that offer 
innovations that appeal to the market (Lepak, Smith & Taylor, 2007: 186). But competition is also 
controversial in the sense that it contributes to the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). Within 
the competition paradigm, the only way for a firm to gain is for another to lose, i.e. competition is a 
zero-sum game (Orsato, 2009: 17). Furthermore, this “social Darwinism” has been adopted by 
modern business as mantra to justify irresponsible and uncaring corporate behaviour (Porritt, 
2007), to the detriment of society. 
An increasing body of knowledge is looking at cooperation as a source of prosperity. After all, as 
Meadows (2001) pointed out: “Some kinds of excellence rise out of competition; other kinds rise 
out of cooperation. You’re not in a war, you’re in a community”. Under the assumption that 
competition drives economic activity past the global environment’s ability to assimilate polluting 
consequences (Stebbing & Heath, 2003 in Porritt, 2007), coopetition – the practice of collaborating 
with your competitors – provides an attractive alternative to the tragedy of the commons as 
portrayed by Hardin (1968).  
1.2 THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
The most recent Living Planet report of the World Wide Fund for Nature (2014) indicates the extent 
of the ecological crisis in which the world finds itself. The report shows that the number of 
individual animals have decreased by 52% between 1970 and 2010 (Ibid., 16), pointing to massive 
biodiversity losses globally.  As a human species, we need 1.5 earths to sustain our population and 
current per capita living requirements. Agriculture, for instance, accounts for 92 per cent of global 
water consumption (Ibid., 12). At the same time, carbon emissions keep rising as a result of human 
activity, leading to increasing global temperatures. Climate change of two degree Celsius would 
have a vast impact on agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa (World Economic Forum, 2016: 50). These 
and other environmental problems need to be solved for human survival. 
At the shallowest view of the interaction of human with the environment, environmental issues can 
broadly be classified in terms of two dimensions, namely over-exploitation and pollution (Rennings 
& Wiggering, 1997: 26; Naess, 1973: 95).  This argument is succinctly worded by Marstrander 
(1996: 200): 
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In the 19th century, we allowed ourselves to run industry as if we had unlimited 
resources and we could produce unlimited waste without doing any harm. We are 
entering a period in which we want to base our industrialized society on a model which 
has limited energy and limited resources as inputs, and limited waste as its final output. 
Figure 1.1 portrays nature as the context within which society and the economy exist and 
resonates with the above quote from Marstrander (1996: 200). Such a perspective is regarded as a 
shallow view of the ecology as it values nature only for its ability to sustain society and the 
economy. Yang (2006: 33) argued that the ecological crisis we find ourselves in is partly due to this 
human-centred worldview.  
Yang (2006: 33) regards the ecological crisis as an outcome of:  
 The insensitivity of the modern economy to the vulnerability and limits of nature;  
 The power struggle of modern politics; 
 Society equating happiness with material satisfaction; and 
 The overwhelming acceptance of a mechanical and dualist view of nature (i.e. nature and 
man are separate). 
It is not industrialisation that should be blamed for our ecological crisis, but rather industrial 
civilisation.  
 
Figure 1.1: An eco-system view of human activity 
One of the most central and evident problems with the industrial civilisation is that our view of value 
is constrained by a narrow focus of how nature and society relate to the creation of value.  The five 
capitals model (Forum for the Future, 2005) shown in Figure 1.2, provides a useful framework to 
explore the relationship between different types of capital.  
The five capitals model distinguishes between five forms of capital, namely: 
i) Financial (e.g. cash, debtors, inventory); 
ii) Manufactured capital (e.g. fixed assets such as factories); 
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iii) Social capital (e.g. trust, shared values, relationships); 
iv) Human capital (e.g. knowledge, health, skills); and 
v) Natural capital (resources, capacity to absorb waste). 
In some representations of the model, intellectual capital is separated from human capital to form 
six capitals (International Integrated Reporting Council, 2013). 
 
Figure 1.2: The five capitals model 
Source: Forum for the Future, 2005. 
The five (or six) capitals model allows us to articulate the destruction of total value. For instance, 
natural resources are provided by nature free of charge, but it does not mean that it has no value. 
As such, it would be possible for a firm to save expenses by dumping poisonous waste into a river, 
while the subsequent damage may destroy far more natural capital and social capital (in the form 
of trust of the community). Similarly, it is possible to sell a scarce natural resource (such as an 
endangered fish) at a much lower price than the real value because the seller only has to recover 
his own expenses.  
The issue of substitutability of resources is a central debate in environmental economics. The two 
extremes are embodied in the weak and strong views of sustainability. Weak sustainability is 
based in neo-classical economic theory and assumes that one form of capital can be substituted 
for another, for instance manufactured for natural capital (Rennings & Wiggering, 1997: 25). In 
such instances, economics is concerned with the best allocation of resources (ibid: 27). Weak 
sustainability therefore means that the total capital stock should not decrease (Gutés, 1996: 147).  
Strong sustainability is concerned with ecological carrying capacity and a requirement that 
economic activity should not jeopardize the functioning of ecosystems. That means sustainability is 
equated to non-decreasing natural capital (Ibid.). 
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Whether natural capital is viewed as substitutable with other forms of capital has no direct bearing 
on how one would view coopetition to address environmental issues. However, it may impact how 
value is perceived in such initiatives, an issue that is of relevance later in this study. The legitimacy 
of nature as a stakeholder is partly determined by which extreme of sustainability one adopts. 
1.3 COMMON POOL RESOURCES AND COOPERATION 
The problem of overexploitation is often discussed in literature, and is somewhat addressed by the 
literature around common pool resources or CPRs (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1987).  
CPRs are public goods (i.e. no ownership is assigned to it) that are finite, and therefore, if one 
party uses some of it, it means there is less available for others (Wade, 1987: 96). It is therefore 
susceptible to depletion, erosion and deterioration when used beyond the carrying capacity 
(Blomquist & Ostrom, 1985: 383). Examples of overexploitation of resources are abundant in the 
fishing, forestry, water, and other industries (Wade, 1987: 95). 
Arguably one of the most famous parables in environmental management literature is that of the 
“tragedy of the commons”, i.e. the tale of how a fictional communal field in a town collapses under 
the pressure of overexploitation (Hardin, 1968). Individuals acting in self-interest receive short-term 
gain from their actions, but at an aggregated level the resources collapse. The view that humans 
are exclusively self-interested has also resonated in strategic management literature (Ghoshal, 
2005). But while Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons was a bleak view of society’s ability to 
limit overexploitation of natural resources, Ostrom (1990; 2000), Ostrom, Walker and Gardner 
(1992) and Wade (1987) provided ample evidence that communities can collectively and 
successfully govern the use of CPRs. In essence, the work by Ostrom and her peers can be seen 
as case studies of environmental coopetition at various grass-root levels. Although the coopetition 
body of literature is substantial, little attention has been given to coopetition to address 
environmental issues. Coopetition literature can thus gain from broadening its scope to CPR 
literature, but the CPR theory needs to be translated for intra-firm, inter-firm, inter-industry and 
other behaviour. 
Much of the discussion in the CPR literature focuses on the validity of the “zero contribution 
thesis”, which states that no self-interested person would contribute to the production of a public 
benefit: 
Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or 
some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, 
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests 
(Olson, 1965: 2).  
Extensive empirical evidence exists that portrays a more positive view of human behaviour 
(Ghoshal, 2005), but much remains unknown about the contexts and variables that make collective 
action more probable. (Ostrom, 2000: 154). 
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Prior to much of Ostrom’s writing, the dominant view of commons was that, left to their own 
devices, communities would exploit common pool resources past its carrying capacity. Three such 
examples are those of: 
i) Hardin (who coined the description of the tragedy of commons in 1968);  
ii) Olson (1965) who argued that someone who cannot be excluded from the benefits of 
collective action, has little incentive to participate in the creation thereof; and  
iii) The prisoner’s dilemma from classic game theory (in which communication between players 
is forbidden) (Ostrom, 1990: 4). 
Based on such thinking, it is not surprising that the dominant thinking around governing the 
commons relied on control from outside in the form of government-imposed control, converting the 
commons into private property (be aware that this is only an analogy), or creating institutions (for 
instance, third-party institutions) to govern the commons (Ostrom, 1990: 8-15). 
However, empirical evidence suggests that individuals in social dilemmas can find solutions 
without the need for outside enforcement or governance (Ostrom, Walker & Gardner, 1992: 405). 
Using an experimental design, Ostrom et al. (1992: 414) showed, that when individuals are given 
the opportunity to self-organise, they often, but not always, make credible commitments that deliver 
better outcomes without an external enforcer. This is corroborated by extensive empirical studies in 
many different instances of Ostrom’s work.  
Ostrom et al. (1992: 414) also found that the presence of communication, covenants and penalties 
for transgressors have a bigger positive impact on the outcome of a social dilemma experiment 
than what the predicted theoretical game theory result suggests. 
Much of the work by Ostrom and her colleagues focused on the logic of cooperation, antecedents 
of cooperation and governance of groups of stakeholders in CPR cases. An enduring contribution 
of Ostrom are the eight design principles of CPR institutions shown in Table 1.1.  
Most of the design principles of Ostrom (1990: 90) relate to the structure of the design, strongly 
reminding one of Dostel’s (2005: 313) adages that structure exerts passive governance for 
activities.  
Ostrom and her linked body of work are associated with New Institutional Economics, a field of 
economics that focuses on social and legal norms and rules (referred to as the rules of the game) 
that underlie economic activity (Brue, 2000: 419). Although the work of Ostrom and her co-authors 
is relevant to understanding environmental coopetition, it is, for two reasons, of limited relevance to 
the particular research focus of this dissertation: 
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Table 1.1: Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions 
1. Clearly-defined boundaries 
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly 
defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology and/or quantity of resource units are related to local 
conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material and/or money. 
3. Collective-choice arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules. 
4. Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, are accountable to the 
appropriators or are the appropriators. 
5. Graduated sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on 
the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these 
appropriators, or by both.  
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among 
appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise 
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental 
authorities. 
For CPRs that are parts of larger systems: 
8. Nested enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are 
organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
Source: Ostrom, 1990: 90. 
Firstly, New Institutional Economics is concerned with structures that drive behaviour, and is less 
concerned with the value that initiatives generate. Freeman and Reed (1983) criticised economics 
for not considering stakeholder theory. This study is concerned with the value that is created from 
coopetition initiatives, and less so with the structures that govern or drive such initiatives. As a 
result, the literature surrounding CPR institutions is not covered in depth in this dissertation. 
Secondly, whereas some of the environmental issues in this dissertation can be considered CPR 
problems, not all the cases can be classified as such. Glass recycling, for instance, reduces 
reliance on natural resources, but the resources are sufficiently abundant not to be classified as a 
CPR problem.  
1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL COOPETITION 
Companies are responsible for environmental impacts in various contexts, for instance, water, air, 
land, and biodiversity. While there is a moral and ethical imperative for companies to act 
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environmentally responsible, it would naturally happen much faster if it can be shown that being 
environmentally responsible can generate value for the companies (Marcus & Fremeth, 2009: 19).  
 It is, however, extremely difficult for companies to differentiate themselves on environmental 
grounds (Bateman & Snell, 2007; Orsato, 2009). Despite indications from consumers that they 
would pay more for green products, the reality seems to show that consumers do not consistently 
act on the intention they exhibit in surveys. Environmental coopetition provides an attractive option 
to companies hoping to capture some value from environmental activities, even if competitors also 
gain in the process.  
For example, when Swedish breweries collaborated to reduce the cost of collecting empty bottles 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000), it benefited all companies. The resulting reduction in carbon emissions 
and waste potentially makes this an example of environmental coopetition. What remains unclear 
though is whether the environmental benefit was merely the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith (1776), 
or whether it was an explicit choice in the minds of the coopeting parties. If the benefit was 
unintentional, assigning a carbon cap to this industry would potentially make the benefit explicit.  
While the competitive paradigm may manifest in value for a single company, most environmental 
problems require collective action to solve (Seabright, 1997). At the same time, companies 
increasingly collaborate around environmental innovations.  
Despite an extensive body of literature dealing with value creation and appropriation in coopetititive 
initiatives, not much is said about the public and environmental value that exists in such cases 
(Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 1998; Dagnino & Padula, 2002; Dyer, Singh & Kale, 2008; Janssen, De 
Man & Quak, 2013). Other aspects of coopetition literature also seem at odds with empirical 
observations, such as the assertion that the collaboration component of coopetition should happen 
far from customers. 
While some may argue that partnerships and collaboration favour incremental changes to the 
fundamental changes needed for sustainability (Levy, 1997: 142), it does provide an alternative to 
the belief that companies will only act if they can gain an opportunity to outperform the competition. 
In fact, there is a strong indication that sustainability leaders are far more willing than other 
companies to collaborate with a wide set of stakeholders, including competitors (Kiron, Kruschwitz, 
Haanaes & Von Streng Velken, 2012: 73).  
Despite a significant growth in publications dealing with coopetition, the topic is still considered a 
relatively new and unexplored topic in management research (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014).  It is 
therefore encouraging to see reports (Yami, Castaldo, Dagnino, Le Roy & Czakon, 2010: 6) that 
the phenomenon has become more mainstream in its dimensions and significance. Yet, from the 
absence of a coopetition-related discourse in sustainability literature, it is evident that a gap in 
knowledge exists around environmentally-orientated coopetition. This lack of discussion is also 
evident in other areas of environmental strategy.  In a working paper about the construct validity of 
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environmental strategy measures by Walls, Phan and Berrone (2008), there was no measure 
provided for environmental collaboration, while it has already been pointed out that environmental 
issues often cannot be solved in isolation. 
While a number of examples of environmental coopetition exist (such as environmental standards, 
fishing quotas, research and development (R&D) collaboration, and transport agreements), only a 
few authors in the area of coopetition have recently ventured towards discussing ‘environmental 
coopetition’ as it is defined in this dissertation (for example Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013; Holmburg 
& Örne, 2013; De Marchi, 2012; Blanco, Lozano & Rey-Maquieira, 2009; Limoubpratum, Shee & 
Ahsan, 2014; Choi, Garcia, & Friedrich, 2010). While this seems to be a problem of theory, 
understanding the answers to questions like what, why and how, can inform private firms, public 
administration and society about how more such initiatives can be fostered. This dissertation 
therefore also aims to address a practical issue by exploring how firms and stakeholders perceive 
the creation and appropriation of value in environmental coopetition initiatives. 
1.5 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND GAP 
A well-used analogy in coopetition literature is that of the enlargement of the value-pie versus the 
slicing of the pie (Brandenburger & Nalebuﬀ, 1996; Lado, Boyd & Hanlon, 1997; Walley, 2007; 
Lacomba, Lagos & Neugebauer, 2011; Chin, Chan & Lam, 2008; Rusko, 2011; Ritala & Tidström, 
2014). While this analogy may be powerful at a very high level, it lacks the power to articulate 
value-related dynamics (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2014) in coopetitive initiatives.  
Furthermore, while there is sufficient literature about value appropriation in the coopetition and the 
collaboration bodies of literature, these typically do not consider a wider stakeholder view of value 
(see Dagnino & Padula, 2002; Dyer et al., 2008; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Ritala & 
Tidström, 2014; Park, Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2014).  
Research on the value aspect of coopetition is still limited, both at theoretical and empirical levels 
(Ritala & Tidström, 2014). As such, our understanding is constrained impeded by the “incomplete 
conceptualization and measurement of value and by scant characterization of the different patterns 
of stakeholder value appropriation” (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2014).  
One context in which the understanding of value creation and appropriation is poorly articulated, is 
environmental coopetition. Environmental coopetition refers to initiatives through which companies 
collaborate with their competitors to reduce environmental impact or to create environmental value. 
While a few authors (Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013; Holmburg & Örne, 2013; De Marchi, 2012; 
Blanco et al., 2009) have focused on coopetition to address environmental issues, it remains 
poorly described and analysed. And while examples of environmental coopetition are relatively 
abundant, not much is known about how value is created, how value is appropriated, and how the 
different types of value relate to each other in such a context.  
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This dissertation firstly addresses a gap in theory, namely the lack of articulation and 
understanding of value (i.e. content) and the different patterns of value creation and appropriation 
(i.e. process).  
Secondly, this dissertation addresses an empirical gap by exploring coopetition in a context that 
has not been well studied in the  body of knowledge related to coopetition. 
Thirdly, not many studies of coopetition have focused on the wine industry, with the few examples 
being studies of: 
 Australian, New Zealand and US coopetition for screwcap closures on bottles (Choi, Garcia, 
Friedrich, 2009), 
 wine cluster coopetition in New Zealand (Dana, Granata, Lasch & Carnaby, 2013), and 
 a longitudinal study of a French wine producers union (Granata, Geraudel, Gundolf, Gast & 
Marquès (2015). 
This dissertation therefore contributes to the body of knowledge of coopetition in the wine industry. 
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research questions provide direction and scope to all parts of a study (Robson, 2002: 82). This 
dissertation makes a conceptual contribution to the need for a better understanding and articulation 
of value creation and appropriation dynamics (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2014; Ritala & Tidström, 
2014; Park et al., 2014) by addressing two parallel research questions.  
RQ1: What types of value do companies create and appropriate in environmental coopetition?  
RQ2: How do the different types of value interact (i.e. value dynamics) in environmental 
coopetition?  
1.7 THE IMPORTANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
Value creation and appropriation has two dimensions, namely content and process (Bowman & 
Ambrosini, 2000; Lepak, et al., 2007: 181). The two research questions directly address these two 
aspects of value by advancing the definition of value from the economics debate to the coopetition 
debate and by providing an analytical typology of value (referring to RQ1) that aids in the 
understanding of the dynamics between different types of value (referring to RQ2). In addressing 
these two questions, the dissertation contributes to the extant literature in five ways as described 
below.  
1.7.1 The value creation view 
Researchers in the coopetition and collaboration literature have thus far viewed the created value 
as either knowledge value or economic value. The researcher argues for the inclusion of socio-
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environmental value in the value creation view of coopetition. This aspect extends and 
consolidates work done by Lado et al. (1997), Dagnino and Padula, (2002; 2007), Ritala and 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, (2009), Zhang and Frazier (2011) and Kenworthy (1995).  
1.7.2 The value appropriation view 
The main focus in extant coopetion literature has been on common and private benefits as value 
captured between and within coopeting firms (Ritala & Tidström 2014). This dissertation extends 
the concept of captured value by introducing a wider stakeholder view (Freeman, 1984; Harrison & 
Wicks; 2013; Hörisch, Freeman & Schaltegger, 2014) of value appropriation (Dyer et al. 2008, 
Lado et al. 1997, Ritala & Tidström 2014). Different stakeholders have different views about value 
because of unique goals, contexts and knowledge (Lepak et al., 2007: 185). By including public 
benefit in the view of value appropriation, the researcher brings an aspect of social embeddedness 
(Granovetter, 1985) into the rhetoric of value. Ultimately social embeddedness can be linked to a 
competitive advantage (Czakon & Lizak, 2013). 
The dissertation further suggests a more precise articulation of the appropriation of the “common” 
component of the increased value pie (Dyer et al., 2008; Park et al., 2014; Ritala & Tidström, 
2014). Privately-captured common benefit represents the component of common value captured 
by a focus firm.  
1.7.3 A typology of coopetition value types 
The coopetition value matrix (CVM) represents a third contribution by integrating the expanded 
perspectives of value. The CVM serves as a typology through which coopetition-related value can 
be mapped and through which value dynamics (Ritala & Tidström 2014, Garcia-Castro & Aguilera 
2014) can be articulated. Such a value matrix can aid coopeting entities, firstly, to understand how 
more value may be created, and secondly, to understand how more value can be captured. 
1.7.4 Value dynamics 
The fourth contribution is a description of different value dynamics in the CVM. The results of the 
study show an extensive number of observed dynamics, but ultimately the researcher narrowed 
these down to three generic dynamics that may inform future studies.  
1.7.5 The context  
While the above theoretical contributions are potentially generic to most coopetition initiatives, this 
dissertation also addresses the call for new empirical contributions (Ritala & Tidström 2014) by 
focusing on ten cases of environmental coopetition. Given the scarcity of coopetition studies in an 
environmental context, the researcher believed the empirical setting offers an interesting addition 
to the literature while providing a rich setting to illustrate the proposed theory. 
Secondly, very few studies of coopetition have been done in the wine industry, and none in the 
South African environment. The study therefore makes an empirical contribution in this regard. 
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Lastly, the cases described in this study are intricate, and often the companies would be involved 
in multiple and overlapping initiative. This is popularly referred to as networked coopetition (Czakon 
& Czernek, 2016). Even though the scope of the  study did not include this view, it is important to 
note the context.  
1.7.5 The CVM methodology 
The dissertation followed a novel approach to analysing coopetition initiatives by mapping value in 
the CVM. This represents a novel methodology and can be applied further in other cases and 
contexts. 
1.8 CLARIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
In any field of study, it is likely to find similar concepts, constructs or phenomena, but which are 
referred to by different names. In addition, the terminology may not imply exactly the same 
meaning, in which case the words we use become even more important. It is important to define 
concepts up-front as it may require different explanations and approaches (Babbie, 2010: 132). A 
good definition has one explicit, clear and specific meaning. It should not be ambiguous or vague 
(Neuman, 2000: 158). This section provides conceptual clarity in some instances and in other 
cases, where there are irreconcilable definitions in the theory, indicates a preference for a 
particular definition. The concepts are listed in alphabetical order and not in order of relevance.  
1.8.1 Cartel 
A cartel is a formal or explicit agreement between producers to coordinate prices or production 
(Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003: 171; Pindyck & Rubenfield,1995: 462; Levenstein & Suslow, 2006: 45). 
The degree of competition between competitors is higher in cartels than in alliances and 
coopetition relationships (Rusco, 2011: 313). A high level of competition makes it difficult for firms 
to work together.  
Other definitions state that a cartel is a group of firms that collude.  Colluding firms in comparison 
to competing firms, are able to charge higher prices, usually produce less, block new firms, and as 
a result earn higher profits (McEachern, 2013: 225).  
Cartels are most prevalent in industries with ten or fewer sellers, or in industries where most sales 
are made by only a few sellers (Pressey, Vanharanta & Gilchrest, 2014: 4). The wine industry is 
highly fragmented between many small players, so it would be unlikely to find cartels in the 
industry. 
1.8.2 Collusion 
Collusion refers to the illegal actions of firms that divide the market, set prices, or limit production. 
(Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003: 171; Pindyck & Rubenfield, 1995: 455; McEachern, 2013: 225). A 
deeper discussion of collusion follows in the literature review (See Section 2.8). 
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1.8.3 Common pool resources 
Common pool resources (CPRs) can be seen as a subset of public goods. But where public goods 
can be used by many at the same time, or put differently, exclusion is difficult, some public goods 
provide infinite benefits. In contrast, common pool resources are finite and yield subtractive 
benefits (Wade, 1987: 96). Each person’s consumption subtracts from the total common pool 
resources available to others (Blomquist & Ostrom, 1985: 383). The problem of pollution can be 
seen as a reversed problem of commons, in such instances it is not about taking out of a system, 
but putting into a system with a limited absorption capacity (Hardin, 1968: 1243). Carbon dioxide 
pollution, for instance, is a CPR problem. We made reference to glass waste earlier (see Section 
1.3) to illustrate that not all pollution is a CPR problem. 
1.8.4 Competitor 
A number of different definitions exist of what a competitor is. Some authors define competitors as 
firms that operate in the same market and sell a similar product (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000: 413). As 
a result, your product or service becomes less attractive in the presence of your competitor’s 
product (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996).  
Firms can also be regarded as competitors if the actions of one firm hinder or limit the actions of 
another (Dorn, Schweiger & Albers, 2016: 2). 
1.8.5 Coopetition (also “co-opetition”, “co-opertition”, “coopertition” and “competitive 
collaboration”)  
There are a few alternative definitions of coopetition. The definition used in this study is that of 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000), stating that coopetition is when competitors simultaneously 
collaborate and compete with each other. Even though some others argue that collusion is a form 
of coopetition, we consider only instances where coopetition adds value for consumers and society 
through innovation and increases in efficiency (Walley, 2007; Czakon, Mucha-Kuś & Sołtysik, 
2016).  
1.8.6 Coopetitors 
Coopetitors are the competitors who are collaborating in the coopetitive actions (Dagnino & 
Padula, 2002: 4). They can also be referred to as the collaborators, or simply, partners. 
1.8.7 Environmental coopetition 
We define environmental coopetition as the action of competitors to collaborate/cooperate to 
reduce environmental impact and/or create environmental value. 
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1.8.8 Impure public goods 
Impure public goods are recognised by the joint provision of a private good and an environmental 
public good (Kotchen, 2006: 281). Coffee that is grown in the shade of rainforests represents both 
a private good (coffee) and an environmental public good (conservation of a rain forest). 
1.8.9 Intangibles 
Intangibles or intangible value is often defined narrowly as patents, licences, trademarks and the 
likes (Brennan & Connell, 2000: 2), but could also include company reputation, human capital, 
customer loyalty, or other such dimensions (Lev & Daum, 2004: 6). Knowledge value (or 
intellectual capital), is also seen as intangible value (Martin, 2004). 
Intangibles are inert, meaning that they do not generate value on their own, but can generate value 
when combined with other factors of production (Lev & Daum, 2004: 6). 
1.8.10 Knowledge 
There are numerous classifications and typologies of knowledge. The literature makes a distinction 
between different kinds of knowledge, for instance explicit versus tacit knowledge; and individual 
knowledge versus group knowledge (Cook & Brown, 1999).  
One could also make a distinction between know-what knowledge and know-how knowledge. 
Know-what knowledge can be associated with awareness and understanding, whereas skills and 
competencies are more readily associated with know-how or tacit knowledge (Winterton, 
Delamare-Le Deist & Stringfellow, 2005). 
Explicit knowledge (or know-what) can be documented and conveyed easier, but is considered 
less important (e.g. Brown & Duguid 1998; Cook & Brown, 1999) than tacit knowledge (or know-
how) as it cannot lead to a sustainable competitive advantage. Tacit knowledge is much harder to 
communicate or to gain, and Cook and Brown maintained that it can never be made explicit (1999: 
397).  
Knowledge is closely associated with learning. While conceptual learning is at the level of know-
what and is associated with understanding and using new concepts, operational learning is 
associated with know-how, or the ability to act (Winterton et al., 2005). The idea of a learning curve 
illustrates that there is a feedback loop between understanding how something is done and doing 
it. Explicit and tacit knowledge are therefore mutually reinforcing and dependent (Alavi & Leidner, 
2001: 112). 
A further element to be aware of is that knowledge consists of content and process (Haas & 
Hansen, 2007). The aspect of content and process will also emerge in the discussion of value 
creation. 
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1.8.11 Private goods 
When a product or service is a private good, the consumption of one unit excludes someone else 
from consuming the same unit. For instance, when a person consumes a loaf of bread, that unit of 
bread is no longer available to anyone else. Private goods stand opposite to public goods. 
1.8.12 Public goods 
Public goods are characterised by two characteristics namely non-rivalrous consumption and that it 
is non-excludable (Bannock, Baxter & Davis, 2003: 316): 
 Non-rivalrous implies that the consumption of the good by one person does not deprive 
another of its use.  
 Non-excludable means that it is impossible to exclude any person from using it. This 
characteristic often makes public goods susceptible to free riding. 
 Public goods are often (but not always) non-rejectable in that individuals cannot abstain from 
using it, even if they wish to.  
A country’s defence is often quoted as an example that meets all three of the three criteria.  
Another example is ecosystem services such as the CO2 sequestration of plants. 
Public (analogue) television is an example of a public good that satisfies the first two 
characteristics, but not the third.  
1.8.13 Stakeholder theory 
A deeper discussion regarding stakeholder theory follows in the literature review of the 
dissertation. For the purpose of clarification, it is important to note that the definition in this 
dissertation is the wide definition of a stakeholder as defined by Freeman and Reed (1983: 51). 
This wide definition of a stakeholder includes any group or individual who can impact on or who 
may be impacted on by the achievement of the objectives of an organisation.  
1.8.14 Value/Rent/Utility 
Value is a central concept/construct in this dissertation. The concept of value has multiple 
meanings depending on the body of knowledge investigated. The term ‘value’ (or ‘rent’ as 
Dyer et al., 2008: 137 refer to it) in this dissertation refers to tangible value as well as intangible 
value (Integrated Reporting Council, 2013). In short, the researcher follows the definition of value 
as stated by Harrison and Wicks (2013: 100) as “anything that has the potential to be of worth to 
stakeholders”, implying that value is embedded in stakeholder theory. The Integrated Reporting 
Council (2013) also acknowledges that the term value has different meaning for different people, 
thereby choosing not to give a definition of the term. 
By placing the stakeholder in the centre of decision-making, the unit of analysis changed to a more 
relational view of business (Freeman, 2010). Logically, when the central focus of a study is on 
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cooperation between competitors, such a focus is desirable. (Also see value creation for a multi-
stakeholder interpretation of value). 
A central premise of stakeholder theory is that treating stakeholders well and considering their 
interests has value for the company in a number of dimensions (Freeman, 2010; Harrison & Wicks, 
2013). These dimensions are discussed in the literature-review, and are elaborated on further in 
the empirical component of this dissertation. But the dissertation also explored manifestations of 
value for the environment and society albeit from the perspective of the respondents (refer 
Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2: Types of value from economic literature 
Value in Exchange The idea that value is based on how much a given item is within a 
marketplace exchange (e.g., Adam Smith; neoclassical economics). Value 
here is negotiated and inter-subjective. 
Value of Use Value here is based on a subjective evaluation of how much an item is 
worth to a particular individual. It may not be visible to others and may vary 
from zero to nearly infinite value. 
Value of Labour Value is based on how much labour was required to create an item (e.g., 
David Ricardo; Karl Marx; classical economics). Value here is determined 
independent of individual preferences and set by a quality inherent to the 
object (i.e., by labour). 
Value of Production Value is based on the total costs involved to produce an item (e.g., like 
Value of Labour, but adding in other related costs to produce an item). As 
with Value of Labour, value is set independent of individual preferences. 
Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value One way to think about value is whether it is intrinsic, or an inherent feature 
of an item, or whether it is simply a vehicle or means to some other good 
(i.e., extrinsic).  
Most goods in the marketplace are "extrinsic." A sandwich is good for 
satisfying my hunger; money helps me feel important or secure – both are 
"extrinsic" goods. However, some things are good in and of themselves. 
Kant calls a good will an inherent good; virtues also would qualify as 
inherent goods. 
Subjective vs. Objective 
Value 
Related to the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic good is the contrast 
between subjective and objective notions of value. While there are 
numerous ways of defining both terms, “subjective” typically refers to the 
assessment of an individual and what they happen to like, while “objective” 
typically refers to a norm that operates across individuals or at a higher 
level of analysis (e.g., a universal moral norm; a social value; a human 
right). 
Source: Hausman & McPherson, 2006; Harrison & Wicks, 2013: 101. 
‘Utility’ is a term related to value, and reflects the value a stakeholder receives that has merit in the 
eyes of the stakeholder. It is a function of the stakeholder’s utility function (Harrison & Wicks, 
2013: 101). 
1.8.15 Value appropriation 
In this dissertation, value appropriation refers to the capturing of value by coopetition parties (Ritala 
& Tidström, 2014: 500; Dyer et al., 2008:146). Value appropriation could also be referred to as 
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value capturing, value allocation, or value distribution, but in this dissertation, value appropriation is 
the term used most often. Sections 1.9.5 and 2.10 deal with the topic in more depth.  
1.8.16 Value creation 
The International Integrated Reporting Council (2013) states that value is created through an 
organisation’s business model, which takes inputs from the six capitals and transforms them 
through business activities and interactions to produce outputs and outcomes that create or 
destroy value for the organisation, its stakeholders, society and the environment”. 
In this dissertation, value creation refers to the increase in such value through activities by 
coopeting partners/players/parties (Ritala & Tidström, 2014: 500). Some other authors use the 
analogy of an increase in the value pie (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). Section 1.9.5 and 2.9 
deal with the topic in more depth. 
1.9 DELIMITATION 
As with any study, it is necessary to show what the study includes and excludes. Figure 1.3 shows 
some of the boundaries that defined the limits of the study. The triangle represents narrowing the 
focus from broad to narrower limits. Each stepwise limitation forced the study into a more focused 
area. 
 
Figure 1.3: Delimitation of the study 
Because the focus of the study derives from the two research questions, it is advisable to show 
these again as reminder:  
RQ1: What types of value do companies create and appropriate in environmental coopetition?  
RQ2: How do the different types of value interact (i.e. value dynamics) in environmental 
coopetition?  
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1.9.1 The South African wine industry 
This study was executed in the empirical context of the wine industry. Initially the focus was 
broader and the study included more research questions. One of these was aimed at investigating 
the effect of dynamics in different industries on the characteristics of coopetition.  However, after 
the initial surveys it was evident that there was merit in narrowing the study to the wine industry 
only. This was done for three reasons: 
i) It was evident that there would be value in limiting the study to a single industry to at least 
control for one less variable. 
ii) There would be sufficient cases in the wine industry, at least for a qualitative study of the 
kind of this dissertation. 
iii) As the research progressed, the focus of the study narrowed to value creation and 
appropriation. The wine industry alone was considered sufficient to explore the research 
question. 
This being said, the findings of this study would be equally valid in other industries, as well as at 
other levels (e.g. macro, meso and micro). For this reason, the research questions did not only 
refer to the wine industry. 
1.9.2  Coopetition vs other approaches to solving environmental issues 
It is important to acknowledge that coopetition is not the only solution to avoiding and rehabilitating 
environmental damage. There are currently many attempts from public, private and civil society to 
curb negative environmental impact. These actors acknowledge that solving environmental 
dilemmas exceed the capacity of individual actors (De Bruijn & Tukker, 2002: 7) Coopetition 
provides a particular view within this broader landscape of initiatives. Because business has a 
significant impact on the environment, coopetition provides companies with a way to collectively 
launch initiatives. Coopetition is also of particular interest when companies face the same 
environmental issues (Steinmo & Jakobson, 2013: 1). 
1.9.3 Meso-level 
Coopetition is often defined at three levels (Kenworthy, 1995; Dagnino & Padula, 2002; Zhang & 
Frazier, 2011), namely: (i) macro (between clusters of firms); (ii) meso (between firms); and 
(iii) micro (between divisions or workers in a firm).  
Table 1.3 provides an overview of the three different levels: (i) the typical actors who cooperate; 
(ii) the institutions that promote coopetition; and (iii) the economic gains at the different levels.  
This dissertation limited its scope to coopetition between wine producing entities that are 
competitors. This definition of coopetition is a sub-section of the meso-level, indicated in bold in the 
table.  
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Table 1.3: Coopetition at the macro-, meso- and micro-level 
 Actors coopeting Institutions(s) promoting 
cooperation 
Economic benefits 
M
a
c
ro
 l
e
v
e
l 
Firms across industries Centralised business federation Reduced rent seeking 
Unions Centralised and/or concentrated 
labour movement 
Wage restraint 
Government and interest 
groups 
Centralised/concentration of 
authority in the state and 
interest groups 
Coherent, productive 
government policy 
M
e
s
o
 l
e
v
e
l 
Purchasers and suppliers Long-term commitment by 
purchasers 
Heightened communication, 
greater willingness of suppliers 
to invest and raise productivity 
Investors and producers Long-term commitment by 
investors – a product of 
investors having large 
ownership stakes and means of 
effectively influencing producer 
decision-making. 
Extended time horizons for 
producers 
Competing firms Industry trade associations, 
government incentives 
Quicker agreement on R&D 
standards, greater 
investment in R&D and 
employee training, 
assistance with financing, 
technology diffusion, design, 
accounting, marketing, etc.  
M
ic
ro
 l
e
v
e
l 
Labour and management Long-term commitment by 
employers (employment 
guarantee) 
Greater willingness on the part 
of employees to share valuable 
knowledge, accept 
productivity-enhancing 
technology, and upgrade skills 
Workers Employee participation in 
decision-making combined with 
team production and/or revenue 
sharing 
Greater work effort 
Functional divisions within 
firms 
Unified teams that link the 
various departments along the 
production chain 
Quicker, more effective 
transition from R&D to 
production 
Source: Kenworthy, 1995. 
The focus shown in the table above resonates with the definition of coopetition as used in this 
dissertation, namely cooperation between competitors. 
1.9.4 Coopetition as cooperation with competitors 
There are two dominant views of coopetition, namely coopetition as a competition for the total 
value (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996) versus a much narrower view, namely “a situation where 
competitors simultaneously cooperate and compete with each other” (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; 
Walley, 2007; Gnyawali & Park, 2011). This dissertation uses the second definition.  
A different way of explaining the focus of this dissertation is through the typology (Table 1.4) 
presented by Dowling, Roering, Carlin and Wisniewski (1996: 156). The study is focused on 
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horizontal relationships between firms that compete and cooperate simultaneously, i.e. the words 
in bold in Table 1.4.  
Table 1.4: A typology of inter-organisational relationships 
D
ir
e
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
R
e
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
  
  
V
e
rt
ic
a
l 
Arm’s length exchange 
Vertical multi-faceted 
relationships 
Alliances between buyers 
and suppliers 
H
o
ri
z
o
n
ta
l 
Traditional competitive 
markets 
Horizontal multi-faceted 
relationships 
Alliances between non-
competitors 
 Competition Coopetition Cooperation 
Source: Dowling et al., 1996: 156. 
The horizontal axis in Table 1.4 positions coopetition between collaboration and competition. The 
vertical axis allows the delimitation to exclude vertical coopetition, i.e. coopetition with suppliers 
and customers. Chapter 2 deals with this aspect in more depth. 
1.9.5 Intentional collaboration 
Earlier in this dissertation, environmental coopetition was defined as a situation where competitors 
collaborate to reduce environmental impact and/or create environmental value. Environmental 
coopetition is therefore a deliberate strategy, and involves a conscious decision to seek the 
creation of socio-environmental value.  
Bengtsson and Kock (2000: 419) provided an example of coopetition in the Swedish brewery 
industry in which the socio-economic benefit is unintentional. The breweries coordinated the flow of 
empty bottles, which resulted in socio-environmental value, i.e. a reduction in waste and 
emissions. The initial objective was to save costs, and the socio-environmental value component 
was therefore an externality.  
An example of a deliberate environmental value can be found in the work of Orsato (2009:14) 
around non-competitive sustainability strategies. Tetrapak collaborated with the rest of the plastics 
packaging industry in Brazil to establish a plastics recycling industry. The recycled plastic did not 
return directly to Tetrapak, meaning that there is very little direct economic benefit. In this case, the 
socio-environmental benefit was intentional, but provided a common economic benefit to the 
coopetitors in the form of reputation protection.  
These two examples provide evidence that socio-environmental value may be intentional in some 
instances, but on the other hand, it may just be an unintended consequence. In cases where the 
socio-environmental value is an unintentional consequence, there is a benefit in making managers 
aware of it as it could lead to increased common, private and socio-environmental value. The 
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conceptual model and coopetition value matrix presented in this dissertation provide the necessary 
language and illustration to facilitate such awareness. 
1.9.6 Value creation and appropriation 
The initial focus of the study was much wider, but ultimately the study narrowed down to focus on 
the creation and appropriation of value, particularly in cases of environmental initiatives. Aspects 
that were excluded from the study were in-depth exploration of drivers, success factors and 
barriers (to name a few). 
1.9.7 Dyadic vs. multi-actor 
The study was not limited in terms of scope as far as the number of participants in environmental 
coopetition initiatives is concerned. 
1.9.8 Centralised vs. decentralised 
The study deliberately allowed flexibility in the forms of environmental coopetition and therefore did 
not discriminate against cases based on the locus of control. For instance, an initiative like the 
Biodiversity & Wine Initiative (BWI) is externally controlled, while the case of Reyneke Wines 
presented a coopetition initiative that is run by the coopetitors. 
1.9.9 Collusion 
This study avoided instances of collusive behaviour. The methodology does not lend itself to secret 
initiatives but rather relies on the willingness of partners to share their experiences. 
1.9.10 Environmental initiatives 
This study intentionally focused on coopetition with a deliberate environmental aspect to it. This 
was intentional for two reasons. Firstly, the researcher has a background in environmental projects 
and therefore wished to investigate such initiatives specifically. Secondly, the researcher believed 
that environmental coopetition initiatives would exhibit a richer range of value-types than generic 
coopetition or just projects focusing on, for instance, socio-economic upliftment. 
1.9.11 Qualitative vs. quantitative 
Although the study defines different types of value and describes such value, it made no attempt to 
quantify such value in monetary terms. As with any valuation of eco-services or environmental 
benefit, the public benefit component is very difficult to quantify (Kula & Evans, 2011). The 
valuation of ecosystem services is a whole field of study on its own, and would certainly not have 
been feasible as part of the current dissertation.  
Instead the dissertation approached the concept of value and value dynamics from a qualitative 
perspective. 
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1.9.12 Game theory 
Although many studies of coopetition make use of game theory, this dissertation did not put much 
focus on this aspect of coopetition. Once again, the study was less interested in a particular Nash-
equilibrium than in what types of value had been created and what dynamics had led to the 
creation of value. 
1.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided an orientation to the topic of environmental coopetition, the research 
questions and the significance of the study.  
The researcher defined environmental coopetition in this dissertation as the action of competitors 
to cooperate to reduce environmental impact and/or create environmental value. 
The chapter also provided an overview of the terminology used in the study. This consisted of 
providing the definitions to some terms, and in cases where there are multiple definitions, provided 
the preferred definition that was used in the study. One example is the definition of coopetition, for 
which the narrower definition was used, i.e. that coopetition refers to cooperation between 
competing firms.  
Lastly, the chapter delimited the dissertation in terms of its empirical scope and its method. In 
essence, the study set out to investigate the types and dynamics of value that are created in 
environmental coopetition in the South African wine industry. 
Figure 1.4 shows the key terms (shaded blocks) that were briefly introduced and defined in this 
chapter. The diagram also provides a visual delimitation of the broad topics that relate to the 
theory. The wine industry provided the context to study the empirical manifestation of the extant 
and the proposed theory.  
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Figure 1.4: Key terms from Chapter 1 
1.11 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides an overview of extant coopetition literature, particularly with 
regard to the creation and appropriation of value. The chapter suggests the refinement of the 
terminology that is used for the appropriation of value. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of some underlying theory that is relevant to a discussion of value 
creation and appropriation in environmental coopetition initiatives. Particularly, the introduction of 
stakeholder theory in the appropriation view, and socio-environmental value in the value creation 
view are of particular importance. 
Chapter 4 introduces a conceptual model and the coopetition value matrix (CVM). The CVM 
provides a combined view of value creation and value appropriation. 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the underlying research philosophy and the research design. 
The discussion of the research design includes an overview of the data selection, collection and 
analysis methods. The study was aimed at shifting consensus rather than building consensus, and 
therefore could rely on a qualitative investigation of multiple case studies. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
23 
Chapter 6 focuses on the findings that relate to the first research question (RQ1), namely what 
types of value do companies create and appropriate in environmental coopetition. The chapter 
provides a case-by-case overview, and populates the CVM in each of the cases. The result is a 
rich overview of the types of value that can be created and appropriated in environmental 
coopetition cases. 
Chapter 7 builds forth on Chapter 6 by investigating the dynamics that lead to the creation of value. 
The chapter hence identifies many different dynamics for each type of value, but also provides 
higher level generic types of dynamics; it therefore answers RQ2. 
The last chapter, Chapter 8, provides the conclusion, an overview of the contribution, an overview 
of the theoretical and managerial implications, as well as some limitations of the study as precursor 
to suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF COOPETITION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the existing literature surrounding coopetition. Amongst other themes, the 
chapter deals with the definition of coopetition, how value is created and appropriated in 
coopetition relationships, as well as antecedents for, and barriers preventing, successful 
coopetition. The author opted for a critical literature review rather than a systematic (Tranfield, 
Denyer, Smart, 2003) literature review. The literature review therefore focused its attention on 
concepts, gaps, controversies and blind spots.  
2.2 THE ORIGINS OF COOPETITION  
The term coopetition is a portmanteau of cooperation and competition and describes the practice 
of cooperative competition, i.e. when competitors cooperate. Although coopetition literature 
between 1995 and 2010 (Dowling et al., 1996, Bagshaw & Bagshaw, 2001; Dagnino & Padula, 
2002; Luo, 2005) often report Raymond Noorda, CEO of Novell in the 1980s, as the source of the 
word, more recent literature traces the first official documentation to Cherington (1913: 144), who 
in turn referred to a sales manual from 1911 for a sales force of the Sealshipt Oyster Company by 
Kirk Pickett: 
You are only one of several dealers selling our oysters in your city. But you are not in 
competition with one another. You are co-operating with one another to develop more 
business for each of you. You are in co-opetition, not in competition. What competition 
there is, is of the kind that you all can fight to common advantage. The oyster sold from 
the wooden tub is your only competition. Remember – co-opetition, not competition 
between Sealshipt dealers (Pickett in Cherington, 1913: 144).  
Although it may not have been called coopetition, collaboration between competitors is not a new 
phenomenon at all. In fact, evidence of coopetition can be found in early Roman maritime trading 
practices.  Roman merchants collaborated with competing traders by dividing their cargo between 
the different ships sailing along particular routes. In this way, traders protected themselves against 
losing a whole cargo if one ship sunk or was attacked by pirates, without incurring any additional 
costs (Benjamin & Le Roy, 2014). The example illustrates coopetition as a risk management and 
cost reduction strategy in one industry. Coopetition does not only hold benefits for a single 
industry, but can hold benefits at the national economic level.  
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2.3 COOPETITION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Economists and policymakers have traditionally viewed competition as the driver of economic 
success (Kenworthy, 1995: 154). Sceptics of this view have proposed alternative explanations for 
conditions for economic success, such as government intervention, financial systems, and culture. 
Yet, few of these provide robust evidence beyond a handful of cases (ibid.). 
Kenworthy (1995: 186) provided an alternative hypothesis and presented evidence that economies 
that encourage cooperation perform better. Kenworthy (ibid.) considered cooperation at the three 
levels mentioned earlier, namely: (i) macro (inter-industry); (ii) meso (intra-industry or inter-
company); and (iii) micro level (intra-company).  
Examples of cooperation would include long term, close relationships between banks and the firms 
they finance, industry bodies, worker unions, as well as coordination between the latter two. 
Kenworthy’s scores were based on the prevalence of such bodies and the extent of coordination. 
German businesses, for instance, are organised in strong trade associations that facilitate 
cooperative activities such as joint R&D and large-scale apprenticeship programmes (ibid.). Japan 
scores the highest on Kenworthy’s measurement for its high levels of cooperation between and 
within various business institutions; a phenomenon that is also discussed in other bodies of 
literature (see for instance Dagnino & Padula, 2002; Dyer et al., 2008; Knoben & Oerlemans, 
2006). 
Of particular interest in Kenworthy’s study is the link of coopetition with productivity growth 
(see Table 2.1). The meso-level variable represents inter-firm cooperation and is therefore of 
particular interest in this dissertation. Although the adjusted R2 of the model is somewhat lower in 
the 1974-1990 period (0.66) than in the full period of his enquiry (i.e. an R2 of 0.81 in the period 
1960-1990), the meso-level coefficient is stronger in this (1974-1990) period, implying that growth 
in productivity can largely be explained by cooperation between firms.  
Table 2.1: Regression results for macro, meso and micro-level cooperation (1974-1990) 
 Productivity growth Misery index 
Macro-level cooperation -0.41* -0.62* 
Meso-level cooperation 
(i.e. cooperation between purchasers and suppliers, 
between investors and producers, and between competing 
firms) 
0.63** 0.76** 
Micro-level cooperation 0.22 -0.74** 
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.50 
N  17.00 16.00 
(* 10% leveI; ** 5% level) 
Source: Kenworthy, 1995: 186. 
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This implies that nations that create institutions to stimulate inter-company collaboration, 
experience stronger productivity growth, which in turn make an economy more competitive. What 
is interesting though and remains unexplained in Kenworthy’s study is the positive link of meso-
level coopetition with unemployment and inflation (commonly referred to as the misery index). 
2.4 THE BROAD AND NARROW VIEWS OF COOPETITION 
Kenworthy (1995) provided a convenient introduction to coopetition, although he did not use the 
term itself. In fact, coopetition is not universally accepted as a legitimate field of study, and most 
opponents question claims that coopetition requires different skills than the sum of the skills 
required for competition and collaboration. Using different definitions of coopetition may hamper 
coopetition research (Minà & Dagnino, 2016). It is therefore important to be clear about the 
definition used in this dissertation. The coopetition body of knowledge is currently dominated by 
two definitions. 
2.4.1 The broad definition 
The idea of meso-level cooperation as Kenworthy used it, is akin to the initial wide definition of 
coopetition as presented by by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
(1996) described coopetition in the context of game theory, putting forward that collaborating with 
stakeholders (rather than just competitors) could create more value for companies than if they 
were to work in isolation. In this wider view, they included customers, complementors (those 
companies that make your product more attractive), competitors, and suppliers. This was done 
because these stakeholders compete for value (see Figure 1.1). Some of the most important and 
influential works in the coopetition literature have taken similar views of coopetition (see for 
instance Dagnino & Padula, 2002: 5). 
 
Figure 2.1: Brandenburger & Nalebuff’s value net 
Source: Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996: 17. 
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2.4.1 The narrow definition 
Subsequent to the early and broader definition, some authors (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Walley, 
2007: 11; Gnyawali & Park, 2011) have described coopetition as the practice among competing 
firms to cooperate and compete at the same time. This is a much narrower definition than the 
earlier definition proposed by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). This dissertation subscribes to 
the narrower definition. 
Ironically, the seminal proponents of the narrow definition, Bengtsson and Kock (1999; 2000), in 
recent years (2014) made a call to once again broaden the definition. Their defence of the older 
(and broader) definition rests on the view that the business world is becoming increasingly 
networked so that it is no longer strange that your competitor is also a supplier, a customer, or a 
partner in a joint venture.  
2.5 DISAGGREGATING THE BROAD DEFINITION 
At a methodological level, the narrower Bengtsson and Kock (1999; 2000) definition delimits this 
study to a phenomenon with different dynamics than the other relationships mentioned in the 
broader definition of Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) used game theory to show how companies can increase the 
value pie by collaborating with the various stakeholders shown in Figure 2.1. From such a 
perspective, these stakeholders represent a homogeneous group.  As strategy literature shifted, 
however, the focus shifted to the heterogeneous nature of the different players and to the resultant 
differences in the relationships.  
2.5.1 Collaboration with competitors 
Collaboration with competitors is very much different to collaborating with other stakeholders 
(Ritala, 2009). Competitors face similar problems in the market, while they are likely to depend on 
similar resources to address such problems (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Pellegrin-
Boucher, Le Roy & Gurau, 2013). When competitors collaborate, they gain a lot from learning from 
each other, while the knowledge they gain is highly relevant for each other (Park et al., 2014).  
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm provides some insight as to why coopetition may 
benefit competitors. Under the RBV, it is assumed that firms are heterogeneous in terms of their 
respective resource profiles and that such resources are not perfectly mobile between firms 
(Barney, 1991). When competing firms cooperate, firms are able to combine idiosyncratic, as well 
as complementary strengths to gain strategic value (Ritala & Tidström, 2014). Such value can stem 
from many sources, including, access to an expanded sales team, greater investment in R&D, 
greater employee training, quicker agreement on standards, reduced costs and reduced risk, 
assistance with financing, and technology diffusion (Lavie, 2007: 1192; Kenworthy, 1995; 
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Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2013). This dynamic is very different from the 
value creation taking place with customers, with suppliers and with complementors. 
2.5.2 Collaboration with customers 
Authors such as Hart (2007) and Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004) described collaboration with 
customers as the “co-creation of value”. Where customers may previously have been considered 
only as the “target” of a product or service, firms increasingly realise the value that can be created 
by collaborating with customers. Simultaneously, social media has enabled a level of interaction 
between firms and customers that would previously have been impossible. Further, more informed 
consumers that are unhappy with the choice in the market are increasingly exerting pressure on all 
aspects of business to co-create what they want. However, what should be clear is that the 
dynamics of the relationship is somewhat different. 
2.5.3 Collaboration with suppliers 
Collaboration with suppliers (vertical collaboration) is often described as “supply chain 
collaboration”. An extensive body of literature exists to address the dynamics and benefits of 
supply chain collaboration (see for example Donada, 2002). Strong relationships with suppliers can 
be a sustainable source of a competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 1998), but competitors can 
learn more from each other when they cooperate than what they can learn from their suppliers. 
2.5.4 Collaboration with complementors  
Collaboration with complementors in turn has developed into a separate field of study (Habets, 
2008), but seems to have lost claim to the term coopetition. Firms often collaborate with 
complementors in alliances. Alliances are closer to cooperation than to competition (Rusko, 
2011: 312), but is not considered synonymous with coopetition due to the presence of competition 
in coopetitive relationships (ibid.). 
2.6 INTERACTION OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 
Coopetition is a dynamic interaction (Bengtsson, Eriksson & Wincent, 2010). Different 
combinations of strong and weak cooperation and competition are possible. Lindström and Polsa 
(2015: 3) distinguished between intercompany relationships as cooperation dominated, competition 
dominated, or as balanced coopetition. It is important to understand how value is created and 
distributed, as this impacts on the stability of the coopetition relationship (Das & Teng, 2000: 94; 
Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Janssen et al., 2013). 
2.6.1  Dynamics of competition and power 
The dynamics of competition are important for firms at two levels. Firstly, the value aspect of 
competition often involves the negotiation (Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005)  for the biggest share of 
the common benefits that may emanate from a coopetition initiative. It is important for firms to 
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understand how they can capture the most value from coopetition (Dyer et al., 2008). Negotiation 
power is ultimately one of the biggest determinants of the gain a company can make in negotiation 
dynamics (Kim, et al., 2005: 799). Power is classically defined as the probability that a person can 
carry out their will despite resistance (Weber, 1947).  
Kim et al. (2005) decouples power into four components, i.e.  
i)   Potential power as the capacity of a partner to obtain benefits, 
ii)   Perceived power as the assessment of partners of the other parties’ potential power, 
iii) Power tactics, i.e. behaviours aimed at changing the power relationship, and lastly 
iv) Realized power, i.e. the extent to which a party has claimed benefits. 
 
French and Raven (1959) suggest that there are five bases of power. The argue that A’s power 
over B is determine by:  
i) Reward power: how much B can be rewarded and to what extent B believes A controls 
these rewards, 
ii) Coercive power: A can punish B, and the extent to which B believes the punishment can be 
avoided by complying with the wishes of A, 
iii) Expert power: A function of B’s perception that B possesses some special knowledge or 
expertise, 
iv) Legitimate power: A function of how mush B believes that A has lawful authority to 
influence B, and lastly 
v) Referent power: A function of how attracted B is to A and, thus, how much A can influence 
B’s feelings of personal acceptance, approval and self-esteem. 
The points made by French and Raven resonates with coopetition and alliance literature. For 
instance, firms that bring more resources to an initiative is able to realise more gains (Dyer et al., 
2008). Bringing more resources of any kind to an cooperative agreement provides power to such a 
partner in the form of expert power (if the currency is knowledge) or legitimate power.  
Some of the heterogeneous factors that may impact the ability of firms to compete include 
technical know-how, reputation brand awareness and the ability of managers to cooperate 
(Chamberlin, 1933).  
The literature surrounding competition is vast, and much of it falls outside of the scope of this 
dissertation (see Table 4.1). This area has, however, been flagged for further research at the end 
of the study. 
2.6.2  Weak versus strong coopetition 
Secondly, the intensity of the competition in the market may determine whether companies are 
willing to collaborate with their competitors at all (Ritala, 2009; 2012).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
30 
By classifying cooperation and competition as either strong or weak, Czakon, Mucha-Kus and 
Rogalski (2014: 131) distinguished between four different mixes of the opposing forces. Effectively 
these authors split balanced coopetition into four separate classifications based on how strong the 
two actions are (Figure 2.2). Park et al. (2014: 214) used a similar table to the Czakon et al. (2014) 
study when elaborating on the importance of balance in coopetition relationships. Park et al. (2014) 
maintained that a balance of strong competition and cooperation (also referred to as high-intensity 
coopetition or as syncretic1 rent-seeking behaviour (Lado et al., 1997), allows for maximum 
common benefits (i.e. available to all partners), while maintaining the possibility to capture private 
benefits (i.e. the benefits captured by a specific firm). 
The relevance of this typology is to provide a theoretical focus to the context of this study. The 
South African wine industry is highly fragmented. A theme that emerges often is that wine 
producers do not perceive one another as competitors (more will be said about this in the findings 
section). It is therefore likely that the coopetition would either be cooperation dominated (in cases 
where the cooperation is strong) or of low intensity (if the cooperation is weak). The grey area in 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the two likely positions.  
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coopetition
Competition
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Figure 2.2: Matrix showing relationships between cooperation and competition 
Lindström and Polsa, 2015: 3; Czakon et al., 2014: 131. 
It is important to note that coopetition may develop or deteriorate over time. As companies 
collaborate, they build trust and a skill for cooperation, which in turn may lead to more cooperation. 
                                               
1 The word ‘syncretic’ refers to an attempt to reconcile different systems of belief or philosophy. In the case 
of coopetition, companies need to reconcile competitive and collaborative strategies. The first instance of the 
use of the word in coopetition literature was in Lado, et al. (1997: 110). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
31 
A loss of trust, on the other hand can lead to reduced productivity, cooperation and performance 
and therefore destroy value creation efforts (Abosag, Yen, & Barnes. 2016: 3). Coopetition 
relationships can therefore be viewed as longitudinally dynamic over the long term (as illustrated 
by Ritala & Tidström, 2014: 500). 
2.7 THE CONTINUUM OF COOPETITION ACTIVITIES 
2.7.1 Common activities for cooperation 
Kenworthy (1995: 164) identified three key areas in which competitors often collaborate, namely: 
(i) standard setting; (ii) R&D; and (iii) worker training.  
Although one can identify a much broader spectrum of activities (see Dagnino & Padula, 2002: 32; 
Zhang & Frazier, 2011; Kenworthy, 1995; Dorn et al., 2016: 2; Dagnino & Padula, 2002: 32; Zhang 
& Frazier, 2011; Kenworthy, 1995; Dorn et al., 2016: 2.), Kenworthy’s discussion provides valuable 
insights into the contextual differences and subsequent drivers. 
2.7.1.1 Standard setting 
Industries typically collaborate in terms of standard setting, an activity which can be classified as 
an upstream activity (Walley, 2007). ‘Upstream’ implies that the activity is far from the end-
consumer, and that the end consumer may not be aware of the activity.  
Standards level the playing field by setting a lowest common denominator of expectations, for 
instance the performance of a product. Without it, an industry can remain disjointed and 
haphazard, causing a reduction in productivity and lower consumer satisfaction. Of course there is 
the chance that one firm may win the standard at the expense of competitors, but the potential 
upside often does not justify the risk (Kenworthy, 1995: 164; Ritala, 2012: 318)).   
2.7.1.2 Research and development 
There are a number of reasons why R&D is a popular aspect for competitors to collaborate on. 
Firstly, companies often have to invest substantial capital in R&D, with little guarantee that it would 
yield results in terms of sales or profits Ritala, 2012: 318).  
Secondly, two companies may be duplicating similar research, leading to a waste of resources.  
Thirdly, the products of research can often be copied by competitors without the associated time 
and cost (i.e. free riders). There is therefore a disincentive to do R&D, and an incentive to rather 
copy ideas from competitors once they have done the investment in R&D. This generally leads to 
an industry-wide underinvestment in innovation (Kenworthy, 1995: 164).  
The issues raised above increase the risk associated with R&D substantially. By collaborating with 
competitors, companies share the cost of R&D, and also somewhat reduce the risk of free riders. 
Joint R&D can correct the underinvestment, lead to further knowledge sharing, a reduction in 
wasteful duplication, and decrease the cost of duplication by competitors (ibid.: 164). 
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2.7.1.3 Worker training 
Worker training provides a third example of an instance where it is beneficial for companies to 
invest collectively in upstream activities in order to reduce risk. When companies invest in training 
employees, they inevitably run the risk of the employees leaving the company or that they may be 
poached. The benefits of training are also difficult to predict.  
A training consortium can help industries to pool resources and upskill employees for the industry. 
Another strategy is to levy a training tax, which employers can spend on training, or allocate it to a 
public training fund (ibid.: 165). 
2.7.1.4 Other 
In addition to the above three areas of cooperation, consortiums of firms can also collaborate with 
regards to financing, technology diffusion, design, accounting, marketing, and export promotion. 
Such collaboration is particularly beneficial for smaller firms (ibid.: 166). 
2.7.2 The distance of activities from the consumer 
Distance of activities to the customer is a concept that comes up repeatedly in coopetition theory 
(Putnam, 1993; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). When one considers the variety of activities that 
competitors can cooperate on, it makes sense to consider these as activities on a continuum 
representing the distance from the consumer. Distance to the consumer refers to how visible the 
cooperative activity is to consumers, and therefore how much that activity can be used to 
differentiate the entity. Another way of thinking about distance from consumers is in terms of 
upstream (Walley, 2007: 17) or input (Lindström & Polsa, 2015: 1) activities that are far from 
consumers, as opposed to downstream (Walley, 2007: 17) or output (Lindström & Polsa, 2015: 1) 
activities that are more visible to customers. Table 2.2 provides a perspective on opportunities for 
coopetition in firms. 
Coopetition can happen at any distance from consumers (Lindström & Polsa, 2015; Rusko, 2011). 
Yet, historically a dominant view in coopetition literature is that, while competition happens close to 
consumers, collaboration happens far from consumers on aspects that clients are indifferent about 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000: 418; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Orsato, 2009: 16). Some authors have moved 
further than observing a pattern, and have lifted distance from consumers as a pre-condition for 
collaboration (Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013: 2). The reason for avoiding cooperation close to 
consumers is that these activities provide the most opportunity for differentiation from competitors.  
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Table 2.2: Activities categorised according to the input/output continuum 
 Interaction continuum 
Activities Cooperation 
dominated 
Balanced Competition 
dominated 
Input (far from the 
customer) 
Wholesale 
arrangements a 
Access to products and 
licences a 
Planning meetings 
(formal & informal) a 
R&D b, c 
Training of staff b 
Standards b, d 
Design d 
Manufacturing d  
Raw materials 
procurement e 
  
Output (close to the 
customer) 
Marketing campaigns a 
Branding a, e 
Joint customers a 
Delivery service a 
Distribution d, e 
Sales activities a Local services a 
Delivery of marketing 
campaigns a 
Pricing a 
Distribution c 
Source: aLindström & Polsa, 2015: 6; bKenworthy, 1995; cWalley, 2007, dDagnino & Padula, 
2002: 19; e Rusko, 2011. 
More recent literature (specifically Lindström & Polsa, 2015: 6) presents instances of cooperation 
closer to consumers, for instance in joint marketing campaigns, branding, joint customers and 
delivery services. Where activities happen in the supply chain is of particular interest in this study 
as the distance to the consumer seems to play an important role in the creation and appropriation 
of value. 
2.8 COLLUSION 
There is a general lack in research dealing with the distinction between coopetition and collusion 
(Czakon et al., 2016). Collusion is an agreement between two or more parties, sometimes illegal 
and therefore secretive, to limit open competition by deceiving, misleading, or defrauding others of 
their legal rights, or to obtain an objective forbidden by law, typically by defrauding or gaining an 
unfair market advantage. Generally, collusion limits competition, and hence would limit innovation 
and the positive aspects of competition.  
Collusion is an agreement among firms or individuals to divide a market, set prices, limit production 
or limit opportunities (Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003: 171). Typically, collusion involves lesser 
collaboration than coopetition (Rusko, 2011: 312). Collusion happens at a superficial level of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
34 
cooperation; it involves exchange of information, but involves very little knowledge exchange 
between cartel members.  
 
Figure 2.3: Typical relationships between the strategic alliance, coopetition and collusion 
Source: Rusko, 2011: 312. 
Collusion often happens downstream (as firms compete close to consumers) and violates 
legislation governing competition (Walley, 2007: 16). Notwithstanding, companies can also collude 
in upstream activities (Rusko, 2011: 312). 
Pressey et al. (2014) argued that collusion should be included in the definition of coopetition, 
hinting that one should not see the two as separate. As long as cartels do not completely eliminate 
competition, it should be seen as coopetition (Pressey & Vanharanta, 2016: 4).  
Practically one can view the coopetition and collusion as respectively the virtuous and non-virtuous 
sides of the same phenomenon. Walley (2007: 16) argued that the two should be considered 
separate and that coopetition implies that companies collaborate for not only for their own benefit, 
but also for the benefit of the consumer. Such collaboration creates ‘win-win-win’ situations. On the 
other hand, when the consumer is penalised in any way, then collusion is occurring (Walley, 2007: 
16). Lado et al. (1997) argued that such syncretic rent-seeking behaviour (i.e. coopetition) is far 
from competition destroying collusion, but instead enhances competitiveness in a market through 
innovation and cost reductions beyond what competition can provide. 
Pressey et al. (2014) made a further distinction between shadow and dark collusive networks. 
They identified a number of continuums along which the characteristics of collusive networks can 
be distributed (Figure 2.3).  
In the case of collusion, there is a need for concealment. Members of cartels often have a trade-off 
between secrecy and efficiency of the cartel (Pressey et al., 2014: 10). Although there is often the 
call for distance from the consumer in the case of coopetition, concealment and distance from the 
consumer is not synonymous. Table 2.3 provides some clarity of how collusion differs from generic 
coopetition and environmental coopetition. 
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Figure 2.4: Shadow vs. dark networks 
Source: Pressey et al., 2014: 11. 
The form of cooperation may dictate the kind of knowledge that is transferred. In the case of 
collusion, the form of knowledge is often of the explicit kind, for instance data (or information) about 
prices, production numbers or market share. In contrast, virtuous coopetition like joint R&D 
programmes may lead to a considerable transfer of tacit knowledge. This provides some credence 
to Rusko’s (2011: 312) view that collusion lies closer to competition than to collaboration. Due to 
intense competition, companies in collusion do not wish to transfer any tacit knowledge, but in the 
process forfeit the opportunity to gain such knowledge. It is evident that trust is low in such cases. 
In collusion, the underlying paradigm is win-lose as reflected in the fact that competitors operate 
from an assumption that they would lose sales or money if the market is allowed to operate freely. 
Instead, the members of the cartel agree to limit competition in order to protect their market. 
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Table 2.3: Contrasting collusion with coopetition 
 Collusion  
(Non-virtuous coopetition) 
Coopetition  
(Virtuous) 
Environmental 
coopetition 
Visibility Information sharing about 
prices, production, market 
share etc. (Pressey et al., 
2014) 
Deliberately concealed, 
typically upstream (i.e. 
removed from customer), 
but can also be downstream 
(Rusko, 2011: 311)  
Cooperate in product 
design, manufacturing or 
distribution and the 
definition of new standards 
(Dagnino & Padula, 2002: 
19) 
Removed from customer, 
although not necessarily 
deliberately so. 
Often upstream (Bengtsson 
& Kock, 2000; Walley, 2007: 
16-17), but can be 
upstream, midstream and 
downstream (Rusko, 2011)  
Sometimes removed from 
customer, but often 
deliberately close to 
customer 
Impact on 
competition 
Competition is completely 
absent (Pressey & 
Vanharanta, 2016) or 
reduced (Walley, 2007: 16) 
Increases competition, or at 
least does not reduce 
competition. 
Increases competition, or at 
least does not reduce 
competition. 
Impact on the 
consumer  
Consumer is penalised 
(Walley, 2007: 16; Dima, 
2010: 218; McEachern, 
2013: 225) 
Benefits the consumer 
(Walley, 2007: 16) 
Benefits the consumer 
Legal status Illegal Legal Legal 
Value creation Creates value for cartel 
members by manipulating 
prices through limited 
production, fixing prices and 
controlling market share. 
However, cartels destroy 
value for larger society. 
(Walley, 2007: 16; Dima, 
2010: 218; McEachern, 
2013: 225) 
Creates value for partners 
Creates value for 
consumers (Walley, 2007) 
The aim is not necessarily 
to create value for society.  
Deliberate attempt to create 
value for society 
The aim is not necessarily 
to create value for the 
collaborating parties. 
Nature of 
knowledge 
sharing 
Explicit Explicit or tacit Explicit or tacit 
Trust Low Medium to high Medium to high 
Source: Researcher. 
Cartels are more likely to be formed in industries with few sellers (ten or fewer firms), or in 
industries where most of the sales are accounted for by only a few sellers (Pressey et al., 2014: 4). 
This dissertation was conducted in the wine industry of South Africa, an industry that is highly 
fragmented between a large number of players. The dissertation intentionally only studied 
examples of coopetition that created socio-environmental value, which by definition excluded 
collusion. In this sense the wine industry was a sensible choice. 
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2.9 VALUE CREATION FROM COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 
The practice of coopetition creates more value than competition or collaboration on its own could 
(Lado et al., 1997: 118; Ritala & Tidström, 2014). Competition, in the absence of collaboration, 
generates economic efficiency through the efficient allocation of resources (Lado et al., 1997: 110; 
Kenworthy, 1995), by encouraging innovation (Walley, 2007; Schumpeter, 1934), and by providing 
price signals that reduce transaction costs (Jones & Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1985).   
Yet, Kenworthy (1995) challenged the traditional view of competition as the sole driver of economic 
growth and innovation. Instead, he argued that the key to economic success lies in combining 
competition and cooperation. Lado et al. (1997) also argued that there is value in moving beyond 
competition as a zero-sum game towards cooperation. 
But the movement should not be too far towards cooperation. Cooperation without competition has 
been criticised for only providing incremental progress (De Bruijn & Tukker, 2002). It is the threat of 
conflict that encourages dialogue and engagement (Hartman, Hofman & Stafford, 2002) and thus 
enhances performance (Raza-Ullah, Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). Paradoxically, a big driver for 
cooperation between competitors is competition itself, an argument that is closely related to the 
earlier argument about high-intensity coopetition. Increased competition forces companies to 
improve their performance and market attractiveness (Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 2013).  
In essence, the value or benefit created in collaboration relationships has been described as 
relational rent (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 662) or relational value, i.e.:  
a supernormal profit jointly generated in an exchange relationship that cannot be 
generated by a firm in isolation and can only be generated through the joint 
idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance partners.  
As with this quote, most literature dealing with value creation in the strategic management field 
seems to deal with economic value only (Harrison & Wicks, 2013: 98). Sometimes the economic 
benefit may be referred to as financial value (Dorn et al., 2016: 2). The narrowing of the construct 
of value to economic/financial value has been criticised (Hausman & McPherson, 2006) as it could 
obscure aspects of value that extend beyond profit and economic return (Harrison & Wicks, 2013).  
In addition to economic value, Dagnino and Padula (2002: 32) elaborated on the work of 
Kenworthy (1995) to show that coopetitive relationships also generate knowledge value (see 
Table 2.4). Knowledge value is arguably less tangible than economic value.  Dagnino and Padula 
(2002: 18) described knowledge value as the growth in inter-firm knowledge, while they defined 
economic value as the added value due to “inter-firm cost reduction or revenue increase that the 
coopetitive framework may confer” (ibid, 2002: 19). A number of authors (Bowman & Ambrosini, 
2000; Brandenburger & Stuart, 1996) defined economic value as the willingness to pay (of a firm’s 
consumers) minus opportunity cost (of its suppliers). The firm may not charge the full amount that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
38 
a consumer is willing to pay, so some of the created economic value is not realised for the firm, but 
is rather captured by the consumer as consumer surplus.  
Lower risk translates to lower costs (Kendall & Willard, 2015: 11) and is therefore considered as an 
economic benefit. Table 2.4 illustrates the view of Dagnino and Padula (2002: 18) of coopetition as 
value-creation at different levels and with different intentions, i.e. to create knowledge or economic 
value. As pointed out before, this dissertation follows in the example of a number of authors 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Walley, 2007; Gnyawali & Park, 2011) by focusing on the meso-level 
(the darker shaded area in Table 2.4) only, and further on the relationship between competing 
firms only (shown in bold). 
Table 2.4: A matrix representation of coopetition levels for value creation 
  Coopeting actors Knowledge value Economic value 
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Clusters of firms  
 
Firms across industries  
Communication and 
information flows  
Inter-industry new knowledge 
creation and transfer  
Reduced aggressive and 
suboptimal rent-seeking  
Profit and fund sharing 
arrangements  
M
e
s
o
 
 
Firms in an industry  
(horizontal relations)  
 
Purchasers and suppliers  
(vertical relations)  
Intra-industry new 
knowledge creation and 
transfer  
Enhanced capabilities 
Communication and 
information flows  
Co-design  
Co-development  
R&D investment  
Workforce training 
investment  
Quicker agreement on 
standards  
Reduced time-to-market  
Joint R&D joint production  
Supply chain coopetition* 
Enhanced products 
M
ic
ro
 
 
Functions and divisions 
within a firm  
 
Workers in a firm  
Communication and 
information flows  
Intra-firm new knowledge 
creation and transfer  
Greater incentive and 
commitment to work (hard) 
and create knowledge  
Quicker and more effective 
transition from R&D to 
production (e.g., from 60 to 
46 months)  
Heightened productivity 
through commitment  
Source: Dagnino & Padula, 2002: 32; Zhang & Frazier, 2011; Kenworthy, 1995; Dorn et al., 
2016: 2. 
Knowledge value is particularly pronounced in innovation-related coopetition such as R&D 
initiatives (Ritala & Hurmalinna-Laukkanen, 2009: 820). In this respect, the common knowledge 
regarding markets and technologies shared by competitors increases the value creation potential 
of coopetition compared to collaboration with non-competitors (Ritala & Hurmalinna-Laukkanen, 
2009: 823). However, the common knowledge base is of more value for incremental innovation 
than for radical innovation (Ritala & Hurmalinna-Laukkanen, 2009: 824).  
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Knowledge value would ultimately translate to economic value as the knowledge becomes applied. 
For this to happen, firms require “know-what” to recognize the value of external knowledge, the 
“know-how” to assimilate the knowledge and the “know-why” in order to apply the knowledge for 
commercial ends (Dagnino & Padula, 2007: 42). The transfer of knowledge value into economic 
value is an example of value dynamics, a phenomenon that will be discussed in more depth in the 
empirical part of the dissertation. 
2.10 VALUE APPROPRIATION IN COOPETITIVE ACTIVITIES 
2.10.1 The paradox of creating and protecting value 
While the resource-based view (RBV) or strategy (Barney, 1991) helps to understand the benefits 
of coopetition, it also hints at one of the biggest risks of coopetition. The RBV states that a 
sustained competitive advantage is only possible if the resources that create the advantage are not 
easily duplicated by competitors (Hart, 1995). But it is likely that a competitor can obtain strategic 
resources (such as knowledge or skills) from the coopetitive interaction (Ritala, 2009; Zhang, Shu, 
Jiang & Malter, 2010). Firms in coopetition therefore have to contend with partners with opposing 
objectives and who also want to win at the other’s expense (Hart, 1995; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014; 
Ritala, 2009; Ritala & Tidström, 2014; Zhang et al., 2010; Soekijad, 2006). The RBV therefore is 
very relevant to both how the pie is baked and how it is distributed. 
 
Figure 2.5: Private and common benefits and alliance stability 
Source: Dyer et al., 2008:146. 
It is important to understand value appropriation in coopetition relationships as it can influence the 
stability of the relationship. Relationships with a high level of common benefits and high level of 
private benefits are regarded as the most stable (see Figure 2.5). Cases where private benefits are 
high, but common benefits are low, are regarded as the least stable (Dyer et al., 2008:146).  
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2.10.2 Semantic clarity of the value appropriation language 
2.10.2.1 Value created equals value appropriated 
The existing literature about value appropriation suffers from at least two points of confusion. The 
first point of confusion stems from the fact that the creation and appropriation of value are 
inseparable from each other (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2014): the increase in the pie is equal to 
the pie that can be divided. For instance, it has been argued that the total beneﬁt that can be 
generated through an alliance can be defined as the sum of common beneﬁts and private beneﬁts 
(Ritala & Tidström, 2014; Dyer et al., 2008). Whereas this definition refers to the generation of 
benefits, common and private benefits denote the appropriation of benefits.  
2.10.2.2 Common benefits 
The second point of confusion relates to the semantic clarity of the definition used for common 
benefits. Common benefits refer to the collective value generated by the collaborating parties 
(Khanna et al., 1998: 194; Janssen et al., 2013: 2; Dyer et al., 2008: 138; Ritala & Tidström, 2014). 
In line with this view Khanna et al. (1998: 194), in one instance, defined common benefits as 
benefits that accrue “collectively to all participants in the alliance (from activities in markets that are 
governed by the alliance)”. But elsewhere Khanna et al. (1998) described common benefits as 
those benefits “that accrue to each partner in an alliance from the collective application of the 
learning that both ﬁrms go through as a consequence of being part of the alliance”.  
The term common benefit is therefore used to describe both the total value available to coopetitors 
(the total value created), as well as the individual component that may accrue to a particular firm 
(a component of the appropriated value).  
The ambiguity implied by the points above creates confusion and hampers the accurate description 
of the appropriation of common value. 
2.10.2.3 Private benefits 
There is less uncertainty about the definition of private benefits. Private beneﬁts are those that a 
firm can capture unilaterally through acquiring knowledge or resources from its partner and 
applying them elsewhere (Khanna et al., 1998; Dyer et al., 2008: 138; Ritala & Tidström, 2014; 
Dagnino & Padula, 2007: 42; Park et al., 2014, Kumar 2010: 32). Private benefits can be 
generated by using  either a positive-sum or zero-sum logic (Rai, 2013). 
2.10.2.4 Privately captured common benefits 
Not much is known about why certain firms manage to capture more of the common value 
(Dyer et al., 2008: 137), and the language of value lacks a handle with which to grip such value 
(to paraphrase Ritala & Tidström, 2014 and Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2014).  
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In the interest of semantic clarity in the theory above, one can define three levels of benefits 
appropriation between coopetitors, namely: (i) common benefits; (ii) privately captured common 
benefits; and (iii) private benefits.  
Table 2.5 provides definitions of the three levels of benefits and provide examples of each. The 
three examples were chosen to illustrate the different types of benefits in different contexts and 
also indicate that different value-related dynamics are possible.   
Table 2.5: A typology of value appropriation 
 
Positive-sum Zero-sum 
Common benefit: Value that is 
generated as a result of the coopetition 
relationship in positive-sum logic 
(Ritala & Tidström, 2014; Park et al., 
2014; Rai, 2013), and accrues 
collectively to the coopetitors in relation 
to some level of contribution in the 
initiative (Janssen et al., 2013: 2). 
When such value is captured by one 
coopetitor, it leads to the second 
classification, namely privately 
captured common benefits. 
1a) The aggregate increase in revenue 
generated by competing luxury hotels from 
joint destination marketing (see Wang, 
2008) aimed at attracting more tourists to 
Cape Town. 
2a) The total cost saving generated from a 
joint logistics network in which competing 
furniture companies use the same 
distribution channel (see Janssen et al., 
2013).  
3a) The total intellectual capital generated 
from joint R&D by auto-manufacturers (e.g. 
Toyota & PSA Peugeot Citroen in their 
research around city transport). 
 
 
Privately captured common benefit: 
Value that accrues to a particular 
coopetitor from the collective value 
generated in the coopetition 
relationship. The process of 
appropriation of value can happen in 
positive-sum or zero-sum logic (Ritala 
& Tidström, 2014).  
2b) The cost reduction enjoyed by a 
furniture company as a result of a joint 
logistics network. The fact that it may 
experience a cost reduction does not 
prevent its competitor(s) from enjoying a 
similar cost reduction.  
3b) The increase in intellectual capital of a 
particular auto manufacturer (e.g. PSA 
Peugeot Citroen) generated from joint 
R&D. What it learns from the initiative does 
not prevent Toyota from also gaining 
knowledge and both may gain the same 
knowledge. 
1b) The revenue accruing to 
a particular luxury hotel in 
Cape Town as a result of 
joint destination marketing 
(with other luxury hotels). 
Each tourist it attracts means 
one less customer for other 
hotels in Cape Town.  
 
Private benefit: Value that a firm can 
capture unilaterally through acquiring 
knowledge or resources from its 
partners and applying it outside the 
boundaries of the coopetition initiative 
(Khanna et al., 1998; Dyer et al., 2008: 
138; Ritala & Tidström, 2014; Dagnino 
& Padula, 2007: 42; Park et al., 2014). 
Such value can be captured in 
differentiating (positive-sum) logic 
(Ritala & Tidström, 2014) or zero-sum 
logic (Rai, 2013). 
2c) The revenue generated by a company 
that sells both furniture and interior design 
products when it uses a joint distribution 
channel with other furniture companies that 
do not sell interior design products.  
3c) The value of intellectual capital that an 
auto company (PSA Peugeot Citroen) can 
apply in its motorcycle plant, while its 
competitor (Toyota) does not operate in 
that market (and is not able to capture such 
value).  
1c) The revenue generated 
by a luxury hotel group that 
is present in Cape Town 
when it is able to refer a 
guest to its branch in Paris 
while at least one of its 
competitors has a branch 
there  
 
Source: Researcher. 
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The first example shows the application of the theory in the luxury hotel industry (1a-c), the second 
is that of a shared logistics network between furniture companies (2a-c), and the third relates to 
joint R&D in the auto industry (3a-c).  
The first two examples illustrate economic value (from respectively increased revenues and 
reduced costs), while the third illustrates knowledge value.  How the value is appropriated to the 
different partners indicates different dynamics based on different contexts.   
The common value (1a-3a) generated can be appropriated in positive-sum logic (2b & 3b) or zero-
sum logic (1b). But in all three examples, it is also possible for private value to be generated 
outside of the coopetition boundaries. In the case of destination marketing, the private value can 
happen through either positive-sum (1ci) or zero-sum logic (1cii). Companies can generate 
positive-sum benefits by generating value outside of the coopetition boundaries. In the case of the 
joint logistics and joint R&D examples, the private benefits (2c & 3c) are based on product-related 
boundaries, while the positive-sum benefit in the case of the luxury hotel group (1ci) is based on 
geographic boundaries. 
The introduction of privately captured common benefits into the terminology of value avoids the 
ambiguity mentioned previously.  The sum of privately captured common benefits would add up to 
the total common benefit. However, this classification also becomes useful as a measure of total 
benefit captured by a firm, i.e. the sum of privately captured common benefit and private benefit for 
a particular firm.  
2.10.3 Capturing common value 
When competing firms collaborate in the conventional paradigm of coopetition, one can postulate 
that the majority, or some of the resultant benefit, can be captured by the collaborating parties. The 
pie therefore increases in size, and most/some of the increase can be captured. For instance, 
when two mobile phone companies share network towers as many are doing in Africa (Font, Datta, 
Reddy & Ghosh, 2009), the required number of towers is halved (assuming the two networks each 
own half of the towers). In this case, both firms know the cost of building a tower, so each can 
calculate the total saving in capex and opex (shared by the collaborators), as well as the individual 
saving. Furthermore, both firms are able to sign up new clients much faster than they would have if 
they were limited to their own towers only. What part of the market each one captures is a function 
of the effort they put in. 
The total savings and revenue in this example is mostly captured in its totality by the collaborating 
parties. The collaboration initiative does, however, create value for consumers. The value for 
consumers could potentially be in lower network charges, or in the form of increased network 
access. 
One could argue that the above is an oversimplified example. For instance, when firms collaborate 
in order to drive innovation, the increase in knowledge and market value may be more difficult to 
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quantify, and even more difficult to allocate to the different collaborating parties. However, the 
created benefit is still mostly captured by the parties.  
As discussed earlier in the dissertation, there is more value in collaborating with competitors than 
with non-competitors (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009: 823). According to the resource 
dependence perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), companies are often dependent on external 
resources (such as financial or physical resources) to compete (ibid.: 46). And while a lack of such 
resources could hamper competitiveness, collaboration with different stakeholders can allow 
companies to pursue its interests (ibid.: 144).  
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 53) organisations are controlled by those that control the 
resources they require. Therefore, the company that provided the bigger component of inputs into 
the coopetition initiative has more power and should therefore also reap the proportional benefit 
(Barney, 1991). But this view is based on the assumption that each partner can determine the 
extent of the resources provided by other parties, which is seldom, if ever, the case (Dyer et al., 
2008: 138). It is therefore in each partner’s interest to convince coopetitors that the resources they 
bring to the relationship is valuable, rare and non-substitutable.  
The ability of a firm to extract and imitate knowledge and expertise from a coopetitive relationship 
can be a source of major competitive advantage (Ritala & Hurmalinna-Laukkanen, 2009: 825). On 
the other hand, the extent to which a company’s competitors can do the same should be a source 
of concern.  
The resource dependency theory is important to explain the distribution of common (direct) 
benefits, but does not assist in explaining how private value is distributed (Dyer et al., 2008: 138).  
2.10.4 Capturing private value 
Private value was described earlier in this dissertation as value that a firm can capture unilaterally 
through acquiring knowledge or resources from its partners and applying it outside the boundaries 
of the coopetition initiative (Khanna et al., 1998; Dyer et al., 2008: 138; Ritala & Tidström, 2014; 
Dagnino & Padula, 2007: 42; Park et al., 2014). Such value can be captured in differentiating 
(positive-sum) logic (Ritala & Tidström, 2014) or zero-sum logic (Rai, 2013). 
The size of such private benefits are often not known to the alliance partner, and can be explained 
by three theoretical approaches, namely: 
i) Related resources perspective; 
ii) Structural holes perspective (Burt, 1992); 
iii) Resource development perspective (ibid.: 138). 
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2.10.4.1 Related resource perspective 
Companies can generate private value when they have related resources and can apply the 
resources and knowledge acquired in the alliance or coopetition relationship outside of the 
coopetition relationship (Dyer et al., 2008: 141). 
Strategically related resources could include any of the following (Markides & Williamson, 
1996: 348): 
 Customer assets (similar demographics, brand recognition); 
 Channels (distributors, channel access); 
 Inputs and suppliers; 
 Processes (similar product development, manufacturing of service processes); and 
 Technological knowledge base (similar intellectual property, technological know-how, market 
knowledge).  
Coopetition suggests (as elsewhere reiterated) that collaborators would have similar customers 
(being competitors), share suppliers, follow similar methods, etc. The related resource perspective 
therefore shows good fit with coopetition cases. 
Another requirement for capturing more value under the related resources perspective is the 
absorptive capacity of a company (Dyer et al., 2008: 141). The better the absorptive capacity, the 
better the ability to not only appropriate more resources or knowledge, but also to apply an 
increased amount of resources elsewhere vis-á-vis its competitor.  
2.10.4.2 Structural holes perspective 
Structural holes refer to the gaps between a company’s non-redundant contacts in a network. What 
this means is that the two contacts are separated by a buffer and therefore do not overlap in terms 
of the other resources it would give you access to (Burt, 1992: 65). Structural holes therefore 
represent entrepreneurial opportunities for resource access and control (ibid.: 66). The centrality of 
a company in a network, and the number of structural holes should both be positively correlated 
with returns (ibid.: 81). Access to unconnected clusters in a network provides more information to 
organisations. Simon (1947) emphasised how limits in awareness lead to bounded rationality, and 
that decisions, once made, tend to persist in a particular direction. When time is limited for 
decision-making, access to more and relevant information is of much importance. Apple managed 
to dominate the MP3 player market by introducing the Apple iPod. The iPod was not as much a 
technological advance as it represented an advancement in the integration of existing hardware, 
software content and services (Abel, 2008). Apple was able to accomplish this integration because 
of various networks that were not connected with each other, but to which they had access. This 
enabled them to be first to market and enjoy a substantial advantage in the market (Ibid.) 
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Information benefits appear in three forms namely: (i) access; (ii) timing; and (iii) referrals (Burt, 
1992: 62). Access refers to receiving valuable information and knowing who can use it. The more 
companies are connected with other companies, the better their chances they will have access to 
such information. Secondly, timing refers to the fact that a bigger network of contacts increases the 
chances that companies will receive valuable information before the rest of its competitors. Thirdly, 
it is impossible for a company to be present in every possible meeting. It is therefore beneficial if 
other entities in the network mentions your name, bringing you referrals. 
2.10.4.3 Resource development perspective 
The benefits to a firm of having a large network or being central in a network goes beyond the 
ability to broker information and resources. Access to timely and reliable non-public information 
provides a company with considerable foresight when considering future investment in capabilities 
and resources. Through its network, a company may have access to information about market 
trends, opportunities and directions that could provide insight into necessary resources to take 
advantage of future scenarios (Dyer et al., 2008: 144). 
In order to benefit from the information in its network, a company requires a sense-making ability to 
understand, organise and make sense of incoming information. Provided a company possesses 
the necessary sense-making ability, firms that receive more non-public information would be able 
to make better decisions and would be aware of more opportunities. As a result, companies with 
more network connections would receive more information than companies with fewer connections 
(Dyer et al., 2008: 144). 
2.10.4.4 Summary 
In summary, the resource dependence perspective, structural holes perspective, and related 
resources perspective, highlight the private ‘exploitation’ opportunities, while the resource 
development perspective highlights the private ‘exploration’ opportunities (Dyer et al., 2008: 145). 
Firms are therefore able to capture more value from coopetition initiatives if they have a stronger 
position in a social network, if they have better relations with certain partners with scarce skills, and 
if they possess specialised expertise or knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge obtained from the 
coopetition initiative (Lepak, et al., 2007:188). 
2.11 ENABLERS OF COOPETITION 
2.11.1 General enablers 
Enablers are contextual variables that have a positive impact on the success of coopetitive 
initiatives. Often these are the positive factors that could be associated with overcoming barriers to 
coopetition. Barriers and enablers therefore represent opposite sides of the same coin. Enablers 
and barriers are not the core focus of this dissertation. However, one should still consider the 
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enablers of successful coopetition as the same enablers and barriers may be present in the cases 
that were explored in this study. 
Table 2.6 shows a summary of factors from the literature that could affect the success of 
coopetition.  
Table 2.6: Enablers of coopetition 
Factors Examples 
Interpersonal 
characteristics* 
The need of partners for each other c 
Level of negotiation skills c 
Clarity of objectives and new ideas c 
Vision c 
Knowledge c 
Mutual benefits d 
Strategic fit d, g 
Trust – honest and forthcoming d 
Return on investment d 
Integrity d 
Power k 
Organisational 
characteristics* 
Available capital c 
Company culture c 
Previous experience d 
Relative strength/position of firms in industry e 
Acceptance of responsibility for environmental consequences d 
Commitment to cooperation g, j 
Activeness g 
Personnel resources g 
Organisational proximity  
(including cognitive proximity, cultural proximity and social proximity) h 
Technological alignment m 
Strategic alignment m 
Individual 
characteristics* 
Personal traits a 
Motivation a 
Attitudes a 
Employee’s position f 
Employee’s responsibilities f 
Loyalty d 
Persistence d 
Consistency d 
Forgiveness d 
Detail oriented d 
Leadership d 
Open-mindedness d 
Industry level Length of the product cycle at industry level m 
Technological convergence of the industrym 
External Geographical distance / proximity b, g, h 
Policy i 
Source: a Selin and Myers (1995) ; b Selin & Chavez, 1995; c Fyall & Garrod, 2005; d Kubickova & 
Wang, 2011; e Bleeke & Erns, 1991; f Moreau & Leathwood, 2006; g Lindstrom & Polsa, 2015: 7; 
h Knoben & Oerlemans, 2006: 73; i Kenworthy, 1995, j Wang, 2008, k Kim, et al., 2015; mGnyawali 
& Park, 2009 
Organisational theory identifies a number of elements that need to be present to lead to change in 
organisations (Simon, 1947; March & Simon, 1958; March, 1991). According to Simon (1947), the 
actions of individuals, and therefore of an organisation is determined by the information/knowledge 
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that such employees are exposed to. This body of theory relates well to the earlier structural holes 
perspective of Burt (1992). Cooperating with competitors can provide a company with valuable 
knowledge about issues of mutual interest, but in this instance, awareness also acts as driver to 
coopetition. 
2.11.2 Proximity 
One of the most often mentioned enablers of coopetition is proximity. Proximity not only relates to 
geographical separation, but also to other forms of space between entities that cooperate. One can 
distinguish between three broad classifications of proximity, namely: (i) organisational proximity; 
(ii) technological proximity; and (iii) geographic proximity (Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013: 4-5; Knoben 
& Oerlemans, 2006: 73). However, proximity is a context-sensitive enabler, meaning that one type 
of proximity may be an important enabler in some instance, while in others it has no impact. 
Figure 2.6 provides a comprehensive view of proximity-related enablers.  
 
Figure 2.6: Dimensions of proximity at the dyadic level 
Source: Knoben & Oerlemans, 2006: 73. 
Defining organisational proximity is somewhat problematic as many different views of it exist 
(Knoben & Oerlemans, 2006: 73). Organisational proximity refers to organisations that share 
(implicitly or explicitly) similar rules and routines of behaviour, as well as similar beliefs (Brown & 
Duguid, 1991). According to Knoben and Oerlemans (2006: 73), organisational proximity can 
further be broken down into other related concepts (see Figure 2.6). 
Cognitive proximity describes intellectual distance (or closeness) between entities, i.e. the 
cognitive base of a firm must be close enough to the new knowledge that is created in order to 
communicate, understand and process it successfully (Boschma, 2005: 63). Cognitive proximity is 
considered a key success factor in innovation initiatives between organisations (Knoben & 
Oerlemans, 2006: 73; Lindgren & Holgersson, 2012: 1224). Referring back to the body of literature 
on knowledge, explicit and tacit knowledge are a tag-team (Cook & Brown, 1999: 397), the two 
cannot exist in isolation and the one can be a useful tool in the generation of the other. It is 
therefore important for collaborators to have similar understanding of problems and knowledge (i.e. 
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cognitive proximity), in order to create new knowledge or to transfer competencies (Steinmo & 
Jakobson, 2013: 1).  
Another aspect of proximity that could be included is social proximity, which enhances trust 
through social relationships (Steinmo & Jakobson, 2013: 2). Social proximity originates from the 
embeddedness literature and indicates that economic relationships are often embedded in social 
context.  
Cultural proximity, as used in this study, relates more to organisational culture than national 
(country-level) culture. When organisational cultures are similar, it is easier for organisations to 
interact as they attach similar meaning to events and interpret actions in the same way. The 
interpretation of cultural proximity is therefore very close to the way that organisational proximity is 
viewed. Both make the interaction between entities smoother without needing to go through the 
difficult process of making implicit actions and knowledge explicit (Knoben & Oerlemans, 
2006: 73). Cultural proximity also shows large overlap with institutional proximity and is difficult to 
untangle (ibid.). Because there is not a very big focus on enablers in this study, the researcher will 
not explore proximity in more depth. As will be seen later in the study, wine producers operate at 
high levels of geographical, cognitive and social proximity. 
Geographic proximity simply refers to the physical distance between entities (Knoben & 
Oerlemans, 2006: 73).  Geographic proximity facilitates close, rich interactions and aids in the 
transfer of tacit knowledge (Torre & Gilly, 2000). 
2.11.3 The contextual nature of enablers 
Enablers may be contextual as illustrated by Lindstrom and Polsa (2015: 7). For instance, while 
these authors (ibid) consider activeness, commitment to coopetition, strategic fit and geographical 
distance as enablers for coopetition in general, they identify particular enablers for particular 
activities. For instance, for joint marketing campaigns, personnel resources and strategic fit are 
important enablers (see Table 2.7). The table further provides a summarised overview of types of 
coopetition and the enablers that increase the effectiveness of these particular types. 
Also note that Table 2.7 takes the conversation back to how close an activity is to the final 
consumer. The examples in the table are all in close proximity to customers. 
2.12 CONCLUSION 
Competition is a big driver for cooperation between competitors as it forces companies to improve 
their performance and market attractiveness. It is therefore not surprising that countries that 
encourage cooperation between competitors show higher levels of innovation. Collaborating with 
competitors provide firms with access to resources such as market access and knowledge that 
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non-competitors cannot provide. Chapter 2 focused on cooperation between competitors, or what 
this dissertation refers to as generic coopetition (as opposed to environmental coopetition.) 
Table 2.7: Summary of most mentioned factors for successful coopetition close to 
customers 
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Sales activity x       
Marketing campaigns x x      
Branding   x x    
Joint customer     x x x 
Delivery of service     x x x 
Source: Adapted from Lindstrom & Polsa, 2015: 7. 
 
Companies can collaborate on a wide spectrum of activities. Such activities can be close or far 
from customers. A pervasive view in the coopetition literature is that cooperation happens far from 
customers (i.e. high up in the value chain), while competition happens near the customer as firms 
attempt to differentiate themselves. More recent studies indicate that there are instances where 
firms do cooperate nearer to customers.  
In Chapter 2 the researcher elaborated on the topics that were introduced previously (the black 
blocks in Figure 2.7 were covered in Chapter 1). The chapter provided a deeper view of different 
definitions of coopetition, and argued for the narrow definition by showing how much of the other 
relationships are captured in other bodies of literature.  
The areas in grey in Figure 2.7 show the main topics that were added to the conversation. On the 
value creation side, the dissertation provided an overview of how extant literature categorises the 
value that is created. The chapter also dealt with collusion, which stands opposite coopetition as it 
destroys rather than creates value. 
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Figure 2.7: An overview of topics dealt with in Chapter 2 
This chapter also introduced a more detailed view of the appropriation of value. In order to provide 
a better view of the total private benefit captured by a firm, the terminology surrounding value 
appropriation needed refinement. The researcher therefore argued that the term privately captured 
common benefits should be introduced to describe the component of the common value that is 
captured by a particular firm. The chapter also touched on the idea that value can be appropriated 
in either positive-sum or zero-sum logic. 
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical foundation for the next chapter, which deals with environmental 
coopetition. While the literature that was reviewed in this chapter is valid, it is inadequate to 
describe the value that is created in cases of environmental coopetition. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
CHAPTER 3 
A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL COOPETITION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a theoretical extension of the literature that was covered in Chapter 2 and is 
aimed at addressing the first gap (the theoretical gap) that was identified earlier, namely the 
articulation of value and value dynamics in coopetition initiatives. 
In order to address this gap, the chapter borrows from fields such as environmental strategy, 
environmental ethics, stakeholder theory and public value in order to extend on the existing 
coopetition body of literature. Much of this literature has not featured in a coopetition context before 
and this study therefore attempts to reconcile many of the different bodies of literature to form the 
basis for a theoretical model in the next chapter.  
3.2 VALUE FROM A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE  
3.2.1  The Sustainable Value Framework 
It is sensible to firstly define what we mean with environmental coopetition and to create some 
context in which to view the activities. One of the strongest lenses to view environmental 
coopetition activities through, would be the Sustainable Value Framework (SVF) of Hart and 
Milstein (2003). The SVF (Hart & Milstein, 2003) provides a holistic view of how companies can 
create value from sustainability-related initiatives (see Figure 3.1).  The framework views actions 
along two axes. 
 
Figure 3.1: The Sustainable Value Framework 
Source: Hart & Milstein, 2003. 
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The vertical axis separates actions as either orientated towards today or orientated towards 
tomorrow. The horizontal axis separates actions into those actions that are internally focused or 
externally focused.  By positioning the two continuums as the two axes of a two-by-two matrix, the 
researcher provided a framework that helps companies to understand the value that can be 
created for the firm.  
The two quadrants on the left in the matrix focus on internally focused actions. The lower quadrant 
on the left focuses on initiatives that can be done today, and has an internal focus. This could 
typically include initiatives to reduce costs or risk. The upper quadrant is still focused on internal 
actions, but is focused on the future. It is the space within which companies can look towards 
different ways of doing the same, i.e. to innovate and reposition itself. 
The right side of the matrix is externally focused. The bottom quadrant on the right focuses on 
actions that are externally focused with a focus on the present. Typically, these actions would 
include communication with stakeholders to disseminate information. The company can increase 
value by building its reputation and securing its licence to operate.  
The top-right quadrant is aimed at engaging stakeholders in order to create future value for the 
firm. Actions in this quadrant include initiatives that encourage information sharing with 
stakeholders, and stakeholders with the firm. The creation of societal value through collaboration 
has been described in strategic management literature as shared value. Shared value refers to 
increasing the competitiveness of a firm while simultaneously advancing the economic and social 
conditions in the communities in which it operates (Porter & Kramer, 2011: 66).   
According to Hart and Milstein (2003), companies should at all times be focused on all four 
quadrants. Disregarding any of the areas will lead to failure to create the maximum value for a 
business. In essence, the model suggests that firms should balance current actions in the business 
with future actions, and similarly, balance an internal focus of optimisation with communicating and 
engaging with stakeholders.  
Coopetition and environmental coopetition is not limited to any of the four quadrants of the 
Sustainable Value Framework. One could potentially argue that the top right-hand corner is of 
particular interest in the context of coopetition because it promotes the idea of engagement with 
competitors to create shared value in the future. But coopetition on sustainability issues can also 
assist in managing the reputation of an industry or of partners in a coopetitive relationship (see the 
later discussion surrounding the work of Peloza and Falkenberg, 2009). Such initiatives would be 
representative of the bottom-right quadrant of the SVF.  
Previous mention was made of studies that did touch on examples of environmental coopetition. In 
order to relate these back to theory, the examples from the literature were placed into the SVF 
(Figure 3.2). It is insightful that examples of environmental coopetition can be found in each of the 
four quadrants.  
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• Tetrapak in Brazil worked with competitors in the 
packaging industry to establish recycling infrastructure 
for the industry (Orsato, 2009). 
• EU car companies working together with each other and 
EU regulators for disposal of used cars (Senge, Smith, 
Kruschwitz, Laur, & Schley, 2010)
• Agreement in an industry to implement sustainability 
practices (Vernon, Essex, Pinder & Curry, 2005) aimed at 
lowering reputational risk.
• Sharing logistic infrastructure to reduce costs and carbon 
emissions  (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Zhang & Frazier, 
2011; Limoubpratum, Shee & Ahsan, 2014).
• Michelin convinced some of its competitors to collectively 
lobby for lower rolling resistance standards, which 
reduces carbon emissions (Hanoteau, 2009: 39) and 
establishes reputation. 
• Mercedes, BMW, Audi and Porsche collaborated for the 
future introduction of mandatory catalytic converters in 
cars (Hanoteau, 2009: 35).
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Figure 3.2: A SVF view of environmental coopetition 
Source: Researcher 
The SVF hints at the fact that a conversation of environmental strategy and environmental 
coopetitive strategy should start at the broadest level with the motivation for environmental action. 
3.2.2  Integrated reporting guidelines 
The International Integrated Reporting Council (2013) or IIRC provides some valuable insight into 
the description of value with regards to sustainable development. According to the IIRC (Ibid.: 10), 
whether a company creates or destroys value relies to some extent is based on how stakeholders 
such as competitors, local communities and regulators perceive the activities of the company, as 
well as the impact of the company on the environment. 
What eminates very clearly from the IIRC’s (Ibid.) position is that gains in company value should be 
measured against the extent to which it relies on inputs from the natural enivironment. 
The work of the IIRC (ibid.) overlaps to some extent with the SVF (Hart & Milstein, 2003) in that the 
IIRC also relates to value creation in the short, medium and longer term,  
3.3 DRIVERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL COOPETITIVE STRATEGIES 
3.3.1 Broad drivers of environmental behaviour 
Understanding the motivation for environmental action (and by extension, for environmental 
coopetition) is important in order to predict environmental behaviour of companies, and to 
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understand the efficacy of command-and-control, market-based or information-based policies 
(Bansal & Roth, 2000: 717).  
Reyers (2009) indicated three high-level drivers of corporate environmental action in South Africa, 
namely: (i) legitimacy; (ii) the financial business case; and (iii) moral responsibility (ibid.: 154). 
These are very similar to the “firm motivations” proposed by Bansal and Roth (2000: 729), namely 
legitimacy, competitiveness and environmental responsibility. Table 3.1 provides a view of drivers 
of environmental action, loosely based on the classification of Reyers (2009). The categories are 
not mutually exclusive. For instance, reputation protection could also be seen as providing access 
to new markets, while stakeholder pressure and stakeholder expectations are closely related. 
Table 3.1: Drivers of environmental action 
Driver Sub-drivers 
Legitimacy  Legislation, regulation & legal compliance 
 Stakeholder expectations 
 Brand/ Reputation protection 
 Licence to operate 
Financial business case  Cost reduction 
 Access to new markets 
 Brand/Reputation building 
 Customer attraction (increased sales) 
 Increased profit margin 
 Managing business risk 
 Innovation 
Moral responsibility  Stakeholder pressure 
 Corporate values & culture 
 Mitigating impact 
 Exerting pressure on stakeholders 
Source: Bansal & Roth, 2000; Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Reyers, 2009, Orsato, 2009; Castro & 
Chousa, 2006: 327. 
Although based on only six case companies, Reyers (2009:164) stated that South African 
companies did not necessarily respond to specific stakeholder pressures or requirements, but 
instead focused on the strategic linkages between the environment and the company. They 
therefore drove the financial business case from the perspective of profitability, competitiveness 
and risk management benefits. It seems that most companies are not driven by moral principles 
when making decisions regarding climate change, but are either trying to increase profits or to 
reduce their risk.  
Orsato (2009) asserted that managers do not necessarily expect to create economic value when 
they create environmental value. Environmental coopetition could also be driven by a moral 
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principle. Such behaviour is in agreement with the social embeddedness argument of Granovetter 
(1985), i.e. that economic activity is embedded in the social networks, relationships and activities of 
people. 
3.3.2 Moral responsibility & environmental ethics 
3.3.2.1 Overview 
For a very long time, companies could ignore the limits set by nature. Companies could extract 
resources without needing to consider the potential depletion of that resource (think of fishing for 
instance). Companies could rely on nature as a free “sink” for pollution, relying on nature’s ability to 
absorb pollution. For a number of reasons this is no longer the case. From a moral and normative 
paradigm, environmental action is not negotiable, and whether it is profitable is irrelevant (Marcus 
& Fremeth, 2009: 19). However, whether it pays is important, as progress will be more rapid 
(ibid.: 19). 
The definition of sustainability as used in the often quoted Brundtland report (also known as Our 
common future) is an illustration of generational justice. According to the report, sustainable 
development means meeting the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs (Brundtland, 1987). By implication, this definition implies that 
sustainable development only requires nature to be conserved for its extrinsic value: if it has no 
value for current or future generations, it has no value at all (Hattingh, 2009). 
A defining characteristic of environmental ethics is the distrust of the valuation of natural resources 
in terms of the use value for humans (Hattingh, 2009; Yang, 2006: 24). Instead, environmental 
ethicists often argue for the conservation of nature for the sake of the intrinsic value (see earlier 
discussion about intrinsic value) and not for the sake of human beings (Hattingh, 2009; Velasquez, 
2006: 271). This view is called the deep ecological view. The deep ecological view can be taken to 
an extreme, claiming intrinsic value not just for animals and plants, but also for lakes, mountains, 
hills, etc. (Velasquez, 2006: 273).  
Environmental ethics is considered a sub-discipline of philosophy and there are a number of 
different underlying dynamics that influence exactly how it is interpreted. Yang (2006: 28) made 
reference to four schools of thought namely:  
i) Enlightened or weak anthropocentrism; 
ii) Animal liberation/rights theory; 
iii) Biocentrism; and 
iv) Ecocentrism (which includes the land ethic, deep ecology and the theory of nature’s value). 
These four schools of thought deal with the position of nature in relation to man and range from 
man at the centre (anthropocentrism) to the environment as the centre (ecocentrism) of the 
relationship (Figure 3.3). A fifth view (Rolston, 1991) represents ecological value as completely 
independent of humans.  
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Figure 3.3: Nature vis-à-vis human beings 
Source: Researcher’s interpretation of Yang, 2006: 28 and Rolston, 1991: 96. 
3.3.2.2 Anthropocentrism 
At the one extreme (see Figure 3.3), humans are not required to have any regard for nature. In this 
anthropocentric view, humans only have an obligation to each other. However, enlightened 
anthropocentrists do acknowledge the intrinsic value of nature (Yang, 2006: 28). One could argue 
that this position is very close to the utilitarian position as defined by Pearce and Moran (1994:17). 
Under utilitarianism, one would typically use financial discounting to decide whether to develop a 
piece of land or to conserve it. It would then also be important to note that the benefits of nature 
often accrue to society, and not to the private individual, meaning that development often happens 
at the expense of nature.  
Blackstone (1974) argued that a liveable environment is not just a desirable state of affairs, but is a 
basic human right, thereby aligning with the anthropocentric view of ecology. A person has a right 
to something if that thing allows him to fulfil his capacities as a rational and free being (Blackstone, 
1974). The South African constitution (RSA, 1996), for instance, contains a number of references 
to the rights of citizens as it pertains to a healthy environment. Section 24 of Chapter 2 (The bill of 
rights) specifically refers to environmental rights in terms of human health, stating: “Everyone has 
the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being”. 
The constitution (RSA, 1996) also recognises the rights of future generations by stating: 
…and to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that  
1. prevent pollution and ecological degradation;  
2. promote conservation; and  
3. secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
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3.3.2.3 Animal liberation/rights 
Animal liberation/rights theorists expand the object of duty to include animals, especially sentient 
ones. Pleasure and pain that animals experience become relevant, and sentience becomes a 
sufficient condition for moral consideration (Singer, 1975). 
3.3.2.4 Biocentrism 
Biocentrism expands this even further to state that humans are inherently not superior to nature 
(Taylor, 1986: 99). All living beings have the will to live, and the will to live makes them sacred and 
equal (Schweitzer, 1923). Biocentrism further states that nature does not simply exist to be 
consumed or used by humans, and that humans are just one of many species (Bari, 1995).  
3.3.2.5 Ecocentrism 
In the ecocentric view, humans are not the conqueror of nature, but purely just citizens therein 
(Yang, 2006: 30). Ecocentrism goes beyong biocentrism in its fixation on organisms and the view 
that humans are inseperable from the inorganic/organic nature that surrounds them (Rowe, 1994). 
In a seminal and often-quoted essay, Leopold (1949) captured the essence of ecocentrism: “A 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It 
is wrong when it tends otherwise” (ibid.: 125).  
Two notable principles underlie deep ecology (Naess, 1973), namely: (i) egalitarianism; and 
(ii) self-realisation.  
The egalitarianism principle, as the name suggests, considers everything in the ecosphere to be 
part of the interconnected whole and are therefore equal in intrinsic value. Everything therefore has 
a right to live and self-realisation.  
In turn, the principle of self-realisation holds that for the morally mature person, the authentic self is 
at one with nature, not the self that focuses on needs of the ego. To harm nature is to harm 
oneself, and defending nature is self-defence (Naess, 1973). 
3.3.2.6 Nature has value without humans 
Rolston (1991: 96) removed the value of nature completely from a human construct, maintaining 
that nature has value without humans. He (ibid.) pointed out the oddity of one species, supposedly 
the only moral species, taking itself as absolute and that judges all other species relative to its 
utility. “There is something overspecialized about an ethic, held by the dominant class of Homo 
sapiens, that regards the welfare of only one of several million species as an object and beneficiary 
of duty” (ibid.: 84).  
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3.3.2.7 Points of agreement 
Despite the seeming differences in the different ethical views of nature, there are some points of 
agreement (Yang, 2006: 28):  
i) The first common principle is that of environmental justice, referring to both distributive 
environmental justice (the equal distribution of environmental benefits) and participatory 
environmental justice (equal opportunity in decision-making). 
ii) The principle of intergenerational justice is an extension of the first principle and is captured 
in the Brundtland report, as described earlier. The right to life, liberty and happiness are 
considered as basic human rights across current and future generations. 
iii) The principle of respect for nature is common among the different views of environmental 
ethics. No one disagrees that human beings depend on the health of the natural 
environment. As a result, humans have a duty to protect the integrity of the ecosystem and 
its biodiversity. 
The three points above represent the lowest common denominator in the different ethical views of 
the natural environment. 
3.3.3 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy loosely translates to the socially accepted and expected structures or behaviour within 
relationships (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997: 866). Legitimacy refers to reputation protection rather 
than reputation building (Bansal & Clelland, 2004).  
Legitimacy, however, is not a mono-dimensional construct, and different stakeholders may have 
different expectations (Barney & Hansen, 1994). Shah (2011) defined a number of forms of 
legitimacy. Of importance to this study, is the perceived legitimacy of the individual firms, as well as 
the legitimacy of the coopetition alliance.  
Partner legitimacy refers to the legitimacy that the coopetition partners bring to an alliance. A 
partner with a positive reputation will enhance the reputation of the alliance, while a partner with a 
negative reputation will do the opposite (ibid.).  
Social legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the alliance by the community of stakeholders in the 
same field (Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). Increased social legitimacy can lead to reduced public 
opposition to the operations of a firm and less antagonistic relations with stakeholders. It is 
therefore of particular relevance in environments associated with close monitoring and watchful 
communities (Dacin, Oliver & Roy, 2007).  
Bansal and Clelland (2004: 92) defined corporate environmental legitimacy as the general 
perception that the environmental performance of a company is desirable, proper or appropriate. 
According to these authors (ibid.), firms with low legitimacy should manage the firm’s 
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environmental performance in order to minimise negative media reports and the need to disclose 
environmental liabilities.  
Alternatively, firms with low legitimacy should (i) invest in impression management efforts that tout 
their firm’s commitment to the natural environment and (ii) initiate low-cost environmental initiatives 
(for instance, participation in community recycling). However, firms with low legitimacy must be 
cautious of being perceived to be greenwashing through unauthentic efforts to manage public 
perception (Bansal & Clelland, 2004: 101). 
Firms with high environmental legitimacy have no need for impression management. Such firms 
can invest in low-cost legitimacy management initiatives to maintain the stability of stakeholder 
perceptions (Bansal & Clelland, 2004: 102). 
Coopetition initiatives can serve as reputation protection for a firm, a few coopetition partners, or 
for an industry (as was shown in the lower left quadrant of Figure 3.2). The setting of industry 
environmental standards is a common example of intra-industry collaboration. Such standards are 
often aimed at avoiding the ratcheting up of capital investments in improving environmental 
performance (ibid.: 94). Such Voluntary Environmental Initiatives (Orsato, 2006; 2009) or VEIs are 
also vehicles to share best practice about reducing environmental impact in cases where 
environmental accidents would impact the reputation of the whole industry (Bansal & Clelland, 
2004: 94).  Figure 3.2 provided the example of Michelin tyres in Europe. Michelin experienced 
increased legitimacy through the implied fuel efficiency-enhancing characteristics of their tyres 
(Hanoteau, 2009: 39). 
3.3.4 Business opportunity and the environment 
Not all companies can gain a competitive advantage from environmental actions (Palmer, Oates, 
Portney, 1995; Batemen & Snell, 2007; Orsato, 2009). Environmental coopetition provides an 
attractive option to companies hoping to capture some value from environmental activities, even if 
competitors also gain in the process. Orsato (2009) provided a useful visualisation of how “non-
rival” strategies relate to competitive strategies. Orsato (ibid) represented the universe of strategies 
on two continuums representing private benefits (or profits) for firms on the horizontal axis, versus 
public benefit on the vertical axis (See Figure 3.4). According to Orsato, the business as usual view 
lies along the horizontal axis, i.e. the business of business is to generate profits for shareholders 
(Friedman, 1970). At the other extreme lies the non-profit sector that arguably attempts to generate 
value for society only.  
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Figure 3.4: Win-win strategies balance private and public benefits 
Source: Orsato, 2009. 
But of course private and public benefits are not mutually exclusive. Orsato portrayed the area 
where both companies and society benefit as the win-win space, i.e. the shaded area between 
line B and line E in Figure 3.4. Within the win-win space, Orsato further distinguished between 
strategies that allow companies to generate or isolate a competitive advantage for itself (zone B), 
and non-rival (i.e. coopetition) strategies (zone E).  
Just as some businesses engage with environmental action to protect their reputation, so there are 
companies that see a clear financial benefit to environmental projects.  For many years it seemed 
that the dominant view was that environmental performance had to be at the expense of 
economic/financial performance (Wagner & Schaltegger, 2004: 558). This is illustrated by the solid 
black line (traditionalist view) in Figure 3.5. However, a number of recent studies and cases 
profess that environmental proactivity may yield a “double dividend” or “win-win outcome” , 
meaning a gain for the business as well as the environment (Beckman, Hielscher, & Pies, 
2014: 23).  
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the  
Figure 3.5: Economic and environmental performance 
Source: Wagner & Schaltegger, 2004: 558 
The financial dividend of environmental projects come in many forms. Figure 3.6 shows some of 
the sources of value for businesses that invest in sustainability (Kendall & Willard, 2015: 11). 
These benefits can have impacts at operational, investment and financing activities (Castro & 
Chousa, 2006: 327).  Lower risk translates to lower costs (Kendall & Willard, 2015: 11) and is 
therefore considered as an economic driver (See Figure 3.6).  
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Figure 3.6: Benefits of pro-environmental behaviour 
Source: Kendall & Willard, 2015: 11. 
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Both competitive and cooperative strategies could yield better environmental benefits while also 
increasing economic performance. For each of the categories in Figure 3.6, it would be possible to 
identify the relevance of coopetition. As a start, any of these categories can be elevated to industry 
level, in which case coopetition in the industry can achieve common value for all companies. 
3.4 SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGIES AND VALUE CREATION 
Apart from the SVF shown earlier, there are a few frameworks one can refer to that may be 
relevant in explaining common value and private value created for companies who engage in 
environmental initiatives. These models, such as the SVF, usually take a wider view of 
sustainability, but for the sake of relevance, this study only considered environmental initiatives.  
Orsato (2006; 2009) provided a framework that focuses on competitive strategies, but which can 
inform coopetition strategies as well, just like the SVF. 
3.4.1 Sustainability strategies 
According to Orsato (2006), competitive sustainability strategies can broadly be divided into four 
categories (See Figure 3.7). Broadly, sustainability strategies can be aimed at: 
i) Lowering processing costs (eco-efficiency); 
ii) Reputation protection (beyond compliance leadership); 
iii) Reputation building (eco-branding), or  
iv) Providing a low cost solution in the market that is also environmentally a leader 
(environmental cost leadership). 
 
Figure 3.7: Sustainability strategies 
Source: Orsato, 2009. 
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Each of these strategies have certain benefits, requirements and payoffs. It is important to 
understand these aspects when thinking about an appropriate strategy for a business. Even 
though these are competitive strategies, it should not imply that a business would embark on these 
strategies without interacting or collaborating with competitors. It does imply that companies should 
be able to generate a competitive advantage from the strategies they pursue. The basis for the 
competitive advantage is different in each strategy presented by Orsato (2006). 
3.4.2 Eco-efficiency 
Eco-efficiency implies an internal drive in a company to reduce the cost of processes. The term 
eco-efficiency dates back to 1991 when defined by the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD):   
…eco-efficiency is achieved by the delivery of competitively priced goods and services 
that satisfy human needs and bring quality of life, while progressively reducing 
ecological impacts and resource intensity throughout the life-cycle to a level at least in 
line with the Earth’s estimated carrying capacity (WBCSD, 2016). 
Typical examples of eco-efficiency can be found in environments where there is waste that can be 
reused or become an input for other processes. Interface floors, one of the world’s largest carpet 
tile producers, saved more than $200 million from 1996 to 2002 through various sustainability-
related initiatives (ibid.). 
It is possible that firms can optimise their processes as a result of coopetition. While the objective 
of coopetition may be to create common value in the form of economic or knowledge value, it is 
possible for competitors to learn from each other. Knowledge obtained in the coopetition 
relationship can potentially be applied back into the business and have both environmental and 
economic benefits.  
3.4.3 Beyond compliance leadership  
Beyond compliance leadership focuses on reputation protection and is strongly associated with 
legitimacy. The strategy is well suited for firms that have already implemented eco-efficiency, but 
are vulnerable in terms of their reputation. Examples of such firms would include firms in extractive 
industries (such as mining), industries that are associated with environmental damage (such as 
fishing), and industries that affect the natural habitat (such as the wine industry).  
Such firms often protect their reputation by signing up to Voluntary Environmental Initiatives (VEIs) 
(Orsato, 2006).   In this regard it is evident that cooperation with competitors in supporting and 
endorsing the VEI both allow for the protection of the VEI’s brand, and the protection of the 
reputation of the firms belonging to it. Figure 3.8 shows a certificate of a member of the Biodiversity 
and Wine Initiative (BWI) in the South African wine industry. The BWI is one of the case studies 
discussed later in this dissertation. Beyond compliance leadership is associated with stakeholder 
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management, as reputation relies on public perception. Companies that excel at this strategy must 
therefore have a competence in stakeholder engagement. 
 
Figure 3.8: Biodiversity & Wine Initiative as VEI 
Firms have choices about how to approach environmental collaboration. Peloza and Falkenberg 
(2009: 98) presented four permutations of strategies that firms can follow when collaborating with 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Table 3.2 shows a scaled-down version of the four 
strategies they presented in their paper (ibid). The upper left and right strategies (shaded area) 
would not be regarded as coopetition in terms of the definition used in this dissertation, as it only 
involves one firm. However, comparing the top row with the lower row allows for interesting 
insights.  
As Orsato (2006; 2009) and Hart and Milstein (2003) mentioned, collaboration by firms with NGOs 
allow for reputation management. By involving more firms and/or more NGOs in the collaboration, 
it is easier to address complex issues. It is also easier to establish legitimacy for the initiative.  
In this regard, single company/single NGO (top left cell) collaboration is susceptible to be seen as 
less legitimate structures because it may be seen as if the company is buying its reputation 
(Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009: 98). On the other hand, multiple companies collaborating with 
multiple NGOs can be weakened by free-riding (ibid.).   
BWI, and some of the other case studies presented in this dissertation would fall into the bottom 
left strategy, namely shared contribution. As the strategy implies, BWI creates legitimacy for the 
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South African wine industry. The case of the Simonsberg conservancy would be an example of 
creating a shared infrastructure. 
Table 3.2: Collaboration with NGOs and competitors 
 Single NGO Multi-NGO 
Single 
firm 
Focused Contribution 
Collaboration examples: 
 Unilever/Rainforest Alliance 
Examples of Objectives Achieved: 
• Differentiate brand from competitors 
• Focused, local social impacts 
• Respond to NGO activism speciﬁc to ﬁrm  
Key Contextual Considerations: 
• Ease of management/limited resource 
requirements 
• Protects intellectual property of the ﬁrm  
• Susceptible to personal inﬂuence/diversion 
away from core business of the ﬁrm 
• Firm is susceptible to charges of “buying” 
reputation 
• Temptation to focus only on PR aspects  
• Criticisms of undue inﬂuence over NGO 
Diffused Contribution 
Collaboration examples: 
Starbucks/Global Exchange/Oxfam/Oaxacan 
State Coffee Producers Network/Ford 
Foundation 
Examples of Objectives Achieved: 
• Address threats to ﬁrm legitimacy from 
multiple sources/contexts 
• Differentiate brand from competitors 
• Access new markets 
Key Contextual Considerations: 
• Broader/complex social and environmental 
goals met simultaneously 
• Encourage NGO investment in ﬁrm 
innovation 
• Increased management resources to 
coordinate disparate NGOs 
• Slippery slope of involvement and 
responsibility 
Multi-firm Shared Contribution 
Collaboration examples: 
Chemical ﬁrms/Fundación Natura 
Examples of Objectives Achieved: 
• Protection/promotion of industry legitimacy 
• Address infrastructure voids 
Key Contextual Considerations: 
• Promotes innovative culture of the ﬁrm 
• Potential for broader social impact on a 
focused issue 
• Reputational beneﬁts accrue to competitors 
equally 
• Requires trusted competitors 
• Potential for loss of intellectual property of 
the ﬁrm 
• Increased management resources and 
attention required 
• Potential for loss of NGO objectivity 
Communal Contribution 
Collaboration examples: 
Nike/Eddie Bauer/Nordstrom/Fair Labour 
Association/Human Rights First/Federation of 
Workers in Philippines/Cambodian Labour 
Association 
Examples of Objectives Achieved: 
• Address complex threat to industries 
• Consensus of priorities among numerous  
powerful social actors 
• Geographically dispersed social impacts 
Key Contextual Considerations: 
• Integrate perspectives from multiple 
powerful  
stakeholders 
• Signiﬁcant management resources and 
expertise required 
• Requires the ability to negotiate priorities  
• Potential for free-riding 
Source: Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009: 98. 
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Creating quality or performance standards can be regarded as cooperation initiatives aimed at 
creating a competitive advantage for the collaborators, especially in relation to the other 
competitors that are not able to meet the standards. Michelin tyres is for instance known for 
lobbying for lower standards of rolling resistance which would eliminate some of its competitors 
from the market (Hanoteau, 2009: 39). However, beyond compliance tends to deliver only a short-
lived competitive advantage as competitors tend to copy the actions of leaders. Eventually the 
competitive advantage is eroded, and the best practice of today becomes the minimum 
requirement to be present in a market tomorrow. For that reason, one should not regard beyond 
compliance as a strategy that generates long-term brand-differentiation, but rather brand or 
reputation protection.  
3.4.4 Eco-branding 
In contrast to beyond compliance leadership, eco-branding is aimed at long-term brand 
differentiation. It is sometimes possible for firms to generate a premium for their products due to 
environmentally-friendly attributes. Eco-branding is better suited for business-to-consumer 
products, as business-to-business markets are less susceptible to environmental messages 
(Orsato, 2006: 34-35).  
There are generally three prerequisites for a successful eco-branding strategy: 
i) The information about the product or service should be clearly communicated, credible and 
not controversial. For instance, a company cannot create its own eco-label and expect the 
market to believe the product is environmentally superior to others. A company can also not 
make green claims about a product or service when other aspects of the product may be 
detrimental to the environment or society. 
ii) The consumer must be willing to pay for the environmental benefits. For this reason, Orsato 
(2006: 35) maintained that it is beneficial if the environmental benefit is also associated with 
a private benefit for the consumer. Studies on willingness to pay have shown that consumers 
are typically willing to pay a higher price when they are convinced of the legitimacy and the 
impact of a product or service. For instance, buying green electricity creates a public benefit 
for society, but no private value for the consumer. In contrast, organically produced 
vegetables arguably create a public benefit (increased biodiversity), as well as a private 
benefit (a healthier diet). Attitude and perceived knowledge about the environmental issues 
also has an effect on the decision to pay a premium for environmentally friendly wines 
(Barber, 2012: 42). 
iii) Competitors should not be able to replicate the green attributes. A competitive advantage 
from green attributes is only sustainable if competitors are unable to copy the actions of the 
focus company.  
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The third prerequisite is of particular importance to this study seeing that it implies a condition 
under which one company can capture common value from its competitors, or capture private 
benefits that its competitors have no access to.  
Research in the South African context indicates that wine awards (which would be a form of eco-
branding) and certifications (which can be regarded as beyond compliance leadership) play a 
minor role in the decision-making process of South African consumers (See Table 3.3). Herbst and 
Von Arnim (2009: 95) surveyed 285 South African wine consumers and concluded that awards 
were the second least important factor in the decision of consumers to buy wine. A second study 
by Raad (2014) came to a similar conclusion, but measured “social responsibility” as a variable 
instead of “awards”.  
Table 3.3: Importance of marketing cues 
Cue Mean Likert value 
(5 = extremely 
important,  
1 = not important) 
N = 285 
Mean Likert value 
(5 = extremely 
important,  
1 = not important) 
N = 112 
Variety 4.14 4.31 
Recommendations  4.03 
Vintage 3.75 3.52 
Producer/Brand 3.58 3.81 
Production method 3.33  
Attractive packaging 3.19 3.30 
Region 3.03 3.26 
Awards 2.97  
Social responsibility  2.81 
Price 2.48 4.00 
Advertising  2.93 
Source Herbst & Von Arnim, 
2009: 95 
Raad, 2014: 43 
Source: Adapted from Herbst & Von Arnim, 2009: 95 and Raad, 2014: 43. 
The two studies interestingly came to very similar overall conclusions but showed a big difference 
in “price” as a decision variable.  
Producers can make short-term decisions about a few of the variables (such as price, packaging 
and advertising), but in most cases can only respond to variables in the long run (such as which 
varieties of grapes to plant). Social responsibility is one antecedent of the decision to buy that 
producers do have some decision-making freedom about. The decision for wine producers would 
then be whether to approach social responsibility issues as an industry or as individual wine 
producers. The second option may have more opportunity for private benefits, but industry issues 
such as loss of biodiversity are best approached as an industry. 
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3.4.5 Low-cost environmental leadership 
Low-cost environmental leadership implies that a product or service has both the lowest cost and 
the lowest environmental impact. The strategy is well suited for business-to-business environments 
where the buyer often does not wish to pay a premium for a product and would rather buy the 
product or service on price than on green attributes. Orsato (2006: 136) gave the example of 
Ecolean packaging, which holds multiple environmental benefits as a packaging material, but also 
sells for less than what competitors charge for their packaging.  
A recent example from the car-industry is the collaborative development efforts by PSA Peugeot 
Citroën and Toyota to develop a small van for the European market (Autoblog, 2015). Previously 
these companies had also worked on a small car that provided fuel-efficient transport at an 
affordable price. 
3.4.6 Conclusion 
The competitive strategies discussed in the previous sections are, by implication, viewed as 
instruments to create private value. It is easier to see the value of coopetition for eco-efficiency and 
beyond compliance leadership. In the case of eco-efficiency, firms are able to explicitly exchange 
best practice, or could learn from each other indirectly.  
In the case of beyond compliance leadership, it is evident that initiatives like industry standards 
and VEIs require cooperation between competitors. Such initiatives require awareness from 
consumers and would therefore be closer to consumers.  In the case of eco-branding and low cost 
environmental leadership, there is less opportunity for cooperation close to the consumer. 
3.5 HOW VALUE IS APPROPRIATED UNDER A WIDER STAKEHOLDER LENS 
3.5.1 Background 
One of the core principles of coopetition is that it requires a mutual benefit for the coopeting parties 
(Czakon et al., 2014: 127). Particularly, coopetition initiatives are most stable when common 
benefits and private benefits are high (Dyer et al., 2008:146).  
Lado et al. (1997) suggested that managers do not make decisions based on their own interests 
only, but also consider the wider socio-economic impacts. Socio-economists have argued that the 
decisions of managers are embedded in social systems (Granovetter, 1985), implying that a 
broader stakeholder view (Freeman, 2010) of value is not only warranted, but also desirable.  
In fact, not considering the wider implications of coopetitive actions is sub-optimal (Freeman, 2010; 
Hart & Milstein, 2003; Bosse, Phillips & Harrison, 2009; Harrison & Wicks, 2013) as it could 
potentially destroy or create value for society, and for the companies. Collusive relationships are 
good examples of collaboration that destroys socio-economic value (Walley, 2007). 
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Environmental coopetition potentially creates value for the collaborating parties, but also for the 
environment and for society (see earlier sections dealing with Hart & Milstein, 2003). Yet the 
existing body of coopetition literature seems sparse in its discussion of public value that is created 
through coopetition. While a number of examples of environmental coopetition exist (such as 
environmental standards, fishing quotas, R&D collaboration and transport agreements) only a few 
authors in the area of coopetition have recently ventured towards discussing environmental 
coopetition as it is defined in this dissertation (for example Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013; Holmburg & 
Örne, 2013; De Marchi, 2012; Blanco et al., 2009; Limoubpratum et al., 2014). In order to 
understand a broader view of value appropriation, it is first necessary to briefly introduce 
stakeholder theory. 
A stakeholder view of coopetition would not only require a different view of the value created. The 
question of how much value is created should therefore be accompanied by for whom value is 
created.  
3.5.2 Stakeholder theory and the natural environment 
It is well known that the same value proposition could hold different value for different parties, and 
that such parties would have different willingness levels to pay for the benefit (Lepak et al., 
2007: 185). This is also true for environmental coopetition initiative (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & 
Jones, 1999: 502); as different stakeholders would benefit in different ways from the same activity.  
This study links aspects of stakeholder theory with environmental coopetition. Ironically, neither the 
natural environment, nor competitors are considered extremely prominent in the stakeholder 
literature (Driscoll & Starik, 2004; Whysall, 2000: 307; Ambler & Wilson, 1995: 4). Furthermore, the 
position of civil society is unclear and ill defined (Lépineux, 2005: 100). 
For a long time, the interests of shareholders have been considered to be the most important 
obligation for companies (Freeman & Reed, 1983: 48). The poster child of this view is Milton 
Friedman (1970), who’s infamous article in The New York Times claimed that the only 
responsibility for companies was to make money for its shareholders.  
However, there is also a long history of authors (Berle & Means, 1932; Barnard, 1938) who were 
critical of the view of shareholder interest as the most important consideration for companies. 
Barnard (1938: 89) maintained that the role of companies is to serve society, and that the 
executive’s role is to instil a sense of moral purpose in the company. The more modern 
manifestation of this view is that of stakeholder theory. The seminal work in stakeholder theory is 
the 1984 book of R. Edward Freeman (2010).  
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3.5.3 The narrow and wide views of stakeholders 
Freeman and Reed (1983: 51) defined both a wide and narrow view of what a stakeholder is. 
The wide sense of stakeholder is any group or individual who can impact or who may be impacted 
by the achievement of the objectives of an organisation. This could include public interest groups, 
the government, competitors, employees, customers, as well as the natural (or ecological) 
environment (ibid: 51). This definition of stakeholders most closely matches the original view of 
Freeman (2010: 55). The absence of civil society is notable in the definition, which appears to be 
an optional stakeholder in the stakeholder literature (Lépineux, 2005: 101). 
The narrow definition of a stakeholder is any group or individual on which the organisation is 
dependent for its survival. This would include employees, customers, certain suppliers and 
shareholders.  
3.5.4 Judging the importance of stakeholders 
Stakeholders can be classified in a myriad of ways, none of which assists managers to identify 
which stakeholders are more important. Mitchell et al. (1997:845) attempted to address this issue 
of judging the importance of categories of stakeholders by suggesting three attributes, namely: 
i) The stakeholder’s power to influence policy; 
ii) The legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with the company; and  
iii) The urgency of the stakeholder’s claim on the firm. 
 
Figure 3.9: Stakeholder typology: One, two or three attributes present 
Mitchell et al., 1997:845. 
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In addition to the three criteria suggested by Mitchell et al. (1997) in Figure 3.9, Driscoll and Starik 
(2004) suggested a fourth criterion, namely proximity. 
3.5.4.1 Power 
A stakeholder has power if it can exert a direct influence on the survival of the firm (Freeman, 
2010). Mitchell et al. (1997) described power as the ability of a stakeholder to use coercive 
(force/threat), utilitarian (material/incentives) or normative power to exert its will in the relationship. 
This definition is not so far removed from the definition of power as stated by Weber (1947) in 
Section 2.6.1. 
In this respect it is undeniable that the natural environment has power over many firms, both at the 
coercive (think about the impact of natural disasters like storms, floods and droughts on the 
agricultural industry) and utilitarian (consider the impact of the loss of fish stock levels on the 
fishing industry). Yet the power of nature is often overlooked due to the long-term and subtle 
impacts (Driscoll & Starik, 2004: 58), especially if one requires of stakeholders to exhibit their 
ability to influence the company (Savage, Nix, Whitehead & Blair, 1991). Because environmental 
resources are often not supplied as an economic exchange, it is frequently not considered by 
companies. The importance of nature as a stakeholder is also related to the weak or strong view of 
sustainability (Rennings & Wiggering, 1997). In the weak form of sustainability, natural capital can 
be replaced by other forms of capital (Gutés, 1996: 147). In such a case, nature is awarded less 
consideration as a stakeholder in favour of shareholders. In strong sustainability, natural capital 
must be sustained at the expense of other forms of capital (Ibid). It therefore recognises nature as 
the primary stakeholder. 
Civil society is increasingly able to exert pressure on companies (Lépineux, 2005: 102) and is 
increasingly seen as a stakeholder with power. Public perception of the role of business is 
changing and more people are seeking coherence between their roles as citizens, consumers and 
employees (Lépineux, 2005: 102). 
3.5.4.2 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy has been discussed earlier (see for instance Section 1.2), but is again reviewed 
through a stakeholder lens. Legitimacy refers to the validity or appropriateness of a stakeholder’s 
claim to a stake (Carroll & Buchholtz, 2012: 67) but remains a rather vague construct (Mitchell 
et al., 1997: 866). The basis for legitimacy could be underpinned by a contract, a moral claim, 
property rights, or in something ‘at risk’ (ibid.).  
In the narrow definition of stakeholders (i.e. any group or individual on which the organisation is 
dependent for its survival), some scholars associate legitimate claims with stakeholders with 
power, or stakeholders that provide important resources to the firm (Hill & Jones, 1992: 133). In a 
more inclusive view, the environment has legitimacy because of being at risk because of the 
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activities of the firm (Clarkson, 1995: 99). In the same way a company can be at risk due to the 
depletion of critical resources (Driscoll & Starik, 2004: 58).  
Despite the legitimacy of nature’s claim on the firm, Freeman’s wide stakeholder map (Figure 3.10) 
does not show the environment explicitly, but shows activist groups instead (portrayed in grey on 
top right of Figure 3.10). Whysall (2000: 308) questioned how the value of landscape quality would 
be incorporated into considering a new development in a green belt. Without the voice of activist 
groups, nature has very little presence in the conversation about stakeholder interests.  
 
Figure 3.10: Stakeholder map of a very large organisation 
Source: Freeman, 2010: 55. 
Figure 3.10 is significant for another reason in the context of this dissertation. Competitors 
(portrayed in grey on bottom left of Figure 3.10) are not often mentioned as stakeholders (Ambler & 
Wilson, 1995: 4) despite the fact that they would qualify as stakeholders under both the broad and 
narrow definitions. Ambler and Wilson (ibid.) argued that there is little practical use to acknowledge 
competitors as stakeholders of each other. Notwithstanding, in the context of coopetition (and 
environmental coopetition) competitors co-create value and should therefore be regarded as 
stakeholders. 
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A last observation about Figure 3.10 is that it does not list the community or society as a 
stakeholder. Since the original 1984 version of this diagram, some authors (such as Carroll & 
Buchholtz, 2012: 87) have included the general public and civic groups in the map. Due to the 
increased pressure from civil society on firms, societal issues are appearing higher on the business 
agenda (Lépineux, 2005: 102). 
3.5.4.3 Urgency 
Urgency refers to the importance of a stakeholder’s claim for immediate attention or the degree to 
which delay in response would be unacceptable to the stakeholder. Because environmental 
problems such as biodiversity loss are often slow to emerge, they are often not considered as 
urgent as environmental catastrophes. In contrast to environmental issues, societal issues are 
enjoying more urgency. Environmental issues, however, are becoming more prominent in 
management literature and the urgency of environmental issues are enjoying more airspace than 
in previous decades. The discourse around the Paris agreement on climate change in 2015 
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2016) and plastic in the ocean 
(McAuly, 2016) are two recent examples. 
Urgency also has an economic interpretation that is particularly evident in short-termism of 
business decisions (Driscoll & Starik, 2004: 205). In such cases the long-term environmental 
impacts of a business could be outweighed by the short-term costs of avoiding it. 
3.5.4.4 Proximity 
As mentioned, in addition to the three criteria mentioned by Mitchell et al. (1997:845), Driscoll and 
Starik (2004) suggested that the proximity of stakeholders should be considered in determining the 
saliency of stakeholders, i.e. which stakeholders should be taken seriously and which ones are 
less important.  
The first instance of proximity is that of geographical or spatial proximity (ibid., 209). Stakeholders 
that are closer to a company naturally have a stronger voice. Furthermore, because firms operate 
within a specific ecological space, Driscoll and Starik (2004) argued that this additional criterion 
gives more saliency to the natural environment. The same argument also raises the importance of 
the community as a representation of the larger society. 
Driscoll and Starik (2004: 209) also made reference to firms that may think in a similar way 
(implying cognitive proximity), as well as firms that operate in the same product market. This view 
of proximity brings stakeholder theory into the folds of coopetition and collaboration literature.   
3.5.4.5 The importance of the environment, competitors and society as stakeholders 
For a discussion about environmental coopetition, one needs to consider the importance of 
competitors, society and the environment as stakeholders.  Neither of these three are extensively 
covered or acknowledged in the stakeholder literature, apart from the literature pointing at the 
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omission of these (Lépineux, 2005). This has also been true in coopetition research. The focus has 
historically been on the cooperating parties, and not environmental value. Dagnino and Padula’s 
(2002) view of value was only focused on the company and excluded the potential of value for 
customers or other stakeholders. A framework that was covered earlier (Section 3.2) in this 
dissertation (Hart & Milstein, 2003) provides some insight about the nexus between environmental 
value, stakeholder engagement and organizational value. The SVF suggests that organizational 
value is maximized when firms engage with stakeholders and protect natural capital. 
In the subsequent chapter dealing with the conceptual model, public benefit and the socio-
environmental value are key components of the conceptual model. 
3.6 SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE 
3.6.1 Public good 
The idea of public benefit is well established in welfare economics. In fact, Pigou already in the 
early twentieth century (1937: 184) described situations in which positive externalities exist and, in 
doing so, he provided some of the first examples of public benefit or public goods (the two terms 
are not synonymous) that are created through private actions:  
It is true, in like manner, of resources devoted to afforestation, since the beneficial 
effect on climate often extends beyond the borders of the estates owned by the person 
responsible for the forest (ibid.).  
Public goods, like a better climate described by Pigou (1937), are characterised by non-rivalrous 
consumption and non-excludability (Bannock et al., 2003). 
But environmental goods are often common goods, meaning that it is rivalrous (unlike public 
goods) but non-excludable (like public goods). The best example would be fish stock. No-one can 
be excluded from fishing, but catching a fish means that it is unavailable to the next person, i.e. it is 
rivalrous (Ostrom, 1990; Hardin, 1968).  
3.6.2 Socio-environmental value 
Narrowing the construct of value to only economic value has been criticised on the grounds that it 
could obscure aspects of value that extend beyond profit and economic return (Harrison & Wicks, 
2013: 98; Hausman & McPherson, 2006).  The researcher suggests that environmental coopetition 
creates socio-environmental value in addition to the potential for economic and knowledge value 
(Dagnino & Padula, 2002).  
The term socio-environmental value is closely comparable, but not limited, to the value provided 
through eco-system services as defined by Alcamo and Bennett (2003) and Total Economic Value 
as defined by Pearce and Moran (1994). Table 3.4 provides a comparison of different 
classifications of value.  
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From Table 3.4 it follows that socio-environmental value includes both anthropocentric value 
(Hattingh, 2009) and intrinsic value (Rolston, 1986), and excludes value that is rivalrous, i.e. value 
that can be captured by companies as common or private benefit. Socio-environmental benefits as 
used in this dissertation are thus best described as the sum of intrinsic ecological value and 
benefits that accrue to society because of environmental improvements.   
By implication, all socio-environmental value is public, but not all public goods are socio-
environmental in nature. For instance, in the joint logistics example used earlier (see Table 2.5), 
there is a potential reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. The benefit to society is an improved 
environment and reduced climate change. Such a benefit would be a socio-environmental value 
and a public good. On the other hand, it may be that the initiative leads to lower maintenance costs 
of roads, which is a public good but not a socio-environmental benefit. 
Table 3.4: Comparison of value-related terminology 
 
Categories 
of value 
Description 
Total 
economic 
value 
Common 
goods 
Socio-
environmental 
value 
(a public good) 
U
s
e
 v
a
lu
e
  
 
Direct use 
value  
Value of provisioning services such as the 
actual use of the produce of nature (fish, 
timber, etc.). 
   
Indirect use 
value  
Ecosystem functions that provide value in 
the form of regulating services (flood control, 
disease control) and supporting services 
(nutrient cycling and habitat provision). 
   
Option 
value  
The willingness of an individual to pay to 
safeguard an environmental resource for 
using it in the future. 
   
N
o
n
-u
s
e
 v
a
lu
e
  
  
Bequest 
value 
The benefit accruing to any individual from 
the knowledge that others might benefit from 
a resource in future. This may include the 
value of spiritual, recreational, aesthetic 
benefits (cultural services). 
   
Existence 
value  
Value deriving from a person’s concern for 
simply the existence of any particular 
environmental asset, for instance the African 
Rhino, although they have never seen one. 
  
 
 
Intrinsic 
value 
The value of a species or nature when there 
is no one to do the counting (Rolston, 1986). 
   
Public goods are non-rivalrous (the consumption of the good by one person does not deprive another of its 
use), non-excludable (it is impossible to exclude a person from using it) and are often (but not always) also 
non-rejectable in that individuals cannot abstain from using it, even if they wish to. (Bannock, Baxter & Davis, 
2003) 
Common goods are non-excludable but rivalrous. (Ostrom, 1990; Hardin, 1968) 
Source: Adapted from Pearce & Moran, 1994; Alcamo & Bennett, 2003; Hattingh, 2009; 
Ostrom 1990; Hardin, 1968; Bannock et al., 2003. 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reconciled different bodies of knowledge with that of coopetition literature in order to 
form the foundations for the theoretical model to follow in the next chapter.  
The chapter introduced the three broad drivers of environmental activities, namely: legitimacy, the 
financial business case and the moral responsibility argument (see the grey pie-chart area at the 
centre of Figure 3.11). Legitimacy translates to value through secondary mechanisms like lower 
interest rates on loans and reduced reputational risk. Because the dissertation explores value, the 
chapter therefore continued to explore legitimacy and the financial case more than the moral case. 
This chapter introduced the idea that companies create value through the strategies that they 
choose, albeit to lower costs, to protect their reputation, or to build reputation. Through 
collaboration with competitors it is possible for companies to increase the efficacy of their 
strategies, particularly strategies that rely on industry standards. 
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Figure 3.11: An overview of topics dealt with in Chapter 3 
The chapter also introduced stakeholder theory as an expanded lens to assess the impact of 
environmental (and generic) coopetition. A wider view of coopetition could therefore easily 
incorporate stakeholder theory. In stakeholder theory, one would also consider public goods that 
accrue to society (see the grey areas on the right in Figure 3.11). 
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The chapter lastly introduced the concept of socio-environmental value (see the grey area on the 
left in Figure 3.11). Socio-environmental value is created when companies collaborate to address 
environmental issues, but which is a public good, meaning that the benefits are non-rivalrous, non-
excludable and sometimes non-rejectable. Socio-environmental value could also include intrinsic 
value. 
The following chapter explores the coopetition value matrix as conceptual model. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE COOPETITION VALUE MATRIX 
4.1 EXTRAPOLATING FROM EXISTING THEORY 
This chapter represents the culmination of the two previous theory-based chapters. Conceptually 
the chapter extrapolates from the existing coopetition body of knowledge by incorporating some of 
the theory around stakeholder theory and environmental value.  
Instead of limiting the concept of value creation to benefits that exclusively accrue to the coopeting 
parties, the researcher suggests that it is beneficial to accept a broader definition of benefits – one 
that includes public benefits. 
Similarly, the extant literature recognises that coopetition can create economic and knowledge 
value. This dissertation suggests that the value creation view should also recognise socio-
environmental value. 
The incorporation of these two extensions on the coopetition body of knowledge gives rise to the 
conceptual model introduced in this chapter. 
4.2 INCREASING AND SPLITTING THE PIE 
Conceptually, the dissertation relies on the analogy of a pie (Brandenburger & Nalebuﬀ, 1996; 
Lado et al., 1997; Walley, 2007; Lacomba et al., 2011; Chin et al., 2008; Rusko, 2011; Ritala & 
Tidström, 2014) to graphically portray the creation (Figure 4.1) and appropriation of benefits/value 
(Figure 4.2).  
4.2.1 Value creation 
In order to understand the analogy, one should imagine the pie of value. When more value is 
created (Figure 4.1) through cooperation, it consists either of economic value, knowledge value, or 
socio-environmental value (Dagnino & Padula, 2002: 32; Orsato, 2009: 14; Porter & Kramer, 
2011: 6). These are represented by increasing rings around the centre pie (the centre pie 
represents the value available without collaboration).  
As the rings in Figure 4.1 move further away from the centre, the value becomes more difficult to 
measure and to appropriate to the coopeting parties. For instance, knowledge value is somewhat 
more difficult to determine accurately than economic value, while socio-economic value is non-
excludable and notoriously difficult to determine.  
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Figure 4.1: Creation of value in environmental coopetition 
Source: Researcher. 
In some cases of coopetition, the socio-environmental benefit may be an externality. As stated 
earlier in the delimitation of the dissertation, the cases that were explored in this study were 
chosen specifically for the deliberate socio-environmental value they create. 
4.2.2 Value appropriation 
Figure 4.2 provides an illustration of how the total benefits created (shown in Figure 4.1) are 
appropriated to coopetitors and society.  For convenience of the discussion, the sections of the pie 
were numbered. Once again, the centre of the pie represents the situation in the market with no 
collaboration. The value that is created in addition to this value, is appropriated to different 
stakeholders.  
Section 1 of the pie represents the common benefit. This component is as a result of the collective 
effort of the partners, and is accessible to all partners (one can use a hypothetical coopetitive 
relationship between two firms, A and B). This could for instance refer to an increase in the 
knowledge stock of firms based on the co-design of a product (Dagnino & Padula, 2002). 
Alternatively, it could be a cost saving (i.e. an economic) benefit accruing to all competitors that 
invest in a more efficient logistics network (Limoubpratum et al., 2014). 
Section 2 portrays the common benefit captured by Firm A. In the absence of a better term, this 
component was labelled (as suggested before) as privately captured common benefit. Logically, 
the remainder of the common benefit is captured by Firm B. In relation to the examples above, 
privately captured common benefit in this case may represent the component of the increase in 
knowledge for Firm A. Or in the case of a logistics cost saving, privately captured common benefit 
represents the costs saved by Firm A due to the coopetition initiative.  
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No
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Common benefit: Firm A and Firm B collaborate. The created benefit cannot be 
generated in isolation and could only be generated through the joint idiosyncratic 
contributions of firm A and firm B (numbered 1). The common benefit is available to both 
parties.
Private benefit
1
12
Privately captured common benefit
Common benefit
123
No
collaboration
No
collaboration
Due to certain capabilities firm A captures some or all of the common benefit (numbered 2).
Firm A acquires knowledge or resources from its partner and applies them 
elsewhere to create private benefits (Numbered 3) that is not available to firm B.
Private benefit
Privately captured common benefit
Common benefit
123 No
collaboration
In some instances, socio-environmental benefits are created through the partnership,
intentionally or unintentionally. This value is only available to the public (Numbered 4).
4
Public benefit
 
Figure 4.2: Appropriation of benefit (value) in coopetition relationships 
Source: Researcher. 
Section 3 illustrates the private benefit as defined by Dyer et al. (2008) as well as Dagnino and 
Padula (2002: 12; 2007: 41). Private benefits are only available to one partner by virtue of its ability 
to apply knowledge and resources in markets outside of the coopetitive relationship.  For instance, 
if Firm A gains knowledge about a particular design-method from the co-design initiative, it is able 
to apply such knowledge to other designs. In fact, the mere availability of knowledge represents a 
private benefit. Firm A may also gain skills or resources from the logistics initiative that it can apply 
into other initiatives. 
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Section 4 portrays the public benefit (Orsato, 2009: 14). This value could consist of economic 
(socio-economic) knowledge or socio-environmental value but is non-excludable. By implication, all 
socio-environmental value is public, but not all public value is socio-environmental in nature. For 
instance, in the efficient logistics example used to illustrate sections one to three above, there is a 
potential reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. The benefit to society is an improved environment 
and reduced climate change. Such a benefit would be a socio-environmental value and a public 
good. On the other hand, it may be that the initiative creates many jobs, which would be a public 
benefit, but it would not be considered socio-environmental value. 
4.2.3 The value creation and appropriation 
The total value created equals the total value appropriated (illustrated for effect in Figure 4.3). To 
illustrate, one can use a thought experiment using knowledge in Firm A and Firm B. If an increase 
in knowledge stock takes place in both Firm A and Firm B (knowledge_valueA and 
knowledge_valueB), the pie on the left (Figure 3.4) increases by the sum of the increase, 
specifically in the knowledge value ring, i.e. 
value_createdTotal  = knowledge_valueTotal = knowledge_valueA  + knowledge_valueB …(4.1) 
Knowledge increases by positive-sum logic, so the common benefit increases by the same 
amount.  
value_appropriatedTotal = common_benefit = privately_captured_common_benefitA + 
privately_captured_common_benefitB  …(4.2) 
and we know that 
knowledge_valueA  + knowledge_valueB = privately_captured_common_benefitA + 
privately_captured_common_benefitB  …(4.3) 
which then leads us to 
value_createdTotal  = value_appropriatedTotal  …(4.4) 
The total value that is created is therefore only created if it is captured. The implication is that the 
two pies in Figure 4.3 increase by the same amount.  
 
=
Private benefit
Privately captured common benefit
Common benefit123 No
collaboration
4
Public benefit
No
collaborationKnowledge value
Economic value
Socio-environmental value
 
Figure 4.3: Created value is equal to appropriated value 
Source: Researcher. 
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This argument would also hold for cost savings (an economic benefit) or for an increase in 
biodiversity (an increase in socio-economic value that is a public good/benefit.) 
4.3 THE COOPETITION VALUE MATRIX 
The previous section portrayed value creation and appropriation as two independent constructs. 
Combining the views of value creation and appropriation into a single typology (see Figure 4.4) 
enables the conceptual disaggregation of value to illustrate how the total created value is 
appropriated to coopetitors and other stakeholders.  
 
123 No
collaboration
4
Socio-environmental value
 
Figure 4.4: Combining the value creation and value appropriation views 
Source: Researcher 
The coopetition value matrix (CVM) (Table 4.1) is a typology of value that addresses the gap in the 
literature as identified by Garcia-Castro and Aguilera (2014) and Ritala and Tidström (2014) by:  
 Improving the articulation of value creation; 
 Improving the articulation of value appropriation; 
 Allowing a better understanding of the dynamics of the two processes;  
 Allowing a better understanding of how different manifestations of value interact; 
 Allowing the articulation of potential opportunities for increased value creation or 
appropriation. 
The CVM illustrates extensions of the existing literature by suggesting the addition of privately 
captured common benefit and public benefit to the nomenclature of value appropriation (left-hand 
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vertical column), while also incorporating socio-environmental value into the value creation view 
(lower right-hand cell in the CVM).  
As the rows proceed downwards in the matrix, the benefit moves further away from the coopetition 
relationship. Also, as the rows proceed from left to right, the value becomes more abstract/ indirect 
in nature. By implication the CVM suggests that socio-environmental value is the most abstract and 
indirect in nature. The empirical component of this dissertation further illustrates the dynamic 
interaction between different types of value. 
Table 4.1: Coopetition value matrix 
  Value creation 
Economic  Knowledge  Environmental  
V
a
lu
e
 a
p
p
ro
p
ri
a
ti
o
n
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
  
Economic value-generated as a 
result of the coopetition relationship 
in positive-sum logic (Ritala & 
Tidström, 2014; Park et al., 2014; 
Rai, 2013) - in the form of tangible 
(increased revenue, lower expenses) 
or intangible (increased brand, lower 
risk) value. Examples could include: 
 Joint R&D investment (Kenworthy, 
1995) 
 Workforce training investment 
(Kenworthy, 1995) 
 Quicker agreement on standards 
(Dagnino & Padula, 2002) 
 Reduced Time-to-Market  
 Joint production  
 
A positive-sum logic increase in the 
collective knowledge stock of the 
coopetitors as a result of the 
coopetition relationship. This could 
be aspects related to:  
 Industry new knowledge creation 
and transfer (Steinmo & Jakobsen, 
2013) 
 Communication and information 
flows  
 Co-design (Dagnino & Padula, 
2002) 
 Co-development 
A benefit accrues to society because 
of environmental improvements, but 
this value is non-excludable (i.e. it 
cannot be captured by any of the 
coopetitors exclusively) and therefore 
cannot be considered as a common 
or private benefit. For this reason this 
cell is empty in the CVM. 
P
ri
v
a
te
ly
 c
a
p
tu
re
d
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
  
The component of economic value 
captured by any particular firm of the 
benefit created within the coopetition 
initiative. By implication, the 
remainder of the common value is 
appropriated to the other participants. 
The appropriation can follow either 
positive or zero-sum logic (Ritala & 
Tidström, 2014). 
A positive-sum logic increase in the 
knowledge stock of any particular 
firm (Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013) that 
relates to the objectives of the 
coopetitive initiatives. 
P
ri
v
a
te
  
The economic value generated by a 
firm outside of the coopetition 
relationship from skills or resources 
acquired inside the coopetitive 
relationship (Khanna et al., 1998; 
Dyer et al., 2008: 138; Ritala & 
Tidström, 2014; Dagnino & Padula, 
2007: 42; Park et al., 2014). The 
appropriation can follow either a 
positive (Ritala & Tidström, 2014) or 
zero-sum logic (Rai, 2013). 
A positive-sum logic increase in the 
knowledge stock of a firm that has 
value outside of the coopetitive 
relationship, but based on knowledge 
that was acquired inside the 
coopetitive relationship. Based on 
different backgrounds and different 
experiences, firms may learn 
different things (Steinmo & Jakobsen, 
2013: 3).  
P
u
b
li
c
  
Socio-economic value 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic value (or socio-economic 
value) accruing to society as a result 
of the coopetitive relationship. The 
appropriation follows positive-sum 
logic. 
Public knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
An increase in the knowledge stock 
in society (i.e. public knowledge) as a 
result of the coopetitive activities or 
relationship. The appropriation 
follows positive-sum logic. 
Socio-environmental value 
An increase in environmental value 
expressed as the utility for society, or 
as intrinsic value. Such value can 
derive from: 
 Protecting a species of fauna or 
flora 
 Reducing resource intensity 
 Reducing waste 
The appropriation follows positive-
sum logic. 
Source: Researcher 
There is no environmental value available to the coopetitors. This aspect flows from the definition 
of socio-environmental value as a public good, meaning that companies cannot exclude society 
from access to the benefits, and therefore cannot capture value exclusively for the partnership 
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(common benefit) or for themselves (private benefit). However, common or private value can be 
generated in addition to socio-environmental value without diminishing it (i.e. it is a positive-sum).  
4.4  DYNAMIC ASPECTS OF COOPETITION 
One aspect which has not been discussed in much depth in this dissertation is how different types 
of value interact. This aspect eludes to specifically to the second research question of the 
dissertation. However, apart from the dynamics of value, there are also other dynamic aspects of 
coopetition. 
4.4.1 Longitudinal shifts in relationships 
The collaboration process does not remain static over time. Collaborative relationships are socially 
contrived and are therefore shaped and restructured by actions and the interpretation of the 
actions of the parties involved (Bailey & Koney, 2000). Cooperation consists of a repetitive 
sequence of cooperation, conflict and compromise, with each dependent on the objectives of each 
of the parties (Augustyn & Knowles, 2000). Wang (2008: 155) defines five stages of collaboration 
in destination marketing, namely  
i. assembling (issue identification,partner selection),  
ii. ordering (establish goals, develop programs), 
iii. implementation (assign roles, exectitive programs), 
iv. evaluation (assess against goals and expectations), and 
v. transformation. 
In the transformation stage the outcome can range from evolving into a stronger relationship to 
ending the relationship completely (Ibid.). 
4.4.2 Value dynamics 
Apart from dynamics in the relationship, value that is created and appropriated can interact with 
other classifications of value. Garcia-Castro and Aguilera (2014) bemoans the lack of 
characterization of the patterns of value dynamics, while Ritala and Tidström (2014) points towards 
this need at both theoretical and empirical levels. From previous sections of this dissertation, 
examples can be drawn of how different types of value interact.  
Coopetition literature provides some anecdotal examples of how economic investments in 
coopetition (time, money and other resources) can lead to other forms of value: 
 Joint R& D initiatives can lead to environmental knowledge (Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013; 
Holmburg & Örne, 2013, De Marchi, 2012), 
 Participation in voluntary environmental programs can postpone or avoid regulatory 
behaviour of public agencies (Blanco et al., 2009), 
 Joint investment in freight solutions can lead to economic, social and environmental value 
(Limoubpratum, et al., 2014), 
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 Joint lobbying for reduced rolling resistance for tires leads to lower emissions for cars as well 
as increased market share for the leaders in an industry (Hanoteau, 2009: 39). 
Similarly, the literature around environmental strategy provides evidence of how environmental 
value can lead to economic value for firms.  
 Orsato’s (2009) win-win strategies (see Figure 3.4) are such examples. Firms create socio-
environmental value for society, while simultaneously creating value for shareholders in the 
form of cost savings, risk reduction or eco-branding (Orsato, 2006: 132-135; Peloza & 
Falkenberg, 2009: 98). As also illlustrated earlier in Figure 3.6, Kendall and Willard (2015: 11) 
points to a number of benefits for companies that engage in pro-environmental behaviour. 
 While the traditionalist view was that environmental performance would have to reduce 
economic performance (Wagner & Schaltegger, 2004: 558), this is questioned by the 
revisionist view (see Figure 3.5).  
 Previous mention was made of shared value, i.e. increasing value for both a company and 
economic and social conditions in the communities (Porter & Kramer, 2011: 66). 
 Lastly, the sustainable value framework (SVF) of Hart and Milstein (2003) illustrates how 
firms create value through environmental and social initiatives internally and externally, today 
and in the future (See Figure 3.2). 
As the examples above indicate, and as has been pointed out before, it is sub-optimal for 
managers not to think of the wider environmental and societal implications of their decisions, either 
in terms of value creation or value destruction (Freeman, 2010; Hart & Milstein, 2003; Bosse, 
Phillips & Harrison, 2009; Harrison & Wicks, 2013). 
These examples allows us to look at the CVM as a tool to investigate, not only the classification of 
value, but also the dynamic interaction of creation and appropriation of value. The references 
provided above are mostly related to environmental and societal value and how it relates back to 
economic value. This and aspects will empirically be investigated further in Chapter 7. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the conceptual model that is applied in the rest of the dissertation. The 
CVM builds on extant theory (Chapter 2) by introducing concepts from stakeholder theory and 
environmental economics (Chapter 3). In this way the study follows a typical structure of theory 
building research by drawing from theory beyond the study’s original theoretical domain (Ridder, 
Hoon & Baluch, 2014: 381). The resultant framework (the CVM) integrates the value creation and 
appropriation views (see grey aspects in Figure 4.5). The CVM maps nine types of value based on 
permutations of creation and appropriation aspects (grey areas in Figure 4.5).  
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Figure 4.5: Aspects introduced in Chapter 4 (in grey) 
Source: Researcher. 
The next chapter (Chapter 5) provides an overview of the research design.  
Chapter 6 applies the CVM to ten cases of environmental coopetition to further extend the 
understanding of value that is created in such cases (as reflected in RQ1 shown in Figure 4.5).  
Chapter 7 applies the CVM in order to identify how different types of value may interact (as 
reflected in RQ2 shown in Figure 4.5). 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
It is said that a Chinese philosopher, upon being asked whether it is possible to cross 
the same river twice, replied that it is not possible to cross the same river even once! 
Constant flux militates against conclusions that are always and forever true. 
(Erlandson, Harris, Skipper & Allen, 1993: 60) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the research methodology. TerreBlanche and Durrheim (1999: 33) stated 
that researchers need a series of decisions, based on four dimensions, namely: 
i) Purpose of the research; 
ii) Theoretical paradigm informing the research; 
iii) Context in which the research is carried out; and 
iv) The research techniques employed to collect and analyse data. 
The above points can be described as the design of a study, while the fourth point specifically 
refers to the methodology. This chapter provides insight of the last three points above as the 
purpose has already been discussed in Chapter 1. 
Conceptually this chapter also provides reflection on the nature of the contribution and how the 
contribution was arrived at. This PhD aims to be shifting consensus rather than building consensus 
(Hollenbeck, 2008). It does so through building theory from case study research. 
5.2 MAKING A CONTRIBUTION 
Theoretical contributions, regardless of the method or type of data used, involve findings that 
change, challenge, or fundamentally advance our understanding of a phenomenon. In other words, 
it should make us think differently to what past research suggested (Bansal & Corley, 2011: 235). 
Furthermore, such new knowledge must be arrived at in a scientific way, i.e. in an orderly 
investigative way (Eisenhardt, 1989: 532; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Ridder, Hoon & McCandless, 
2015).   
According to Money (2009), a contribution can be thought of at three different levels, namely: 
whether it contributes to (i) theory; (ii) context or (iii) method. This study’s contributions at each of 
these levels are discussed below. 
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5.2.1 Contributions to theory 
Ridder et al. (2014: 381) provided a map for case study researchers to allow researchers to 
position their research findings vis-à-vis existing theory (see Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1: Entering a dialogue with theory to demonstrate a contribution 
Source: Ridder et al., 2014: 381. 
Figure 5.1 in essence implies that the outcomes of a study can extend, refine or generate theory 
(Snow, 2004; Ridder et al., 2014: 381). Using this typology, the theoretical contribution of this 
dissertation can broadly be positioned as follows: 
i) Theory extension: The study first extended theory (Snow, 2004; Ridder et al., 2015) by 
showing that the extant literature of coopetition is equally applicable to the context of 
sustainability, or in the case of this dissertation, environmental projects.  
ii) Theory refinement: This dissertation refined the theory (Ridder et al., 2015; Burawoy, 1991; 
Snow, 2004) surrounding coopetition theory through a number of refinements to the 
articulation of value creation and appropriation. Theory refinement entails the modification or 
even rejection of theoretical statements through the close investigation of new cases. New 
thinking about a topic can be launched by identifying a new construct, or refining existing 
constructs. 
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iii) Theory generation: The study lastly built new theory by identifying new constructs (Ridder 
et al., 2015), generating novel conceptual frameworks and developing mid-range theory by 
drawing on existing bodies of knowledge. PhD research can also lead to new and novel 
questions, an outcome that is completely acceptable as an outcome for a PhD (Remenyi & 
Money, 2002: 113). 
Whetten (1989) stated that a complete theory must contain four elements: 
i) What: Theories should state what variables are included. Theory should strive for balance 
between comprehensiveness and parsimony (only show variables that add to our 
understanding). 
ii) How: The researcher should show how variables are interrelated. Typically this aspect would 
be portrayed by “arrows connecting boxes” (Whetten, 1989: 491). The What and How 
elements constitute the domain of the theory. The more complex the relationships, the more 
useful it becomes to graphically depict them. 
iii) The Why question addresses the underlying psychological, economic, or social dynamics 
that justify the causal relationships. During a study, logic replaces data as a basis for 
evaluation.  
iv) Theory development aims to challenge and extend existing knowledge. Hollenbeck (2008) 
refers to consensus shifting as opposed to consensus forming. In order to shift consensus, 
authors should provide compelling and logical justification for altered views (Whetten, 
1989: 491).  
The fourth element of Whetten’s (1989) requirements of theory falls under context. 
5.2.2 Contributions to context  
Whetten’s (1989) fourth requirement for a theory states that theoretical contributions should be 
framed in a context of Who, Where and When. Researchers need to consider if and how their 
findings would translate beyond the current temporal and contextual boundaries (Whetten, 
1989: 491). A study can make a contribution to context by showing how the theory translates into a 
different context (Ridder et al., 2015). Such a contribution, however, only has merit if something in 
the new context suggests that the theory should not work under such conditions (Whetten, 1989: 
491; Bansal & Corley, 2011: 235; Ridder et al., 2015: 162).  Again, this study chose a fairly narrow 
but important context, i.e. environmental coopetition that has not been studied much in the 
coopetition literature.  
The setting in the South African wine industry is also a context that has not been studied in the 
context of coopetition before. However, the theory that was developed in this dissertation is generic 
in nature and should be of much wider significance. 
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5.2.3 Contributions to method 
A study can thirdly make a contribution by applying a new methodology in an existing field and 
context. The field of coopetition has been studied through multiple methods including game 
theoretical, experimental and case-based inquiries (Dagnino & Rocco, 2009). This dissertation 
makes use of a novel methodology through the mapping of value in the CVM.  
The study followed a multiple case study design aimed at an iterative theory building method as 
typically described by Robinson (1951) and Eisenhardt (1989). In broader terms, the study followed 
a very typical sequence for qualitative analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 9): 
 The initial transcribed interviews and documents were coded using ATLAS.ti, a qualitative 
data analysis tool.  
 From this flowed comments, reflections, etc. (often referred to as memos), that were 
captured. 
 The researcher went through the material to identify similar phrases, patterns, themes, 
relationships, sequences, differences and similarities between interviews and cases, etc. 
 These patterns and emergent themes informed subsequent data collection. For instance, the 
focus on the value aspect of coopetition emerged gradually from the data. 
 The researcher gradually elaborated on a small set of generalisations that emerged from the 
data. 
 Lastly, these generalisations were linked back to the formalised body of knowledge regarding 
coopetition in the form of constructs or theories. 
5.2.4 The extent of a contribution 
Money (2009) further stated that a contribution in only one of the three aspects (theory, context 
and method) may not be a big enough contribution for a PhD, but also warned that a study that 
attempts to make a contribution along all three axes (of Figure 5.1) may be too risky. This 
dissertation makes a contribution at three levels, namely at the theoretical, contextual and 
methodological levels. The contributions were discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.7. 
5.3 PARADIGMS, DESIGNS AND METHODS 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2007: 108) used a research onion (see Figure 5.2) to explain some 
of the choices available to researchers regarding their research. This study can be captured by the 
following key terms (in red blocks in Figure 5.2): 
 Case study; 
 Inductive; 
 Interprevist; 
 Longitudinal;  
 Mono method. 
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Figure 5.2: Mapping this dissertation in the research onion 
Source: Adapted from Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007: 132. 
This dissertation is based in the interpretivist philosophy (or paradigm) of research (see the darker 
grey column in Table 5.1). Ontologically, this dissertation studies the phenomenon of 
environmental coopetition through the perceptions of the people who are involved in the cases of 
environmental coopetition (Corbetta, 2003: 15).  
Epistemologically the interpretivist paradigm implies that there is interdependence between the 
researcher and the object of study in that the researcher searches for meaning in order to create 
comprehension of the phenomenon (Corbetta, 2003: 15).  
Qualitative researchers seek illumination and understanding (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 113) of 
phenomena that may otherwise seem enigmatic or confusing (Eisner, 1991: 58). It extrapolates to 
other similar situations, unlike quantitative research that searches for causal determination, 
prediction and generalisation of findings (Hoepfl, 1997: 48).  
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Table 5.1: Characteristics of the basic paradigms of social research 
 Positivism Post-positivism Interpretivism 
Ontology Naïve realism: social reality is 
‘real’ and knowable (as if it 
were a ‘thing’) 
Critical realism: social reality 
is ‘real’ but knowable only in 
an imperfect and probabilistic 
manner 
Constructivism: the knowable 
world is that of meanings 
attributed by individuals.  
Relativism (multiple realities): 
these constructed realities 
vary in form and content 
among individuals, groups 
and cultures. 
Epistemology Dualism-objectivity Modified dualism-objectivity Non-dualism: non-objectivity.  
 True results 
 
Results probabilistically true Researcher and object of 
study are not separate, but 
interdependent 
 Experimental science in 
search of laws 
 
Experimental science in 
search of laws 
Multiplicity of theories for the 
same fact 
Interpretive science in search 
of meaning 
 Goal: explanation Goal: explanation Goal: comprehension 
 Generalisations: ‘natural 
immutable laws’ 
Generalisations: provisional 
laws, open to revision 
Generalisations: opportunity 
structures; ideal types 
Methodology Experimental manipulative Modified experimental-
manipulative 
Empathic interaction between 
scholar and object studied 
 Observation Observation Interpretation 
 Observation-observed 
detachment 
Observer-observed 
detachment 
Observer-observed interaction  
 Mostly induction Mostly deduction (disproof of 
hypotheses) 
Induction (knowledge 
emerges from the reality 
studied) 
 Quantitative techniques Quantitative techniques with 
some qualitative  
Qualitative techniques 
 Analysis ‘by variables’ Analysis ‘by variables’ Analysis ‘by cases’ 
Source: Adapted by Corbetta (2003: 15) from Guba & Lincoln (1994: 109). 
In alignment with Corbetta’s view (2003: 15) of interpretivism, this dissertation made use of multiple 
case studies to study environmental coopetition. In this regard, Parkhe (1993: 228) argued in 
favour of inductive research to make advances in theory, and most particularly so in emergent 
fields.  
In essence, as stated before, this PhD study set out to shift consensus rather than build consensus 
(Hollenbeck, 2008). For instance, the study questions previous coopetition research that limits the 
idea of value to value that is created for the coopetitors. Instead, this study incorporates 
stakeholder theory to show how value is created for society, for the environment, and ultimately 
also for coopetitors. 
One of the strengths of case studies over other designs is the ability to bring the reader very close 
to the phenomenon and its context. Case studies are particularly useful where phenomena are 
influenced by, or influence, the context (Hartley, 2004: 323; Ridder et al., 2015).  
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By studying coopetition in the context of environmental problems, allowed the researcher to show 
how value is dynamic, and that the dynamics of value are different even though the classifications 
of value are similar.  
The findings of qualitative research should generalise to theory rather than to a population 
(Rudden, 2006: 8.3; Mitchell, 1983: 207), and this is evident from the theory that emerged during 
this study. 
Because of the closeness phenomenon to the context in case study research, one should note that 
case studies proliferate rather than narrow. It attends more to the idiosyncratic than to the 
pervasive (Stake, 2009). For this reason, there are always too many ‘variables’ for the number of 
observations.  
5.4 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY VS. TRUSTWORTHINESS AND AUTHENTICITY 
5.4.1 Reliability and validity 
The case method as a qualitative approach has certain implications for what is described as 
external validity or “the degree to which findings can be generalised across social settings” 
(Bryman & Bell, 2007: 410), as well as the external reliability of the dissertation, i.e. “the degree to 
which a study can be replicated” (ibid.).  
Hartley (2004: 324) argued that the criteria for quantitative research, i.e. reliability, validity and 
generalisability can be addressed, but with different logics and evidence. Quite a large number of 
authors have discussed this issue, but the strongest voices belong to Guba and Lincoln (1994).  
According to these authors, criteria for quantitative research are based in the realist ontological 
position (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 114), or differently put, it presupposes “that a single absolute 
account of social reality is feasible” (Bryman & Bell, 2007: 410). Under such an assumption, 
research is measured against the criteria of internal validity, external validity, reliability and 
objectivity (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 114) as shown in Table 5.2. Indeed, these two authors stated 
that:  
These criteria depend on the realist ontological position; without the assumption, 
isomorphism of findings with reality can have no meaning, strict generalizability to a 
parent population is impossible, stability cannot be assessed for enquiry into a 
phenomenon if the phenomenon itself can change, and objectivity cannot be achieved 
because there is nothing from which one can be “distant” (ibid.). 
However, Guba and Lincoln (ibid.) proposed an alternative to reliability and validity, namely 
trustworthiness and authenticity.  
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5.4.2 Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness can be described through four sub criteria, namely: (i) credibility; (ii) transferability; 
(iii) dependability; and (iv) objectivity. These four criteria of trustworthiness can be matched to the 
requirements for quantitative research, but in a qualitative context.  
Table 5.2: Trustworthiness criteria vs. Quantitative criteria 
Criteria in 
quantitative 
research 
Trustworthiness 
criteria in 
qualitative 
research 
Clarification Application in this dissertation 
Internal validity 
(Is there a match 
between 
observations and 
the ideas the 
researcher 
develops?) 
Credibility “...entails both ensuring 
that research is carried out 
according to the canons of 
good practice” and  
confirming findings with the 
members of the social 
world that was studied.    
As the study progressed, the developing 
theory was used to introduce the topic to 
interviewees. Also, at the end of a number 
of the interviews, the researcher would 
discuss aspects like the coopetition value 
matrix with interviewees.  
In many of these cases, the interviewees 
were excited about the conceptual 
development, and often would request that 
the final findings should be presented back 
to the coopetition partners.  
A paper that was published from the 
dissertation was presented to some of the 
interviewees who were mentioned for input 
and response. The responses were 
supportive and in agreement with the 
paper’s findings. 
External validity 
(generalisability) 
Transferability Providing a rich description 
of the social world so that 
other researchers can 
judge the transferability of 
the findings to other 
environments.  
The researcher tried to maintain a balance 
between superfluous information about the 
cases, and providing a rich enough 
description for the reader to understand 
how the contexts may affect the theory. 
Reliability  
(a sense of 
stability) 
Dependability The researcher should 
keep an audit trail to allow 
others to test whether 
inferences can be justified. 
Meticulous management of the process 
allows for a clear audit trail. Interviews 
were recorded, transcribed, translated and 
coded. All of these steps are completely 
auditable and confirmable. 
Objectivity  
(distanced and 
neutral observer) 
Confirmability While acknowledging that 
complete objectivity is 
impossible, it should be 
apparent that the 
researcher has not overtly 
allowed personal values or 
theoretical inclinations to 
influence the conduct of 
the research or the findings 
flowing from it. 
While I would acknowledge that I am 
passionate about solving environmental 
issues, the focus on how value is created 
and appropriated in environmental 
coopetition cases is not impacted by my 
values. Providing direct quotes in many 
instances, allows the data to speak for 
itself and for the reader to judge my 
objectivity. Regular interaction with my 
supervisor and peers also provided 
valuable testing grounds for my own 
paradigms. 
Source: Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 114; Bryman & Bell, 2007: 410; Miles & Huberman, 1994: 278-280. 
The first three columns of Table 5.2 provide a synthesis of Guba and Lincoln (1994: 114), Bryman 
and Bell (2007: 410), and Miles and Huberman (1994: 278-280). The right-hand column provides 
insight of how the criteria for qualitative research by Guba and Lincoln (1994) were met in this 
dissertation.  
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5.4.3 Authenticity 
Authenticity as described by Guba and Lincoln (1994) extends the criteria to measure qualitative 
research to include also fairness, ontological authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic 
authenticity and tactical authenticity (See Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3: Clarification of Guba & Lincoln’s authenticity criteria 
Guba & Lincoln’s 
authenticity criteria 
in qualitative 
research 
Clarification Application in this dissertation 
Fairness Does the research reflect the 
opinions of all the members in 
a social setting? 
Interviews included participants of coopetition initiatives, 
industry bodies, environmental activists, as well as other 
stakeholders.  
Interviews were also triangulated with other types of data 
such as academic journal findings, websites and company 
reports. 
Ontological 
authenticity 
Does the research assist 
members to gain a better 
understanding of their social 
environment?  
The coopetition value matrix assists stakeholders of 
environmental coopetition initiatives to better understand 
how and for whom value is created. 
Educative authenticity Does the research assist 
members to better appreciate 
the views of other members of 
the social setting?  
The coopetition value matrix allows the disaggregation of 
value, which in turn helps members to understand why and 
how different stakeholders benefit from environmental 
coopetition initiatives. 
Catalytic authenticity Does the research stimulate 
to action?  
Not a particular aim of the study, although a request from 
some respondents indicates that the findings would act as 
catalyst to action. 
Tactical authenticity Does the research empower 
action? 
A better understanding of how socio-environmental value 
facilitates the creation of common and private value can 
increase the likelihood of action. Yet this aspect was not a 
particular objective of the study. 
Source: Reworked from Bryman & Bell (2007: 414) and Guba & Lincoln (1994: 114). 
The authenticity criteria for qualitative research has not made much impact on qualitative research, 
and are sometimes regarded as controversial (Bryman & Bell, 2007: 414).  For instance, for the 
purpose of this PhD study, it was not envisioned that the study would attempt to strictly meet the 
criteria for catalytic or tactical authenticity.  
5.5 THE RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
Although the “coopetition” body of literature could be considered as intermediate (in most respects) 
or even mature (in fewer respects), there is little discussion in coopetition theory about 
environmental coopetition as a phenomenon. Instead, theory dealing with environmental 
coopetition would be considered emergent. Emergent theory “proposes tentative answers to novel 
questions of how and why, often merely suggesting new connections among phenomena” 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007: 1158).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
96 
This dissertation makes a conceptual contribution to the need for a better understanding and 
articulation of value creation and appropriation dynamics (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2014; Ritala & 
Tidström, 2014; Park et al., 2014) by addressing two parallel research questions.  
RQ1: What types of value do companies create and appropriate in environmental coopetition?  
RQ2: How do the different types of value interact (i.e. value dynamics) in environmental 
coopetition?  
The research questions narrowed considerably during the process of research (See Appendix A for 
a view of the original scope and Appendix B for the original interview guide).  
Early in the research process (specifically during interviews for the case dealing with conservation 
of the riverine rabbit; the case was eventually excluded from the study), it became evident that 
there was little economic or knowledge benefit for some participants in the coopetition initiatives 
under investigation, while other partners comparatively reaped more of the benefits. Thus, the 
question of value creation and appropriation emerged, and it soon became the primary focus. As 
stated by Eisenhardt (1989), the crisper question allowed more focus in other parts of the research 
process, such as the literature review and the interviews. (This aspect reiterates the refinement of 
research questions, the focus and the cases as implied by steps 4, 5, 5a and 5b in Figure 5.3.) 
Because the theory underpinning both RQ1 and RQ2 is emergent, it required a qualitative 
approach. Large sample quantitative studies would have been inappropriate in this dissertation. A 
number of reasons can be given to support this statement:  
i) Firstly, there is no sampling frame of coopetition cases in the wine industry of South Africa. 
And because the phenomenon is unknown to most respondents, one would not be able to 
perform an industry-wide survey to arrive at such a list.  
ii) Related to this point, because there is so little known about the forms of environmental 
coopetition and how the concept should be described, a quantitative study would have been 
inappropriate.  
iii) Thirdly, there simply is not enough known about environmental coopetition and the dynamics 
of value creation and appropriation in such cases to warrant deductive approaches. 
Deductive research tends to aggregate a phenomenon without considering different contexts. 
Clearly, such an approach could not have worked for this study.  
Lastly, the How research question hints at an inductive process (Edmondson & McManus, 
2007: 1158; Yin, 1981). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
97 
5.6 BUILDING THEORY FROM CASES 
5.6.1 Motivation for the case method  
Case study theory-building tends to be inductive (Hartley, 2004: 324). Yin (2009) compared the 
method to that of a detective sifting through evidence (some relevant and others not) to determine 
what happened, why and under what circumstances. But such work is not just undertaken to 
understand the features of the particular case, but also draw out findings that are applicable to a 
wider base (Hartley, 2004: 324). While quantitative studies rely on statistical inference, case study 
research relies on ‘logical’ inference. Yin (2009) distinguished, in a similar way, between ‘empirical’ 
and ‘analytical’ generalisation.  
Not all inductive studies require a disregard for a priori knowledge as is sometimes required of 
grounded theory (Remenyi, 2013a: 29; Yin, 1981; Ridder et al., 2014: 381). Without a strong link to 
a theoretical framework, case study research may deliver results that are fascinating in a particular 
context, but is of no further significance (Hartley, 2004: 324). The research focus of this 
dissertation did not evolve independently of the relevant theory, and was therefore much closer to 
analytic induction (Manning, 1982) than grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
In essence, Figure 5.3 provides a good overview of the way in which the study evolved. The study 
originated from a practical problem in the wine industry relating to environmental coopetition. A 
preliminary investigation of the coopetition body of literature identified that:  
 The field lacked sufficient depth in the context of environmental coopetition; 
 There was no literature available about the public benefit that was created in such cases; 
 The existing nomenclature of coopetition lacked the semantic clarity to describe the value 
constructs effectively. 
The study therefore originated from an apparent gap in the literature, and because so little was 
written about environmental coopetition, an inductive approach was chosen.  
Figure 5.3 illustrates the broad structure of the methodology that was followed. The structure 
resembles the outline suggested by Bryman and Bell (2007: 406), but the process is very similar to 
that put forward by Kathleen Eisenhardt’s seminal paper on how to build theory from case studies. 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) paper made an important contribution to the field of case study research and 
has already been cited more than 25 000 times. The paper combined a number of previous views 
on qualitative methods, design of case study research (Yin, 1981) and grounded theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) and extended the work further to include areas such as a priori specification of 
constructs, triangulation of multiple investigators, within-case and across-case analyses and the 
role of existing theory (Eisenhardt, 1989: 533).  
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1. General research question
2. Selecting relevant cases
5a. Tighter specifications of the research 
question(s).
5b. Collection of further data within and 
from new cases
6. Writing up finding/conclusions
3. Collecting the relevant data from first 
cases
4. Interpretation of data
5. Conceptual and theoretical work
 
Figure 5.3: An outline of the main steps in the research methodology 
Source: Constructed from Eisenhardt (1989: 533) and Bryman & Bell (2007: 406). 
Yet it is important to note that case study research does not aim to generalise to a population, but 
rather to generalise to similar cases (or to theory). For this to happen, enough context must be 
provided to allow the reader to generalise as they identify essential similarities. For this reason, the 
demands for typicality and representativeness require a proper description of the target case 
(Stake, 2009: 23). 
Yin (1981) listed three reasons for using case studies in building theory, i.e.:  
i) It is essential in the early development stage of knowledge (when the existing literature is not 
developed enough to allow for explicit hypotheses (Ridder et al., 2015: 142));  
ii) It is required to understand the phenomenon in its real-life context; and  
iii) When the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clear.  
Case study research is therefore ideally suited for an emerging (or poorly described) phenomenon 
such as environmental coopetition.  
5.6.2 Selecting cases 
Due to a lack of examples and discussion in the literature around environmental coopetition 
(as also pointed out by Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013: 5), this dissertation should be seen as an 
exploration of the intricacies of the phenomenon of environmental coopetition through selected 
purpose-chosen case studies (i.e. using judgemental sampling).  
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The higher the level of heterogeneity of the cases used, the more problematic it becomes to 
generalise from a single case or few cases (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster, 2009: 104).  
Heterogeneity itself is not the problem as much as heterogeneity that will impact on the nature of 
the phenomenon under study. Case researchers can overcome much of this limitation by using 
theoretical ideas and information about cases in their analyses, and by selecting cases based on 
such ideas and insights (Gomm et al., 2009: 105). 
There are different strategies in case selection. Cases can be selected for the fact that they are 
typical in some respect.  Cases, however, can also be selected to reflect extremes within the 
expected heterogeneity (Gomm et al., 2009: 107). This dissertation only made use of cases in 
which the environmental coopetition phenomenon occurs, and not cases in which it does not 
(ibid.).  “Qualitative sampling often begins by recruiting participants solely based on whether they 
have experienced the research topic in question” (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007: 232). Case-studies 
that do not contribute to society’s understanding or the ability to explain, cannot be regarded as 
knowledge (Remenyi, Money, Price, & Bannister, 2002: 15). The selections were further based on 
certain characteristics, such as the type of environmental problem the company experienced, size, 
position as sustainability pioneer, reputation in the industry. 
 There is no sampling frame for coopetition initiatives, hence the initial interviewees were 
purposefully selected (Neuman, 2000: 198) because of the wine companies’ position in the 
industry, either through prominence or reputation for sustainability. During the interviews, the focus 
shifted to cases, and cases were identified through snowball sampling (Neuman, 2000: 199). At the 
end of the interviews, participants were asked whether they were aware of other examples of 
environmental coopetition.  
One of the problems with snowball sampling is that respondents know each other because they 
are similar or are friends, and therefore hold similar views and paradigms. The researcher 
therefore often approached bodies that stand removed from specific case studies, such as 
Conservation at Work, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Biodiversity & Wine Initiative (BWI) 
and Wine Organisation of South Africa (WOSA).  
The objective of interviewing people in organisations such as WOSA and WWF was twofold: They 
firstly provided access to other cases that may not be similar to previous cases, and secondly, 
provided different perspective on cases than the coopeting parties (informant triangulation). (This 
approach should remind the reader of the structural holes theory discussed earlier, specifically 
because connecting with unconnected networks allows for better insight.) 
All in all, cases were heterogeneous in the sense that all cases focused on environmental 
coopetition. However, cases were pursued based on differences rather than similarities in order to 
gain as much insight into how aspects such as the number of partners, the nature of the 
environmental problems, and proximity impact these initiatives.  
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Another difficulty experienced in this study was the lack of distinction between sustainability 
activities that happen within case companies, but have no relation to the coopetition activities, and 
those activities that happen in or between participants of the coopetition initiative. Often 
respondents would refer to value of environmental initiatives, but under closer investigation, the 
activity would not be related to coopetition.  
In an extreme example, one case company (associated with interviewee W10) is widely recognised 
for its proactive environmental initiatives, but had very little interaction with other wine producers 
regarding joint sustainability initiatives apart from industry initiatives such as the Biodiversity & 
Wine Initiative (BWI). The reason was that it was isolated and had no wine-producing neighbours. 
It hence belonged to industry initiatives such as the BWI, but had no other interaction with 
competitors. 
A key question in case study research revolves around the number of cases that should be studied 
to make a robust conclusion (Remenyi, 2013b: 23). A single case may suffice to falsify a theory, as 
with Popper’s (1968) famous example of a black swan. Such a strong case can, in itself, be 
regarded as a contribution to theory (Ridder et al., 2014: 378). But falsifying a theory is seldom 
considered enough of a contribution (Whetten, 1989: 492). After all, most theory can be considered 
an approximation of real life; so finding an exception may not be considered sufficient to shift 
consensus. It is also important to provide a better explanation of phenomena in the place of the 
original theory. Without a better explanation, it is hard to tell whether the original explanation is 
really flawed, or just the best explanation at the time of a complex world (ibid.). 
Because one case is often not sufficient, most authors who write about building theory from cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Ridder et al., 2015; Remenyi, 2013b; Snow, 2004) recommend multiple case 
studies for theory-building. Two cases often are not considered sufficient for PhD research. For 
PhD research Remenyi (2013b: 23) recommended three to four cases, sometimes perhaps even 
five. Because academic research requires cases in depth, most supervisors would consider more 
than five cases more than enough work for a PhD study (Remenyi, 2013b: 23). This dissertation 
considered more than double this number of cases in line with Eisenhardt’s suggestion of five to 
ten cases (1989: 545). More than ten cases is considered unwieldly (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 
2014: 34).  
Not all cases were studied at the same depth. Gomm et al. (2009: 107) maintained that it is not 
necessary to study all cases in the same depth. While one or two cases may be investigated in 
depth, others may be examined more superficially to check the generalisability of findings from 
earlier cases. This resonates well with the iterative approach that Eisenhardt (1989: 533) described 
for building theory from cases. Another aspect to depth is that some cases just plainly does not 
have as much ‘meat’ as others do. Particularly, one case in this dissertation could only be 
described superficially, but it also represented a rather shallow level of coopetition. 
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5.7 THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
5.7.1 The initial wider context 
The nature of the dissertation is such that the conclusions of the study are likely to be 
generalisable to other industries and contexts. What is more important is to point out why the wine 
industry was an ideal context to investigate.  
At the outset of this study, one of the objectives was to explore how the industry context would 
impact the types, methods, motivations and barriers of environmental coopetition (RQ6 in 
Appendix A). As a result, three industries were considered, namely the fishing, the wine and the 
forestry industries. Because there is no central database of coopetition or environmental 
coopetition initiatives, early interviews were less focused on specific examples of environmental 
coopetition, and more on understanding the prevalence of such cases in the three industries.  
The following emerged from this broad overview: 
i) The fishing industry has been plagued by cases of collusion in the past. The industry is 
dominated by only four large players, and it is an industry that already suffers under 
controversy due to the pressure on fish stocks. Companies in the fishing industry therefore 
do not want to work directly with one another, but rather choose to work through government 
departments to agree on quotas, and via organisations like the Marine Stewardship Council 
for industry standards. Apart from these examples, most interviewees stated that cooperation 
was extremely limited. For instance, fishing companies cannot collectively manage the waste 
of two adjacent canning plants because this could potentially allow the companies to 
estimate the size of their competitor’s production. Knowing the extent of a competitor’s 
production could potentially be considered collusion, even in cases where it constitutes an 
authentic effort for eco-efficiency. As a result, companies are extremely weary of talking to 
each other about synergies, and are even more weary of speaking to a researcher who 
studies cooperation with competitors. 
ii) The forestry industry is even smaller in terms of the number of large players, and there was 
also a practical issue that these companies were not geographically close to the researcher. 
No interviews were conducted in this industry. 
5.7.2 The wine industry as context for environmental coopetition 
The wine industry turned out to be an ideal context for this dissertation. The industry is highly 
fragmented, with the number of wine producers estimated to be close to 500, while grape farmers 
are estimated at 3 800 (South African Waste Information System, 2014). Historically the wine 
estates did not compete with one another and were highly regulated until 1994. Remnants of the 
absence of competition are still visible in the ease with which some of the bigger players seem to 
cooperate. Given the fragmented nature of the wine industry, the industry experiences little 
discomfort with competitors interacting. For this reason, and other reasons that will become more 
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visible later in the study, the industry has ample examples of environmental coopetition. By 
focusing only on one industry, much of the variability in context was removed. 
The wine industry in South Africa is vulnerable to climate change, mostly in terms of water 
sensitivity. While the industry in itself does not have a major carbon footprint, it is considered 
vulnerable to the impact of climatic changes and water scarcity.  
But vulnerability also pushed in the opposite direction. One of the major impacts of the wine 
industry is that it affects negatively on the floral biodiversity of the region. Nearly 95 percent of wine 
growing in South Africa happens in the Cape Floral Kingdom (Fairbanks, Hughes & Turpie, 
2004: 1075), known for its fynbos – the most diverse flora in the world.  
The above context is sufficient for the understanding of the ten cases to follow in the next chapter. 
Each of the cases elaborates further on the wine industry and its dynamics. 
5.8 INTERVIEWS 
Section 5.6.2 provided an overview of how the cases were selected. Depending on the case, 
between two and five people were interviewed with the specific objective of gaining an 
understanding of the interviewee’s perspective of the case. In some instances, interviewees were 
sufficiently informed to provide perspectives on more than one case. 
The duration of the interviews ranged between twenty minutes and almost two hours (see 
Table 5.4). On average, the interviews were one hour and four minutes in length. All but one of the 
interviews were subsequently transcribed.  
Thirty-two (32) qualitative interviews were conducted, after which thirty-one (31) interviews were 
transcribed. Thirty (30) of the interviews dealt with the wine industry. Ten cases were selected from 
the interviews for further analysis.  
Cases were disqualified when: 
 It was not from the wine industry (e.g. Oceana fisheries, part of the original scope of the 
study); 
 It was too similar to another case (e.g. the Groenberg Conservancy);  
 There was insufficient data on the case (e.g. the Orange river/KWV waste treatment plant); 
or  
 There were insufficient interviewees who could speak with confidence on the case (e.g. the 
riverine rabbit conservation case). 
All three the cases from the wine industry mentioned above were very similar to other cases, so 
the researcher believed that not much was lost by disqualifying these cases. 
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Table 5.4: Interviewees case matrix 
# Inter-
viewee 
Description Position Date of 
interview 
Duration 
of 
interview 
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1 W1 Wine producer. Premium brand, known 
as a sustainability leader, more than 
one wine farm in different regions 
operating under the same brand, 
medium sized in bottling capacity 
Marketing 
manager 
8 Jul 2011  Not 
recorded 
          
2 W2  Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, medium sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Communi-
cations 
executive 
8 Jul 2011  1:27 
 x      x  x 
3 W3 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, medium sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Manager: 
Strategic 
initiatives 
  
 x      x  x 
4 W4/W15 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Sustainability 
manager 
13 Jul 2011  1:23 
 x x x    x  x 
5 W5  Wine producer. Known as a 
sustainability leader, medium sized in 
bottling capacity. 
CEO 16 Jul 2012  1:17 
 x x      x  
6 W6 Robertson area wine producer. 
Premium brand. Known as a 
sustainability leader, more than one 
wine farm in different regions operating 
under the same brand, medium sized in 
bottling capacity. 
Sustainability 
manager 
29 Aug 2013 2:04 
x  x        
7 W7 Robertson area wine producer. 
Provider of grapes to the cooperative. 
Diversified farm (olives, aromatic oils, 
accommodation). 
Wine grape 
farmer 
3 Oct 2013 1:30 
x          
8 W8 Robertson area wine producer. 
Cooperative 
CEO 3 Oct 2013 1:24 
x  x        
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Table 5.4: Interviewees case matrix (continued) 
# Inter-
viewee 
Description Position Date of 
interview 
Duration 
of 
interview 
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9 W9 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. Has board representation on 
glass recycling company board 
General 
manager 
11 Mar 2014 0:45 
  x         
10 W10 Wine producer. Stellenbosch area, 
known for pro-active environmental 
initiatives, does not cooperate much 
apart from BWI. 
Wine maker 21 Jan 2015 0:34 
 x x    x    
11 W11 Wine producer, part of Greater 
Simonsberg Conservancy, BWI 
Champion. Is a farm under the control 
of Distell. 
Wine maker 29 Jan 2015 0:46 
   x x x   x   
12 W12 / N5 Wine producer, part of Greater 
Simonsberg Conservancy, BWI 
Champion Person interviewed is a 
coordinator of the conservancy and 
therefore plays a dual role. 
Conservancy 
manager 
12 Feb 2015 1:18 
  x x x      
13 W13 Wine producer. Known as a 
sustainability leader, medium sized in 
bottling capacity. 
Sustainability 
manager 
18 Feb 2015 1:13 
  x      x  
14 W14 Wine grower/producer CEO/Owner & 
Conservancy 
manager 
10 Mar 2015 1:08 
   x x      
14 W15 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Sustainability 
manager 
13 Apr 2015  0:54 
x  x     x x x 
16 W16 Wine grower/producer. Elgin region. 
Known for sustainability initiatives. 
CEO/Owner 20 Apr 2015  1:36 
x  x        
17 W17 Organic wine farm. Stellenbosch 
region. 
Managing 
director 
29 Apr 2015 0:38 
  x x x x     
18 W18 Biodynamic wine farm. Stellenbosch 
region. 
Owner 12 May 2015 1:06 
  x   x x    
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Table 5.4: Interviewees case matrix (continued) 
# Inter-
viewee 
Description Position Date of 
interview 
Duration 
of 
interview 
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19 W19 Ultra-premium wine producer, small 
bottling capacity, Stellenbosch region. 
Owner 11 Sep 2015 0:39 
  x    x    
20 W20 Organic farmer, supplier of grapes to 
organic wine producer W18. 
Owner 15 Sep 2015 0:41 
    x x x    
21 N1 Environmental NGO operating in 
Robertson and other areas. 
Activist 27 Feb 2014  1:00 
x          
24 N3 Environmental multinational NGO Manager 1 Aug 2012 1:14           
25 N4 Environmental organisation Project 
manager 
24 Jun 2014  1:18 
x  x x      
 
26 N5 / W12 See W12 Manager             
27 N6 Environmental multinational NGO. 
Local initiative in the wine industry. 
Project 
manager 
16 Feb 2015  0:48 
  x x      
 
28 N7 South African NGO working with 
conservancies. 
Chairperson 10 Apr 2015 0:43 
x  x x      
 
29 J1 Journalist working in the wine industry. Journalist 23 Apr 2015 0:30 x  x x       
30 T1 Industry body CEO 31 Mar 2015 0:52  x         
31 F1 Farmer Owner 24 Apr 2015 0:54 x          
32 N8 Wine body Communica-
tions Manager 
13 May 2015 
19 May 2015 
0:48 
   x      
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5.9 INFORMED CONSENT AND ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
5.9.1 Anonymity of respondents vs. anonymity of case companies 
The study and the way it proceeded provides an interesting perspective on the ethical aspects. For 
a start, while it was easy to ensure the anonymity of the respondents, it was never a consideration 
to make the case companies anonymous, as the discussion of value for different stakeholders 
would be impossible to convey without providing contextual information, such as pictures of labels 
or other physical pieces of evidence. Any attempt to make the cases anonymous would undermine 
any claim of intrinsic value of the cases (Gomm et al., 2009: 99).  
On the other hand, because the environmental coopetition initiatives are generally in the public 
domain, none of the respondents expressed any sensitivity around the discussion of this in the 
dissertation. At the writing up stage of the study, it was deemed necessary to obtain permission 
from respondents to use the names of case companies. It is not uncommon in case study research 
to use the names of case companies. See for instance Ritala and Tidström (2014) and Bengtsson 
and Kock (1999). 
5.9.2 Expressing views on behalf of companies 
Another important aspect revolved around the ability of respondents to talk on behalf of the 
companies they may work for. In this regard it is important to note that respondents were not 
required to talk as official representatives of any organisation. Respondents were chosen based on 
their involvement in, or knowledge of, environmental coopetition initiatives. Such people were best 
equipped to provide insight in the perceived value that is created by environmental coopetition 
initiatives. However, this was also clarified by requesting respondents to provide a declaration that 
they were entitled to respond on behalf of their organisations. 
The nature of the study is such that it falls in a low-risk category. The information required for the 
study is not confidential, and the focus is on the motivation, value, and mechanism that lead to the 
particular instance of environmental coopetition. Respondents were usually requested for an 
interview by email and had the right to decline. During the interview itself respondents were again 
given the background and focus of the study, and had the option to decline. None of the 
interviewees who agreed to an interview declined the interview once it had commenced. 
5.10 TRIANGULATION 
One of the ways to increase the robustness (or grounding) of qualitative research is through 
triangulation (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 266; Bloor & Wood, 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989). Denzin 
(1989) distinguished between four kinds of triangulation. Table 5.5 below shows the four methods 
of triangulation that were applied in this study. 
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Table 5.5: Triangulation in this study 
Type of 
triangulation 
Description How the principle was applied in this dissertation 
Data 
triangulation 
Using 
different data 
sources to 
study the 
same 
phenomenon 
Data triangulation was interpreted in a number of different ways. 
First, environmental coopetition was studied through a number of 
different cases. 
Secondly, most of the cases relied on a number of different views of the 
same case. This can be regarded as informant triangulation (Stake, 
1995). 
Thirdly, not only were coopetition partners interviewed, but in a number 
of cases, other stakeholders were included as sources. 
Lastly, in many of the cases, other sources such as websites, brochures, 
meeting documents and emails were included as sources or at least 
consulted. 
Investigator 
triangulation 
Using 
different 
investigators 
in the same 
study 
In the absence of multiple interviewers, the researcher strived for regular 
discussions with supervisors, colleagues and peers to discuss the study.  
Theoretical 
triangulation 
Using 
different 
theoretical 
models in 
the study 
The study relied on theory from multiple theoretical models that 
ultimately formed part of the new theoretical framework.  
For instance, the study relied both on the theories surrounding value 
creation and value appropriation, and further incorporated theory from 
stakeholder theory and environmental economics. 
Methodological 
triangulation 
Using more 
than one 
method to 
study the 
phenomenon 
The study did not make use of methodological triangulation. Section 5.5 
provides a motivation why a qualitative approach was most suitable to 
this study. 
Source: Adapted from Denzin, 1989; Stake, 1995. 
To benefit from triangulation, one should select triangulation sources that represent different biases 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994: 267).  Interviews for this dissertation were conducted with a broad range 
of stakeholders in order to triangulate the results (termed informant triangulation by Stake, 1995). 
Some of the interviewees included persons working with the NGO and non-profit organisation 
(NPO) environment in order to corroborate or contrast the views of coopeting entities, but also to 
identify further cases. Interviewees included neighbours to the coopetition initiatives, people no 
longer involved, the dissidents, the renegades and the eccentrics (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 
2014: 36).  
Table 5.4 provides an overview of the interviewees. In some instances, supporting material from 
websites, founding documents, annual reports and marketing material served as further sources of 
evidence (data triangulation).  
Triangulation is not without its critics. Some believe that triangulation is too positivist (Remenyi, 
2013b: 98). Bloor and Wood (2006:171) argued that there is always “one best method” to address 
a research topic. Triangulation therefore requires one to address a research topic with a 
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supplementary method that could be inferior to the main one. This is not problematic when the 
inferior method corroborates the result. Nevertheless, triangulation seldom provides confirmation 
(Bloor & Wood, 2006:171) or access to the ‘truth’ (Remenyi, 2013b: 98). Such contradictory results 
may just be because the second method is inappropriate (Bloor & Wood, 2006:171), leaving the 
researcher in the predicament of deciding which result is the truth (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 266). 
There is no easy way of resolving contradictions in evidence. Instead, such contradictions should 
be seen as an opportunity to see a much richer picture and have a better understanding of the 
issues involved (Remenyi, 2013b: 98). Of course, in qualitative research, such contradictories add 
to the tapestry of the case, while quantitative research may battle to incorporate contradictory 
information from multiple sources. 
Respondents were typically asked a number of open-ended questions, including giving examples 
of environmental coopetition based on a short explanation of the phenomenon.  
A number of semi-structured interviews (see Appendix B for the initial discussion guide) had been 
conducted in the wine and fishing industries. See Table 5.4 for a list of the interviewees and which 
cases were discussed. Since the start of the interviews, the focus had narrowed to the wine 
industry only, but the interviews in the fishing industry provided valuable insight. For instance, due 
to the small number of large players in the fishing industry, the threat of collusion accusations 
poses a significant barrier to address environmental issues collectively. 
5.11 UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
The units of analysis of the study were the various instances (or cases) of environmental 
coopetition (Section 5.6.2 provided insight into the selection of cases). In order to find examples of 
such initiatives and therefore study the phenomenon, the researcher chose specific case 
companies in the wine industry. In order to understand the collaboration initiative and the 
appropriation of value, it was necessary to interview more than one participant in the particular 
initiative (at least two, as would be the case with dyadic initiatives). Each of the cases in itself is a 
‘whole’ or stand-alone study (Parkhe, 1993: 251). 
The way in which the study was structured also allowed the cases to be revisited, and even to 
interview the same respondents again (See Table 5.4). Such interviews provided an interesting 
longitudinal perspective. Overlapping collection and analysis also allowed the freedom to collect 
data from different sources as it became available. Such additions of new data would be 
completely inappropriate in most quantitative studies that aim to summarise a situation at a 
particular time (Eisenhardt, 1989: 539). 
It is important for the researcher to be intimately familiar with the details of each case. Within-case 
analysis is therefore very important. This approach allows the researcher to understand and to 
document the unique features of each case, and also to allow readers the ability to identify 
commonalities with cases they may wish to generalise (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540).  
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It is common feature in case study research aimed at building theory for data collection and data 
analysis to overlap (Eisenhardt, 1989: 538). This is reflected in Figure 5.3 as the cycle of theorising 
and collection of further data (see step 4, 5, 5a and 5b). Field notes and reflection is an important 
component of qualitative and case study research. It is often difficult to anticipate what will be 
important in the future. Typical reflection would include “what did I find different in this case from 
previous cases”, “what am I learning” or “how does this case corroborate or contradict previous 
cases”.  
But more importantly, overlapping data analysis and collection allows for flexibility in the data 
collection methods or the cases that are pursued (Eisenhardt, 1989: 539). For instance, as 
mentioned before, the researcher started with an elaborate and extensive interview guide 
(Appendix B). As the focus of the study narrowed, many of the questions became less important or 
even irrelevant.  
5.12 DATA ANALYSIS 
The most important requirement for qualitative analysis is clear thinking on the part of the analyst 
(Robson, 2002: 459). Miles and Huberman (1994) viewed analysis as three concurrent flows of 
activities, namely: 
i) Data reduction;  
ii) Data display; and  
iii) Conclusion/verification. 
5.12.1 Data reduction 
Qualitative data can be overwhelming in its volume. For instance, the interviews for this study 
altogether consisted of approximately 850 pages of transcriptions. Data reduction already starts by 
choosing cases for the additional contribution it can make. Cases are selected, either because they 
are similar to previous cases, or because they are different to previous cases (Gomm et al., 
2009: 107). When saturation occurs, one stops. After data collection, data is typically reduced 
through summaries and abstracts, coding, writing memos etc. (Robson, 2002: 459).  
Coding of data is a key activity in the reduction of data. First cycle coding refers to the assignment 
of labels to quotations in the text (Saldaña, 2010: 45). Similar parts of texts that may refer to a 
particular construct, relationship, theory or some other common theme are in this way collected. 
Assigning labels to pieces of text is known as descriptive coding or topic coding and is often the 
first stage of qualitative data analysis (Saldaña, 2010: 70). 
Codes may emerge from the data itself as is the case with grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967) studies, but could also be defined based on the literature. In this study, the codes were 
allowed to emerge from the text, but in many cases the iterative comparison with available 
literature assisted in aligning codes with the extant literature.  
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Most of the interviews for this dissertation were conducted in Afrikaans to accommodate the 
interviewees. As a result, the majority of the transcriptions were in Afrikaans.  
First coding in ATLAS.ti was also done using the original Afrikaans text to acknowledge as much of 
the original meaning as possible. Only once particular segments of interviews were identified as 
important to use in the dissertation, these segments were translated to English. The translation 
was done in two parts. The segment was translated using Google translate, and then reviewed by 
the researcher (see Table 5.6 for an example). Care was taken to preserve the original meaning of 
the text. In some instances, a language expert verified the accuracy of the translations. 
Table 5.6: Example of translation in stages 
Original transcription of 
interview in Afrikaans 
Ja, maar kyk, ons organiese – ons is sê nou maar 15, 16 plase saam, en dan 
sê nou maar ons gaan na ŉ wynskou toe, dan boek ons as ŉ organiese 
liggaam, so dan staan al ons organiese plase bymekaar.  So met ander 
woorde, as die ou organies soek, dan hoef hy nie vir jou uit te soek tussen al 
die ander en waar jy wegraak nie.  So dan is jy basies apart saam met hulle, en 
dit is ook tog direkte kompetisie.  
Google translation of 
interview 
Yes, but look, our organic - we are , say, 15 , 16 farms together , and let's say 
we go to a wine show when , then book us as an organic body , so then we are 
all organic farms together . So in other words , as the old organic search , he 
need look out for you among all the other and you get lost. So then you 
basically separately with them, and that is yet direct competition.  
Revised translation Yes, but look, our organic group - we are, say, 15, 16 farms together, and let’s 
say we go to a wine show, then we book as an organic body. So then all the 
organic farms stand together. So in other words, if someone is looking for 
organic wine, he doesn’t need to search for you among all the other where you 
would have disappeared. Thus we form a group that is differentiated from the 
rest of the market, but compete with each other directly. 
 
The interviews were analysed and coded (Saldaña 2010) using ATLAS.ti, a computer-aided 
qualitative data analysis software package. Initial coding was based on themes from the literature, 
but new codes emerged when the existing constructs were insufficient to describe the data.  
Most of the interviews were coded more than once as the focus of the study progressed. As 
Figure 5.1 at the start of this chapter indicated, the analysis of the data oscillated between working 
with theory, working with data, and reviewing the conceptual model. Data collection, coding and 
theorising (Edmondson & McManus, 2007: 1158) thus happened concurrently. This aspect also 
aligns with steps 4, 5, 5a and 5b in Figure 5.3. As the analysis and interpretation of data 
progressed, the researcher was able to put tighter specifications (step 5a) on the initial research 
questions (Appendix A) and the interview questions (Appendix B). Based on a clearer focus, later 
interviews were generally much more focused. This was also the reason for repeating some 
interviews to gather further and new data. 
Second level coding categorises the initial codes into fewer groups or families of codes (Robson, 
2002: 477; Friese, 2012: 184). Saldaña (2010: 159) referred to this as axial coding, meaning you 
define an axis that draws together a group of codes. Typical code families identified text addressed 
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the research questions, such as the benefits of environmental coopetition (e.g. economic value, 
common benefits, etc.). However, the coding also identified peripheral themes such as the drivers 
of coopetition, e.g. consumer pressure, reputation building, and altruistic behaviour.  
5.12.2 Data display 
Qualitative data is often in the form of large volumes of text. Displaying data in figures, tables, 
matrices, etc. provides a way to reduce data, but also a way of making sense of data (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Doing so allows one to get a feel of what the data is telling you, what 
conclusions can be drawn, and what further analysis needs to be done. This was indeed the case 
with the CVM, which allowed the data to tell its own story once it was mapped into the CVM. Table 
5.7 (on the next page) shows how quotations were used to populate the CVM for one of the cases. 
From the quotations, the CVM was populated with more generic descriptions.  
5.12.3 Conclusion drawing and verification 
Already at the start of data collection one starts to draw conclusions, noting patterns, relationships, 
structures, etc. (Robson, 2002: 459; Miles & Huberman, 1994: 245).  While case study researchers 
search for convergent evidence regarding the conclusion for each case, these conclusions should 
inform the choice of new cases and the information that needs replication by other cases (Yin, 
2009; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Ridder et al., 2014: 378). If subsequent cases provide support for 
the propositions that were shaped from earlier cases, it provides compelling support for the 
theoretical model, which in turn allows for the generalisation to new cases (Parkhe, 1993: 251; 
Ridder et al., 2014: 375). However, if these cases are contradictory in some way, the early 
propositions must be revised and retested with yet more cases (ibid; Manning, 1982: 280).  
The power of case study research lies in its power to build theory beyond the specific case at 
hand, not through statistical generalisation, but through analytical generalisation in which 
researchers attempt to generalise a particular set of results to broader theory through induction 
(Robinson, 1951; Yin, 2009).  
On the one hand, the data analysis in the dissertation looked for complementary arguments from 
the interviews regarding value creation and appropriation, and on the other hand, the analysis 
looked for dissimilarities. While looking for similarities helped to understand how the extant theory 
could be applied in environmental coopetition, the search for dissimilarities was aimed at refining 
and generating theory to help understand what value is created and how it is created. 
A large part of the analysis relied on reflection, and two instances serve to show the power of 
reflection. Firstly, the CVM came to exist when the researcher was asked at a conference in 
Sweden to provide examples of different types of value. The resultant table did not seem 
significant until the researcher reflected on the conference with a supervisor. During the reflection, 
the value of the CVM as a diagnostic tool became evident.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
112 
Table 5.7: Coopetition value matrix for the Rooiberg Breederiver conservancy 
 Value creation 
 
Economic value  Knowledge value  Environmental value 
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The leopard also, if you kill them, 
then all that will happen is that the 
jackal will come and Caracal will 
come, and then you have bigger 
problems. There are only four 
Leopards; if these things come, it 
will be hundreds of them. And 
then your chickens are gone, 
because everybody keeps 
chickens, everyone is keeping a 
pig or a sheep or something, you 
know.  
So, (name removed) is our main 
source [of information] for 
everyone here. There is a guy 
who is always willing to assist- 
(name removed)  has only one 
problem, and that is to get hold 
of him. Because he is busy. But 
if you get hold of him, that guy 
will have all the information you 
need.  
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t 
…um… you know I'm sure that 
Graham Beck didn't put the 
leopard on their label for...for just 
pretty picture sake. I think they 
intend to sell more wine. 
So how the hell will I get to him? 
How can I just drive to (name 
removed)  and say I want to see 
(name removed)  and now he 
maybe would not want to see 
me because he has things to 
do. Now you build those 
personal relationship with 
people you normally would not 
build, different reasons, it's not 
every guy who comes your way 
and be your friend. 
P
ri
v
a
te
 b
e
n
e
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t 
Our conservation practices, 
farming initiatives and drive to 
reduce our resource use, reusing 
and recycling where we can, have 
seen us achieve champion 
conservation status BWI and 
recognition at major greening 
awards. (Graham Beck website) 
We make cosmetic products 
from our olive oil, and the 
chemist who designed this 
thing, spoke of putting fynbos in 
it. He wants us to identify the 
fynbos … which one is 
poisonous and which one is not. 
Which one is a skin irritant? … 
And a member told me I should 
speak to Susan. … The next 
day, there she was. And we 
walked through the field and she 
says “that thing and this thing 
and this thing. That one you 
use, you leave that one, that 
one”. ... So, a spin-off I'll say 
she should be there. 
P
u
b
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c
 b
e
n
e
fi
t 
The leopard also, if you kill them, 
then all that will happen is that the 
jackal will come and Caracal will 
come, and then you have bigger 
problems. There are only four 
Leopards; if these things come, it 
will be hundreds of them. And 
then your chickens are gone, 
because everybody keeps 
chickens, everyone is keeping a 
pig or a sheep or something, you 
know.   
The net benefit has been such 
that the wider community are 
now aware that they actually 
living amongst these animals 
[leopards] and they have done 
for generations.” 
You know there's an intrinsic 
value, there's an ecosystems 
value, there's a biological value 
in maintaining your trophic 
pyramids…But how do you 
assign value to...to all those 
virtues.  … you know that's part 
of what I call the intrinsic value. It 
certainly has an aesthetic` value, 
a tourism value, there's a brand 
value 
 
A second example of the power of reflection is the conversation about value dynamics (which 
became Chapter 7). At the outset of the study, it was not envisioned that there would be any 
potential to study the dynamics of value. However, once the CVMs were populated for a number of 
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cases, it became clear that there were definite patterns in how different types of value affected 
each other. Presenting these preliminary flows at a PhD colloquium helped in refining them further. 
Furthermore, once the different flows were identified, it turned out that there were too many to 
really make sense of them. A further extraction led to the identification of the three generic patterns 
of value dynamics at the end of Chapter 7. 
5.13 SHAPING THEORY 
An important component of building theory from cases is building definitions and understanding 
constructs. Themes, concepts and relationships between variables emerge as the within and 
cross-site analysis proceed (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541).  
Miles and Huberman (1994: 245-246) suggested thirteen tactics (arranged roughly from descriptive 
to explanatory) of generating meaning from your data: 
i) Noting patterns, themes and trends; 
ii) Seeing plausibility (do the trends, patterns and conclusions make sense); 
iii) Clustering; 
iv) Making metaphors; 
v) Counting; 
vi) Making contrasts & comparisons/sharpens understanding; 
vii) Partitioning variables (when one variable is, in fact, two or three) (ibid., 254); 
viii) Subsuming particulars to the general; 
ix) Factoring; 
x) Noting relationships between variables; 
xi) Finding intervening variables; 
xii) Building a logical chain of evidence; 
xiii) Making conceptual/theoretical coherence. 
This process of making meaning from data consists of two components, namely: (i) refining the 
definitions of constructs; and (ii) building evidence that exhibits or measures the construct in each 
case (ibid., Manning, 1982: 281).  
A good example of this process in this dissertation is the development of the construct of privately 
captured common benefit. In the starting phase of the research, the theory only allowed for 
common and private benefit (Khanna et al., 1998; Dyer et al., 2008: 138).  As the interviews 
proceeded, however, it became clear that the language of value lacked the clarity to describe the 
component of common value that is captured by a particular partner. The concept of privately 
captured private benefit was accordingly introduced. This is what Miles and Huberman (1994) 
referred to as partitioning, while Ridder et al. (2014) broadly referred to theory refinement.  
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Once the concept was created, the researcher went back to the interviews to find instances where 
privately captured common benefit appeared. As more cases were added to the analysis, a 
distinction was made between privately captured common benefit that relate to knowledge value 
and economic value specifically. The term therefore increased in nuance. Further investigation led 
to establishing a causal link between knowledge-related privately captured common benefit, and 
economic value, either at the common or private level.  
The process described above is not that different from developing a single construct measure in 
hypothesis testing (i.e. quantitative) studies. Using multiple pieces of evidence, the researcher 
builds up construct measures that define and measure the construct (Eisenhardt, 1989: 542). One 
difference is that the construct and its measurement emerges from the evidence, rather than 
defining it in advance. A second difference is that there is no technique like factor analysis to 
collapse multiple indicators into a single construct measure. The reason is that the indicators may 
vary across cases as not all may have the same measures. Furthermore, qualitative measures are 
often difficult to collapse (ibid.). 
Theory that is developed from the iterative case study method described above is by definition high 
in construct validity.  
Part of building internal validity in case study research is building the Why behind relationships. 
Qualitative data is particularly good for understanding Why relationships (Yin, 1981). Just as with 
hypothesis testing research, relationships between variables may be by chance, or could reflect 
the impact of another variable. It is therefore important to discover the underlying reasons and 
plausibility for relationships (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 246; Eisenhardt, 1989: 542). 
5.14 ENFOLDING LITERATURE 
As stated before, this study attempts to shift consensus. A central component of the study 
therefore revolved around the comparison of the emergent findings with extant literature to 
determine points of similarity and conflict (Ridder et al., 2014: 372).  
While comparison with conflicting literature assists in building internal validity (i.e. the validity of 
causal reasoning), a comparison with similar literature can assist in generalisability. Comparison 
with both conflicting literature and similar literature aids in raising the theoretical level, and 
improving construct definitions (Ridder et al., 2014: 375; Miles & Huberman, 1994: 9; Eisenhardt, 
1989: 542). 
Particularly around the principle of distance to consumer, this dissertation found a contrarian voice 
in the cases compared to the dominant view in extant literature. Ridder et al. (2014: 372) referred 
to such discussions as antagonistic positioning. Such conversation led to refinement of theory, 
meaning a modification, negation or refinement of existing theoretical perspectives (ibid.: 381). 
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Another example of antagonistic positioning entailed refinement of the terminology. The 
dissertation found much agreement with the traditional views of value in coopetition, but sharpened 
the constructs where the existing literature was lacking in clarity. This is in line with theory building 
guidelines as set out by Ridder et al. (2014: 375) and Eisenhardt (1989: 542). These aspects will 
be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  
Comparison with complementary theory does not imply only referring to theory with similar core 
logic, but also sharing the same phenomena of interest. Ridder et al. (2014: 381) referred to this as 
synergistic positioning. 
5.15 REACHING CLOSURE 
Two key decisions regarding closure in qualitative research revolve around when to stop adding 
new cases to the study, and when to stop iterating between theory and data (Eisenhardt, 
1989: 545).  
It is good practice to stop adding cases when additional cases and interviews no longer lead to 
noteworthy marginal improvements in what is known about the topic (Eisenhardt, 1989: 533). 
There is no fixed way of determining beforehand when such saturation will be reached. The 
researcher believes that saturation already took place earlier in the interviews, but additional 
interviews were conducted to confirm the belief. 
The end result of case study research as presented in this dissertation can be concepts, a 
conceptual framework, or propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989: 545). This dissertation provided a 
conceptual model, i.e. the Coopetition Value Matrix, as well as propositions in the form of three 
proposed value dynamics.  
5.16 SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of the design and research methodology of the study. 
Coopetition has been studied using a multitude of methodologies, including game theoretical, 
experimental and case based. This dissertation used a multiple case study approach and 
contributes to the coopetition body of knowledge at the theoretical and contextual level.  
In order to explore an expanded understanding of value creation and appropriation, it was 
necessary to study cases that could inform the research questions. The ten cases of environmental 
coopetition were subsequently identified through judgemental sampling. Approximately thirty 
qualitative interviews were conducted, after which the interviews were transcribed and coded in 
order to answer the research questions.  
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A number of strategies exist to ensure that case study research leads to generalisable results and 
a significant part of this chapter focused on the validity of qualitative research to build theory. The 
dissertation’s contribution lies at the level of shifting consensus rather than building consensus 
because environmental coopetition is an emerging field.  
The findings of qualitative research should generalise to theory rather than to a population 
(Mitchell, 1983: 207), and this is evident from the theory that emerged during the study. 
Nonetheless, researchers need to consider if and how their findings would translate beyond the 
current temporal and contextual boundaries.  
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 present the findings of the research.  
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CHAPTER 6 
TYPES OF VALUE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter of the dissertation provides insight into the value that is created in cases of 
environmental coopetition. It presents the intra-case analysis and illustrates what value is created 
in environmental coopetition by using the coopetition value matrix (CVM). In this regard the current 
chapter builds on: 
 Chapter 2: Existing coopetition literature; 
 Chapter 3: Literature that can assist in understanding what value is created in environmental 
coopetition and how that value is appropriated (this includes literature from environmental 
economics and stakeholder theory); as well as  
 Chapter 4: The conceptual model (the coopetition value matrix). 
6.2 THE CASE STUDIES  
6.2.1 Individual cases 
The chapter presents the findings from ten cases of environmental coopetition. These cases 
represented diverse environmental issues, ranging from water availability, biodiversity, pollution 
prevention, recycling and organic farming practices. The ten cases were :  
i) The Rooiberg Breederiver Conservancy/Cape Leopard conservation project; 
ii) The Glass Recycling Company (TGRC); 
iii) The Biodiversity in Wine initiative (BWI); 
iv) Greater Simonsberg Conservancy; 
v) Mealybug; 
vi) Organic Farmers Association; 
vii) Reyneke organic wines; 
viii) Winetech; 
ix) Eerste River Collaboratory; and 
x) Solamoyo. 
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Figure 6.1 provides a network diagram to illustrate how the cases, the wine or grape producing 
entities, and the interviewees related to each other. The diagram is best understood in combination 
with Table 5.4: 
 The dotted lines indicate the boundaries of cases that were also the units of analysis. The 
Glass Recycling Company (TGRC) and the Wine Industry Network for Expertise and 
Technology (Winetech) are respectively supra-industry and industry-wide initiatives. All wine 
bottlers contribute to Winetech, while all glass-users are requested to contribute to TGRC. The 
majority of the focal wine and grape producers were also members of the Biodiversity & Wine 
Initiative (BWI). 
 The bigger spheres indicate wine or grape producing entities, while the smaller  spheres 
represent the presence of other wine or grape producers in the initiatives (who did not 
participate in the study). 
 The codes inside the bigger circles represent the different interviewees. In some instances, 
more than one person were interviewed per entity, sometimes in the same interview, and 
sometimes in separate interviews.  
 Some interviewees were involved with more than one case, but are indicated in the diagram 
in terms of their employer. Interviewees were also only connected with arrows if they had an 
active relationship with the entity. For instance, W16 was informed about the Cape leopard 
conservation project (and is hence listed as an interviewee for the Cape leopard case), but 
does not have any coopetition relationship in that network. 
 The arrows between circles represent the relationships between entities that cooperate in 
some way.  
Figure 6.1 provides insight into the difficulty of viewing networks as completely separate. As such 
Figure 6.1 portrays an example of networked coopetition, i.e. when multiple companies are 
engaged in multiple coopetition initiatives (Czakon & Czernek, 2016). In an interview with any of 
the networked entities, conversations regarding value are entwined in the different links between 
entities and between focal cases. The units of analysis were the different cases, but often quotes 
would overlap between different cases, especially where cases are embedded within each other. 
For instance, when interviewee W17 and interviewee W12 were interviewed, it could be in the 
context of the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy, the collaboration to control mealybugs with 
natural predators, or even related to the BWI.  
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TGRC
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Winetech
W17
Mealybug
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Figure 6.1: A network diagram of the case companies discussed in this dissertation 
Some wine producers are more central in the networks than their peers, while others have more 
links into other networks that are separated by “structural holes” (for instance Laibach wines 
(W17), represented in black) is central in a number of networks/ cases. Laibach wine is part of the 
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy, the mealybug project, and also has ties with organic farmers 
who are outside of the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy. Because of Laibach’s embeddedness in 
numerous networks, it is well suited to illustrate the benefits of coopetition in multiple networks. 
6.2.2 Structural holes as a source of value 
Laibach (indicated in black in Figure 6.1 for the purpose of illustration) participates in three 
environmentally-focused coopetition networks, namely the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy, 
collaboration with its direct neighbours in using natural predators to control mealybug numbers, 
and the Organic Wine Association. Through its cooperation with Reyneke (for example), it has 
further exposure to other networks (like the Reyneke network). 
Some initiatives are conceptually and geographically quite removed from each other; hence it 
reminds strongly of the structural holes perspective of Burt (1992). The distinct networks provide 
Laibach with access to resources and knowledge that are not accessible to the respective 
networks.  
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This places Laibach in a stronger position than its partners as it has an information advantage 
(Burt 1992: 62) in terms of:  
 Access (receiving valuable information it otherwise would not know of);  
 Timing (receiving information before its competitors); and  
 Referrals (having “agents” in every meeting that can bring you referals). 
W18 W19
W20
W14
W11
W12/N5
Organic Farmers Association
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy
Reyneke network
W17
Mealybug
 
Figure 6.2: Network embeddedness of Laibach 
Figure 6.2 provides a visual representation of Laibach’s network position in different networks: 
 Laibach is firstly part of the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy. It joined the conservancy late 
as it has little to offer to the conventional farmers of the conservancy. The farm shows a plaque 
at the tasting room to indicate  that they are part of the conservancy. Laibach also benefits from 
fire-prevention, funding garnered by the conservancy for alien tree clearing, and training for 
various environmental aspects, such as fire-fighting and snake awareness. 
 Laibach has a fairly passive collaboration with its immediate neighbours, meaning that 
neighbouring farms observe farming practices from Laibach and vice versa. These farms are 
also members of the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy and therefore Laibach would not 
benefit much more from the neighbours in terms of access, timing and referrals (ala Burt 1992: 
62) than what it already has access to through the conservancy. 
 Laibach has an active knowledge network with other organic farmers. None of the other 
members of the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy are members. 
 Laibach is a BWI member, but not a champion. It does not show the BWI sign on any of its 
Laibach or Ladybird wines, except for the Woolies Ladybird Chardonnay. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
121 
6.3 THE ROOIBERG BREEDERIVER CONSERVANCY 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The first empirical application of the coopetition value matrix focused on a case of conservation of 
the Cape leopard in the wine industry, particularly in the Rooiberg Breederiver Conservancy.  
Ten of the interviewees (see Table 6.1) touched on this case. Two of the interviews were with 
stakeholders of an agricultural cooperative (Rooiberg Winery), but both could be considered 
competitors of the third firm (Graham Beck Wines). Further interviews were conducted with 
members of environmental pressure groups that work in the area, as well as other stakeholders. 
6.3.2 Background 
The Rooiberg Breederiver Conservancy lies near Robertson in the Small Karoo in South Africa.  
Geographically it is quite small and consists of 28 neighbouring farms. The area is well known for a 
number of scarce species of fauna and flora, amongst other the riverine rabbit, and a number of 
critically scarce fynbos (or fine bush) species. 
A major impetus behind the existence of the conservancy is the significance of the area to a 
dwindling Cape leopard population. The remaining few territorial leopards in the area are 
increasingly fragmented and isolated by urbanisation and cultural activities. The conservancy area 
acts as a corridor for the leopards to move between two mountain ranges, ensuring continued 
survival of the species through a healthy gene pool. Cape leopards live off small animals in the wild 
(Rautenbach, 2009), but have been known to catch farm animals, such as chickens, sheep, cattle 
and commercially-farmed game such as zebra. Even though most of the farmers in the area farm 
with grapes, many of the farms host smaller livestock, which means potential conflict with the 
leopards in the region. 
In the past, leopards were often killed on farms in the area out of fear and a lack of awareness. 
Awareness campaigns by the Landmark Foundation (an NGO) did much to raise understanding 
and tolerance for the species among farmers and the community. Before the campaign, awareness 
levels about the existence and habits of the Cape leopards in the region were low.  
In 2012, the Landmark Foundation installed fifteen cameras on the conservancy to monitor the 
movement, numbers and prey availability. Some of the funding came from one of the conservancy 
members. The members of the conservancy, by mutual agreement, subsequently agreed to 
conserve the endangered Cape leopard. 
Many of the wine producers in the area sell red and white wines, and often at the similar price 
points. For instance, Rooiberg Winery’s upper-end wines sell at the same price point as Graham 
Beck’s lower-end wines. It was therefore surprising that none of the respondents in the 
conservancy regard one another as competition. Table 6.1 summarises the interviewees in the 
Rooiberg Breederiver Conservancy. 
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Table 6.1: Interviewees: The Rooiberg Breederiver Conservancy 
Interviewee Description of organisation or person Position Date of 
interview 
Duration of 
interview 
(hours) 
W6 Robertson area wine producer. Premium 
brand. Known as a sustainability leader, 
more than one wine farm in different 
regions operating under the same brand, 
medium sized in bottling capacity. 
Sustainability manager 29 Aug 2013 2:04 
W7 Robertson area wine producer. Member 
of cooperative. Diversified farm. 
Wine grape farmer 3 Oct 2013 1:30 
W8 Robertson area wine producer, 
Cooperative. 
CEO 3 Oct 2013 1:24 
W15 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Sustainability manager 13 Apr 2015  0:54 
W16 Wine grower/producer Elgin region/ 
known for sustainability initiatives. 
CEO/Owner 20 Apr 2015  1:36 
N1 Environmental NGO operating in 
Robertson and other areas. 
Environmentalist 27 Feb 2014 1:00 
N4 Environmental organisation. Project manager 24 Jun 2014  1:18 
N7 South African NGO working with 
conservancies. 
Chairperson 10 Apr 2015 0:43 
J1 Journalist working in the wine industry. Journalist 23 Apr 2015 0:30 
F1 Farm owner, no active farming activities. Farm owner 24 Apr 2015 0:54 
 
Geographically the two wine cellars (Rooiberg Winery and Graham Beck Wines) are a few 
kilometres apart, meaning that they would firstly compete for physical visitors that wish to buy wine. 
However, this is only a small component of the revenue of the farms.  
At a product level, both wine producers sell a broad range of white and red wines, but Rooiberg 
Winery maintains that it serves the lower to medium-priced wine market, while Graham Beck 
serves a medium to premium-priced market. The two farms would be considered competitors if one 
purely considers a competitor as a firm that sells the same product (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). If 
one would expand the definition to require an overlap in market segments (Pellegrin-Boucher et al., 
2013), there is sufficient overlap in the markets of the two competitors to qualify as competitors. 
Higher-priced Rooiberg Winery wines overlap with lower-end Graham Beck wines.  
At a third level of the definition of a competitor, Bengtsson and Kock (2000) require that the one 
firm’s product makes the other firm’s product less attractive. Ironically, one of the managers, in his 
explanation of why he does not regard his coopetitors as competitors, provided a strong argument 
that they do indeed impact on one another’s revenue: 
Yes. It's like seven cafes next to each other and everyone goes there because that is 
where you will find everything.  If you cannot find what you want, you can now quickly 
run next door and get it. So I think that's the whole concept. We are a wine café area 
here and you love my Shiraz and you like his Pinotage. And you may like the wine of 
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van Loveren [a wine producer in the Robertson area]. So I do not think we operate in 
competition with them. (Interviewee W6) 
The reference to the substitutability (consider Porter’s (2008) five forces) of wines in the quote is 
an implied acknowledgement that the wine producers do impact on the demand for each other’s 
wines. However, the quote also emphasises positive-sum competition (i.e. there is more choice for 
consumers in the market).  
A strong enabler of the coopetition efforts in the region is the social proximity. Wine farmers in the 
area are part of a small rural community, belong to the same church, buy wine from each other and 
often invite “competitors” to taste the newest vintage wines.  
6.3.3 Common benefit and privately captured common benefit 
The conservation efforts of the farms in the Rooiberg Breederiver Conservancy afford the 
collaborators an opportunity to market their efforts, providing them with a potential common benefit. 
Yet, Graham Beck wines market its own conservation effort through the Graham Beck “The Game 
Reserve” range of wines (as shown in Figure 6.3). Graham Beck, however, would not be able to 
conserve leopards through its own actions only; it needs the cooperation of other wine cellars and 
growers.   
 
Figure 6.3: Privately captured common benefit from conservation 
Since launching the range of wines in April 2014, Graham Beck reports easier access to shelf-
space, more shelf space and higher sales figures than before (Interviewee W6). Although such 
benefits are available to the other cellars in the region, they intentionally grant Graham Beck Wines 
this right: 
As I said, I have no problem that the game reserve resides with them, because they 
are the guys who have the money – I cannot foresee that I will counter the effort, and 
it's not my target market. They put a lot of money and marketing money and a message 
in what they do. …They have plowed more back into the community than anyone else 
does or says. So, they – if there is anyone who deserves to have a game reserve and 
to see excellent results from it – it is Graham Beck. [Translation from Afrikaans] 
(Interviewee W8) 
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As a result of this license from its partners, Graham Beck Wines generates value from the 
coopetitive relationship, and does so to a much greater extent than its partners. This value is an 
example of privately captured common benefit. The ability to put a name on this component of the 
value enables one to better describe how value is appropriated. One should also note that, in this 
particular case, the value is captured by Graham Beck Wines in positive-sum logic. Other wine 
producers would also be able to leverage from the brand value, but do not exploit the opportunity. 
The Landmark Foundation puts up signs (see Figure 6.4) at farms that participate in the 
conservation efforts of the Cape leopard. The common benefit to all participants is the brand 
exposure and brand association offered (like the voluntary environmental initiatives mentioned by 
Orsato (2006; 2009) in the literature component of this study), and every participant in the leopard 
conservation project has the right to these benefits.  
 
Figure 6.4: Landmark Foundation and conservancy sign at a wine cellar 
No farmer has more exposure from the project based on the signs as shown in Figure 6.4. 
However, one respondent expressed a strong opinion about the lack of value of the sign compared 
to the label as used by Graham Beck: 
Landmark Foundation asked me why I don’t wish to put up a board. I say the thing is 
bloody ugly, it does not fit with what I do. I say, everyone is aware of the leopard, you 
cannot put that ugly thing here. I told them that for me the best thing is exactly what 
Graham Beck is doing where you put the logo on your product. But I do not have a 
product, because I sell bulk. They [Rooiberg] should – why they do not, I do not know. 
[Translation from Afrikaans] (Interviewee W7) 
It is important to point out that the signs at farms should possibly be seen as reputation protection 
rather than reputation building, i.e. it is an example of a beyond compliance strategy. In contrast, 
Graham Beck is following an eco-branding strategy, and it seems to be successful. 
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There are however, also other (common) economic benefits of the leopard conservation project, 
such as a reduction in smaller predators as reported by a member of the Rooiberg Winery:  
And that we also taught them, you know, if you – you complain, you have too many 
mice in your house; one of the reasons is because it is not clean. The second reason is 
you killed the snake that eats mice. So the more snakes you kill, the more mice you 
have. So that is how they start to learn how things work. The leopard also, if you kill 
them, then all that will happen is that the jackal will come and caracal will come, and 
then you have bigger problems. There are only four leopards; if these things come, it 
will be hundreds of them. And then your chickens are gone, because everybody keeps 
chickens, everyone is keeping a pig or a sheep or something, you know. That's how it 
is on the farm. Now they understand. Protect here and you have benefits, not only 
where you cannot see, you have advantages where it will affect you. [Translation from 
Afrikaans] (Interviewee W7) 
In this particular instance, the value is non-rival and non-excludable, meaning it is a public good of 
which the farmers share in the public benefit.  
6.3.4 Public benefit: economic, knowledge and socio-environmental 
The previous quote made reference of economic benefits to the community, as well as to 
indigenous knowledge within the community regarding the benefits of biodiversity. The matter of 
knowledge in the community was also observed in other interviews:  
The net benefit has been such that the wider community are now aware that they 
actually are living amongst these animals [leopards] and that they have done for 
generations. (Interviewee N7) 
Awareness in the community is key to the survival of the leopard by improving the efficacy of the 
broader conservation effort. A member of Rooiberg Winery referred to the socio-environmental 
value of the leopard. More specifically, the respondent described the bequest value and the 
existence value of having the leopard on his farm. Such value is a public good and part of the 
socio-environmental value: 
For me it has a lot of value because it's a personal thing because I love nature, and I 
agree with what they do because the leopard should not be disturbed. He should go 
where he wants and have to eat what he wants. He caught one of my zebras – and it 
did not even come into my head to look for him and kill him. It's a loss, but so it is. And I 
still think that it is unfortunate that I did not see when he caught the zebra. But then I 
decided that those are too expensive food for him. So I took the zebras off the field for 
now and I put them in an enclosure. [Translation from Afrikaans] (Interviewee W7) 
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A representative of an environmental pressure group that operates in the Robertson area 
described the intrinsic value (also a component of socio-environmental value) as follows: 
You know there's an intrinsic value, there's an ecosystems value, there's an …um 
…you know… a direct biological value in maintaining your trophic pyramids. 
(Interviewee N7) 
Later in the same interview the same representative drew a link between the socio-environmental 
value and an economic benefit for one partner: 
It certainly has an aesthetic value, a tourism value, there's a brand value …um… you 
know I'm sure that Graham Beck didn't put the leopard on their label for...for just pretty 
picture sake. I think they intend to sell more wine. (Interviewee N7) 
The intrinsic value of a species that does not go extinct (i.e. socio-environmental value and a public 
benefit) cannot be captured by any coopetitor (i.e. it is non-excludable). However, it can generate 
other forms of value such as brand value, as the quote illustrates. This aspect of dynamic 
interaction between different types of value is discussed in Chapter 7.  
6.3.5 Private benefit 
Private benefits can causally be associated with a coopetitive relationship, but the value is only 
available to the particular partner. Different partners may generate different private benefits without 
eroding value for other partners. One farmer related how his involvement in the conservancy 
allowed him to reap private benefits: 
We make cosmetic products from our olive oil, and the chemist who designed this 
thing, spoke of putting fynbos in it. He wants us to identify the fynbos … which one is 
poisonous and which one is not. Which one is a skin irritant? … And a [conservancy] 
member told me I should speak to Susan [a neighbour’s wife]. … The next day, there 
she was. And we walked through the field and she says “that thing and this thing and 
this thing. That one you use, you leave that one, that one”. (Interviewee W7) 
Because none of the other farmers farm with olives or produce olive oil, the benefit described here 
is in addition to other common benefits that are created (i.e. it is a positive-sum logic), but it is only 
available to the one farm. 
6.3.6 An opposing view 
Not all stakeholders in the Cape leopard conservation project were equally convinced of the value 
that is created for the environment:  
Because it [the leopard] isn't in direct land use competition with them. Uhm, I think 
that's expedient because they’re exploiting it because there's public interest and that's 
because they are, you know, trying to market their brand or brands... to be 
environmentally friendly. Which frankly it isn't close to that. But that's what they try and 
do.  
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I think that will be incorrect of them to state that their co-operation resulted in the 
leopard being able to freely move over their landscapes. Absolutely not… uhm… There 
were no...no pro-active steps to affect that.  
The skepticism about the biodiversity gain is clear from the quote, but the respondent 
acknowledges the marketing value of the initiative.  
6.3.7 The coopetition value matrix: Cape leopard 
Mapping the case of the Cape leopard in the coopetition value matrix (Table 6.2) provides a more 
holistic, structured and robust view of the initiative in terms of the creation and appropriation of 
value as described by the managers and other stakeholders. This aspect of data reduction and 
display (Miles & Huberman, 1994) was discussed in the methodology chapter. 
Table 6.2: CVM for the Cape leopard case 
 Value creation 
 Economic value Knowledge value  Environmental value 
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The presence of the leopard (an 
apex predator) reduces the 
losses due to smaller predators 
such as jackal and caracal. 
Farmers therefore experience 
fewer losses of small livestock. 
(Interviewee W7, N7) 
 
The Cape leopard conservation 
effort affords coopetition 
partners a collective brand 
value. (Interviewees F1, N7) 
Being part of the conservancy affords 
all the partners access to the 
knowledge of a knowledgeable 
sustainability manager. (Interviewee 
W7) 
Socio-environmental value is per 
definition value that accrues to 
society. It therefore implies that it 
cannot be captured by the 
coopetition parties.  
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Graham Beck is the only farm 
that leverages from the brand 
value of the leopard. This 
affords them more shelf space 
and higher revenues. 
(Interviewees W6, W7, W8, F1) 
One of the farmers reports the ability 
to access more of the time of the 
knowledgeable person, and thus 
captures more conservation-related 
and other knowledge value for himself. 
(Interviewee W7) 
P
ri
v
a
te
 b
e
n
e
fi
t A farmer (Interviewee W7) used 
knowledge captured about 
different plant species in his 
olive oil business to create 
innovative new products. This 
economic benefit is outside of 
the coopetition initiative and not 
available to other wine farmers.  
One of the farmers is able to tap into 
the collective knowledge of the 
coopetition partners about health 
benefits of different plants to use in a 
secondary business. (Interviewee W7) 
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The community benefits 
economically from fewer losses 
from small predators due to the 
presence of an apex predator. 
(Interviewee W7, N7) 
 
Bed and breakfast businesses 
leverage from the increased 
popularity of the region. 
(Interviewee W7, F1) 
The community becomes aware of the 
existence of the leopard and the 
benefits of having it around. Also 
about how to conserve the leopard. 
(Interviewee N7) 
There is intrinsic value 
(ecosystems value, biological 
value) in maintaining the 
trophic pyramid by having an 
apex predator present. The 
leopard holds aesthetic value. 
(Interviewee W6, W7, W8, N7) 
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All but one of the elements of value is present in the table. As mentioned earlier, the CVM can be a 
useful diagnostic tool. Mapping the value in the CVM provides a high-level view for managers to 
understand where value was created, where the value was appropriated, and where there is an 
opportunity. The private knowledge value in Table 6.2 will eventually translate to economic value, 
but this was not the case at the time of the interview. 
The table also allows the investigation of the dynamic flow of value (Ritala & Tidström, 2014) in a 
coopetition relationship, as is illustrated in the points below: 
 Exactly how central knowledge should be considered in coopetition initiatives was evident 
when the flow of value in the CVM was considered. Knowledge captured in the central column 
can facilitate value in the left hand (economic value) column. This is true at the common level, 
the private level, as well as the public level. 
  knowledge at the three levels (common, private and public), however,  can also enhance 
value in the right bottom corner. By increasing awareness of the Cape leopard, it leads to 
increased conservation impact (at least from the view of the wine producers), meaning more 
socio-environmental value. 
 In the case of an eco-brand based on environmental coopetition, the brand value is gained in 
a positive-sum manner with no erosion of the socio-environmental value. Therefore, value in 
one category (for instance below right) can be leveraged in order to create value upwards and 
leftwards (common or private benefit). In doing so, the value is pulled closer into the coopetition 
relationship.  
It is important to note, that the brand value can only be created closer to the coopetition 
relationship by marketing the initiative to consumers (as can be seen from Graham Beck’s label), 
meaning that the cooperation between competitors is much closer to customers than the historic 
view in coopetition literature (see for instance Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Walley, 2007; Steinmo & 
Jakobsen, 2013; Ritala & Tidström, 2014).  
A much deeper but more generic discussion of value dynamics follows in Chapter 7. 
One last aspect that relates back to the literature is that of power (Kim, et al., 2005: 799; French & 
Raven, 1959; Dyer et al., 2008). Graham Beck enjoys several forms of power, enabling it to 
capture more value than its partners. The wine company firstly enjoys legitimate power through its 
investments in the environment and the subsequent belief by its competitors that it should 
legitimately claim the bigger benefit. Secondly, the sustainability manager holds knowledge that 
other farmers see as valuable, giving the company some expert power too. 
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6.4 THE GLASS RECYCLING COMPANY 
6.4.1 Background to TGRC case 
The Glass Recycling Company (TGRC) served as a second empirical illustration of environmental 
coopetition.  
The company was established in 2006 and operates as a national NPO with a mandate to promote 
the recycling and reuse of glass. The company therefore does not recycle glass itself, but acts as a 
promoter of glass recycling and reuse (TGRC, 2012). To some extent, TGRC came into existence 
because the glass industry realised it had to regulate itself or face government regulation. 
Government regulation potentially meant that member-contributions would disappear into a black 
hole (Interviewee W9). TGRC was discussed in six of the interviews (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3: Interviewees: The Glass Recycling Company 
Label Description Position Date of 
interview 
Duration of 
interview (hrs) 
W2  
Wine producer, diversified liquor company, medium sized in 
bottling capacity. 
Executive 8 Jul 2011 1:27 
W3 
Wine producer, diversified liquor company, medium sized in 
bottling capacity. 
Executive 8 Jul 2011 1:27 
W4 
Wine producer, diversified liquor company, large sized in 
bottling capacity. 
Executive 
13 Jul 2011 1:23 
W5  
Wine producer, known as a sustainability leader, medium 
sized in bottling capacity 
Executive 
16 Jul 2012 1:17 
W9 
Wine producer, diversified liquor company, large sized in 
bottling capacity. Has board representation on TGRC board 
Executive 
11 Mar 2014 
0:45 
 
T1 Industry body Executive 31 Mar 2015 0:52 
 
For two of the coopeting companies, respectively two individuals were interviewed (W2, W3 were 
from one company and W4, W9 from another). The remaining two interviews were with an 
executive member of TGRC (T1), and a manager at a much smaller participating company (W5).  
The example of TGRC reminds strongly of the discussion by Bengtsson and Kock (2000) of the 
Swedish beer industry because both represent a form of reversed logistics. There are, however, 
two key differences:  
i) The TGRC initiative is happening closer to consumers, and Distell and KWV (two wine 
producers with TGRC board membership) are openly acknowledged as partners on the 
TGRC website (see Figure 6.5). A television advertisement (and Youtube clip) from 2016 
also features the logos of Distell and KWV near the end of the advertisement (see 
Figure 6.6). The advertisement is meant to raise awareness of the benefits of glass recycling. 
However, such exposure also provides significant brand exposure to these two firms, and 
more so than for other ‘ordinary’ members from the wine industry. 
ii) Unlike the example from the Swedish beer industry, the TGRC example describes an 
initiative with a deliberate environmental benefit.  
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Figure 6.5: Wine companies acknowledged on TGRC’s website 
Source: TGRC, 2016a. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Wine companies (and other partners) acknowledged on TGRC TV advertisement 
and social media 
Source: TGRC, 2016b. 
TGRC is an example of collaboration between multiple players, including government, glass 
manufacturers and fillers/bottlers (who use glass to package their products). All major stakeholders 
of glass in the South African beverage industry (wine, beer, spirits and non-alcoholic) are 
requested to contribute financially to the activities of the TGRC in proportion to the tons of glass 
they use. Most big players contribute, but payment remains voluntary.  
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A few large users of glass, including a few wine production and bottling companies, have seats on 
the board of TGRC. Smaller wine producers are represented by rotating seats on the board. 
Collaboration therefore happens via an industry body to which all players contribute financially, and 
which is jointly governed by stakeholders. 
Distell, one of the bigger partners in TGRC, was a particular focal point for this specific case. 
Distell operates in a number of alcoholic beverage markets, including the spirits (brandy, whiskey, 
etc.), wine and ‘ready-to-drink’ markets. None of the other companies in the wine industry is as 
diversified. It is also the only company operating in the wine industry that makes use of reusable 
bottles, albeit in its ‘ready-to-drink’ and to a lesser extent its spirit and wine divisions. To re-use 
their own glass bottles, Distell encourages consumers to return the glass containers to retailers in 
return for a deposit.  
All returned bottles must then meet stringent criteria while undergoing scrupulous 
quality checks during the wash, sterilise, rinse and dry process before they are deemed 
suitable for reuse.  
Three of our plants: Ecowash, Green Park and Port Elizabeth are equipped to handle 
recycled bottles. During the year under review, the three facilities combined were able 
to re-use a total of 111.3 million bottles (2013: 139.9 million). In doing so, we reduced 
the  amount of glass we purchased by 64 168 tons (2013: 77 802 tons). This equates 
to a saving of 101 007 tons (2013: 116 212) of CO2e emissions that would have been 
emitted if new bottles had been produced. (Distell, 2014: 54) 
Distell therefore manages to benefit disproportionately more from the activities of the TGRC than 
other companies who do not reuse bottles.  
6.4.2 Common, private and privately captured common benefit 
Respondents were able to clearly identify common and private benefits in the case of the TGRC. 
Cullet (recycled broken glass) historically provided a common cost saving in two ways. Firstly, 
cullet used to be cheaper per ton than silica, which is no longer the case (interviewee W9). 
Secondly, every ten percent of cullet that is added into the smelter reduces the temperature by six 
percent (Consol, 2012). The reduced energy use is a common benefit (that is available to all users 
of glass). Economic value, as stated earlier in this dissertation, can also be articulated in terms of 
reputational gains:  
We all have… the benefit that everyone has is a good-news story.…we contribute 
money to a Glass Recycling Company that does something for the environment and it 
can be measured in tons per year that is recycled ... and so on. That does not end up 
in a landfill...so everyone, in that respect, gets the same benefit ...but your benefit is 
again in relation to the glass you buy. It's in relation to what that you have paid. So no 
one can really be advantaged ahead of another. Um, or benefit directly. Um, naturally 
there is a little advertising value for a company. So Distell can now say we are one of 
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the major shareholders, we are making a significant contribution …um …just like 
Breweries [SABMiller] like to play it because they... it's their social awareness and 
social responsibility. So the bigger guys who are shareholders, actually all 
shareholders, may now claim the benefit. Naturally the bigger guys gain more exposure 
in the Glass Recycling Company’s promotional stuff. [Translation from Afrikaans] 
(Interviewee W9) 
This quote illustrates contextual advantages that some firms may have in capturing common 
benefit.  Due to the size of its financial contributions, Distell gains more from the TGRC’s public 
relations activities. Distell enjoys privately captured common benefits in relation to the glass it 
buys, but further also because it is a bigger partner. 
TGRC also acts as industry body for users of glass and provides knowledge about best practices 
to its shareholders: 
If we were not there…over the nine years, we generated significant expertise in the 
field, it would leave a big hole that in the industry and the cost to fund us is cheap…  
(Interviewee T1) 
Yet the level of learning for the wine producers seems relatively superficial and the initiative does 
not encourage knowledge sharing between industry players. Compared to the Cape leopard 
initiative, the knowledge value has less potential for common and private economic value. 
An interesting example of private benefit in the case of TGRC relates to its mandate to promote 
both recycling and reuse of glass. Distell is the only wine and spirits producer in South Africa that 
makes use of reusable bottles. Given that the mandate of TGRC requires it to also promote reuse 
of glass, Distell is able to capture a private benefit (economic) from the coopetition initiative that is 
by definition out of grasp for other contributors.  The underlying logic to this value is differentiating 
(positive-sum) in nature. 
Um, but as I say I have not pushed that agenda too hard, because then ... what about 
the KWV who’s stuff lies there but who does not re-use it. But they also contributed to it 
... we are not past that debate ... They [TGRC] should promote re-use because it would 
increase the cullet as well. ...But especially the last few years they just focused on 
cullet  ... the Glass Recycling Company is not keen on the other one ... they are afraid it 
might benefit only a few of the ... players that benefit from  re-use and therefore don’t 
want to be too obvious in the promotion thereof. [Translation from Afrikaans] 
(Interviewee W9) 
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The addition of privately captured common benefit allows one to describe the total benefit that 
Distell captures through the TGRC as the sum of the privately captured common benefit 
(in markets governed by the coopetition initiative) and the private benefit (in markets outside of the 
coopetition initiative). 
6.4.3 Public benefit: Economic, knowledge and socio-environmental 
The primary mandate of the TGRC is to “educate, enable, encourage and inspire individuals to 
separate their glass for recycling” but it does not physically collect or recycle the glass (TGRC, 
2012). The awareness function (as illustrated earlier in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, as well as in Figure 6.7 
below) is intended to increase the efficacy of glass recycling, and therefore illustrates a typical 
dynamic between public knowledge value and socio-environmental value.  Figure 6.7 was posted 
on the TGRC Twitter page and was originally posted by Friends of Glass, which is the European 
equivalent of the TGRC. It is therefore an apt opportunity to point out that, although this 
dissertation was focused on the South African wine industry, the case studies are indicative of 
initiatives happening in other industries and countries. 
 
Figure 6.7: Public awareness of benefits of glass recycling through social media 
Source: TGRC, 2016c  
The reduced cost of less glass-related waste is a public benefit and an example of both socio-
environmental and economic value (socio-economic value): 
We contribute money to a Glass Recycling Company that does something for the 
environment and it can be measured in tons per year that is recycled ... and so on. 
That does not end up in a landfill... [Translation from Afrikaans] (Interviewee W9) 
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Apart from the amount of glass that is kept out of landfills, recycling glass also has other 
environmental benefits (as is illustrated in Figure 6.6). According to Consol (2012) every ten 
percent increase in recycled glass content equates to reductions of: 
 one percent in electricity and natural gas consumption, 
 ten percent in sulphur dioxide emissions, 
 six percent in nitrogen oxide emissions, 
 seventeen percent  in carbon dioxide emissions, 
 8.5 percent in the use of in raw materials.  
6.4.4 The coopetition value matrix: TGRC 
Table 6.4 represents the value matrix of TGRC as reflected in the interviews and other evidence. 
The CVM allows the visual disaggregation of value in terms of the kind of value, and to whom the 
value is appropriated. The TGRC matrix shows stronger evidence of economic value and less of 
knowledge value. As such one could argue that the economic value is the main driver for coopeting 
parties. At the same time, based on the lack of evidence of knowledge value at the firm level, 
coopeting parties can consider how more knowledge value could be created in the initiative. 
Distell captures more of the value generated from the initiative than other members. It firstly 
captures a bigger share of savings than many other players (privately captured common economic 
value) because of the quantity of glass it buys. Because of the size of its financial contribution to 
TGRC, Distell enjoys board membership. Board membership allows Distell greater reputation 
protection through its logo on the TGRC website (privately captured common economic value), and 
easier access to information and knowledge (privately captured common knowledge value). 
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Table 6.4: CVM for The Glass Recycling Company 
 Value creation 
 
Economic value  Knowledge value  Environmental value 
V
a
lu
e
 a
p
p
ro
p
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a
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n
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
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e
n
e
fi
t 
Cullet (broken glass) melts at a 
lower temperature, meaning an 
energy saving in the glass 
manufacturing process. Some of 
this saving may be passed on to 
wine bottlers (Interviewee W4). 
TGRC provides reputation 
protection to member firms 
(Interviewee W9). 
 
TGRC serves as knowledge 
hub to the glass industry 
(Interviewee T1). 
Socio-environmental value is per 
definition value that accrues to 
society and a public good. It 
therefore implies that it cannot be 
captured by the coopetition parties. 
P
ri
v
a
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ly
 c
a
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m
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o
n
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e
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t 
The “reduced cost” benefit 
captured by any of the partners is 
proportional to the amount of glass 
they buy (Interviewee W9). 
Larger firms benefit more by 
having more representation on the 
board and having their brands 
associated with TGRC 
(Interviewee W9). 
Representation on the board 
provides some players with a 
higher level of access to 
information and knowledge. 
(Interviewee T1, W9). 
P
ri
v
a
te
 b
e
n
e
fi
t TGRC receives contributions from 
all glass users. Many glass users 
contribute funds. The funds are 
used to promote both recycling 
and reuse of glass, but only one 
firm reuses glass in its “spirits” 
division (Interviewee W4, W9). 
Distell adopts knowledge that it 
gained in its involvement with the 
TGRC into areas that its 
competitors do not operate. 
P
u
b
li
c
 b
e
n
e
fi
t 
Glass is recycled and reused, 
meaning reduced cost to society 
for waste disposal and landfills 
(Interviewee W9, T1). 
The bulk of glass recycling is 
driven by the lower end of the 
market who earns a living from 
recycling (Interviewee T1). 
The lower cost to the glass 
manufacturer could potentially 
translate to lower cost of bottled 
wine. 
The primary mandate of TGRC is 
to raise public awareness 
regarding glass recycling, glass 
reuse, and the benefits thereof 
(Interviewee T1, TGRC website). 
 
Recycling glass has numerous 
benefits for the environment in 
terms of a reduction in pollution 
and resource dependency (Glass 
producer website). 
 
6.5 THE BIODIVERSITY & WINE INITIATIVE (BWI) 
6.5.1 Introduction 
As stated in the previous chapter, nearly 95 percent of wine growing in South Africa happens in the 
Cape Floral Kingdom (Fairbanks et al., 2004: 1075). Unfortunately, the best soil for fynbos is also 
the best soil for growing wine (Interviewee W3). Consumers of wine tend to be middle to high-
income individuals who can afford and may be willing to pay for an environmentally-branded 
product (Interviewee W4).  
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The Biodiversity & Wine Initiative (BWI) attempts to protect South African flora. Interestingly, this 
industry-wide initiative with the Cape Botanical Society and the WWF-South Africa, has enabled 
the wine industry to both protect biodiversity, and also generate a common benefit by 
differentiating the South African wine industry through the “biodiversity is in our nature” tagline 
(Interviewee W3). 
The Biodiversity & Wine Initiative was established in 2004 as a conservation partnership between 
the wine industry, the Botanical Society of South Africa, Conservation International and The Green 
Trust (WWF, 2015). The BWI can be classified as a Voluntary Environmental Initiative (VEI) 
(Orsato, 2009).  
Its mandate is to protect natural habitat by encouraging sustainable practices in the wine industry 
and to promote the interests of BWI members through raising awareness of the conservation 
efforts of BWI members. In September 2015, the BWI had 175 members and 29 champions. The 
area under conservation by BWI members was 141 199 ha. (WWF, 2015). 
Table 6.5 below provides an overview of the interviewees who discussed aspects of BWI. The fact 
that so many interviewees touched on the BWI is evidence of its presence in the South African 
wine industry. 
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Table 6.5: Interviewees: BWI 
Interviewee Description of organisation or 
person 
Position Date of 
interview 
Duration of 
interview 
(hours) 
W4/W15 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Sustainability 
manager 
13 Jul 2011 
13 Apr 2015 
1.23 
0:54 
W5 Wine producer. Known as a 
sustainability leader, medium sized 
in bottling capacity 
CEO 16 Jul 2012 1:17 
W6 Robertson area wine producer, 
Premium brand. Known as a 
sustainability leader, more than one 
wine farm in different regions 
operating under the same brand, 
medium sized in bottling capacity 
Sustainability 
manager 
29 Aug 2013 2:04 
W10 Wine producer, Stellenbosch area, 
known for pro-active environmental 
initiatives, does not cooperate much 
apart from BWI. 
Wine maker 21 Jan 2015 0:34 
W11 Wine producer, part of Greater 
Simonsberg conservancy, BWI 
Champion. Is a farm under the 
control of Distell. 
Wine maker 29 Jan 2015 0:46 
 
W12/N5 Wine producer, part of Greater 
Simonsberg Conservancy, BWI 
Champion Person interviewed is a 
coordinator of the conservancy and 
therefore plays a dual role. 
Conservancy 
manager 
12 Feb 2015 1:18 
W14 Wine grower/producer CEO/Owner & 
Conservancy 
manager 
10 Mar 2015 1:08 
W17 Organic wine farm/ Stellenbosch 
region 
Managing 
director 
29 Apr 2015 0:38 
W18 Biodynamic wine farm/ Stellenbosch 
region 
Owner 12 May 2015 1:06 
W19 Ultra-premium wine producer, small 
bottling capacity, Stellenbosch 
region 
Owner 11 Sep 2015 0:39 
N4 Environmental organisation Project manager 24 Jun 2014 1:18 
N6 Environmental multinational NGO. 
Local initiative in the wine industry 
Project manager 16 Feb 2015 0:48 
N7 South African NGO working with 
conservancies 
Chairperson 10 Apr 2015 0:43 
N8 Wine body Communications 
Manager 
13 May 2015 
19 May 2015 
unrecorded 
0:48 
J1 Journalist working in the wine 
industry 
Journalist 23 Apr 2015 0:30 
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The BWI has two tiers of membership, namely BWI members and BWI champions. BWI 
champions are exemplary producers that make a significant commitment towards conserving 
critically endangered biodiversity and practicing environmentally-responsible farming and cellar 
management principles. Champions must also show annual progress against a comprehensive 
environmental management plan (EMP) and at least ten percent  of the total farm must comprise of 
undeveloped natural area that must be set aside for conservation. The minimum amount of land 
that must be set aside to qualify for entry-level BWI membership is two hectares (ha). Depending 
on the level of compliance with BWI requirements, wine producers are allowed to show the 
relevant logo on their wine bottles (see Figure 6.8). One of the problems of the BWI eco-labels as 
shown in Figure 6.8, is that the two labels are very similar, and if the wine label is printed in black 
and white, the two labels are even more similar. The market is also not informed enough that wine 
consumers are necessarily aware of the differences between the two tiers. 
 
Figure 6.8: The two BWI eco-labels indicating different tiers of membership 
Not being a member of BWI does not imply that a wine producer makes itself guilty of 
environmentally-damaging practices. It may purely mean that there is too little indigenous flora to 
qualify for BWI status (Interviewee N6).  
A major driver for BWI seems to be a moral argument (W11, W14). A number of interviewees 
questioned whether BWI makes financial sense, but still comply because they believe it is 
important for the existence of the farms in the future. Even farms that do not have BWI 
membership, or those members who are not champions, express a moral argument in striving for 
higher certification (Interviewee W18, W19).  Even without seeing a marketable difference in BWI 
certification, farmers still view the underlying actions as sensible actions as expressed by 
Interviewee W11: 
But we're doing all of this purely for the sustainability of the farm; it needs to continue 
functioning. That said, it costs you a lot of money; so somewhere you have to make 
money to do good.  
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The above quote makes reference to economic value as a requirement, if not a driver, of 
environmental action. The main drivers of the BWI for farmers are free extension services (access 
to explicit knowledge and people with skills, i.e. tacit knowledge) and the potential for eco-labelling 
that potentially could create market access (Honig, Petersen, Shearing, Pintér & Kotze, 2015: 390). 
6.5.2 Drivers of BWI 
Table 6.6 links the findings in this study with the drivers for joining BWI as identified by Honig et al. 
(ibid.). In order to link these findings back to the literature, the drivers were categorised into the 
three high-level drivers identified in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6: Drivers for joining BWI 
See 
Table 3.1 
Driver a Brief description a Interviewees who 
mentioned such 
aspects 
M
o
ra
l 
Connection with 
nature 
Satisfaction in seeing how nature 
recovers. 
W11, N8 
Social/Eco-
responsibility 
Awareness of one’s impact on future 
generations. 
W11, W8, N8 
Shared vision Alignment in the industry regarding the 
ethics and importance of conservation. 
W11, N8 
Peer pressure Actions by some farmers motivate other 
wine producers to follow suit. 
 
L
e
g
it
im
a
c
y
 
Environmental risk 
mitigation 
Environmental action reduces risks 
associated with climate change, invasive 
species, future water scarcity, hotter and 
dryer summers, etc. 
W11, W13 
Recognition and 
credibility 
BWI membership is seen as a reward for 
doing the right thing. 
W10, W13 
Voluntary contract Because BWI is voluntary and not a long-
term conservation contract, wine 
producers are more willing to participate. 
W11 
Physical farm 
characteristics 
Parts of a farm are undeveloped and are 
thus available for this purpose. 
W12 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
c
a
s
e
 
Easy-win Some farms were already on par with BWI 
requirements and could therefore receive 
membership with little additional effort. 
N6, W6, N8 
Market advantage An economic benefit in selling more wine. W17, J1, W13, N6, N7 
Farm value Environmental actions can increase the 
value of the property, for instance alien 
vegetation clearing. 
W11 
Source: a Honig, Petersen, Shearing, Pintér & Kotze, 2015: 390. 
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6.5.3 Knowledge value 
BWI extension services include support for wine producers to implement sound biodiversity 
practices on their farm, including alien invasive plant clearing programmes, fire management 
initiatives, botanical surveys, water and energy-efficiency interventions, environmental education 
and assistance in establishing private nature reserves (Honig et al., 2015: 390). A key outcome of 
the extension services is the production of an environmental management plan (EMP). Despite this 
aspect being pointed out by Honig et al. (ibid), extension services were never mentioned in the 
interviews with farmers in this study. 
Opinions differed about the creation and dissemination of knowledge within and by the BWI. One 
interviewee commented on the common benefit created through the documentation of experience 
and information in the industry. 
Now, on the BWI level and the IPW [Integrated Production of Wine] level, obviously 
those are industry efforts, you know, which we participate in, and there’s obviously 
collaboration with the industry bodies and you know, through that we’re collaborating 
with other producers in the country really, because the information that they pick up 
here goes to a source that’s available to everybody, and if there’s new ideas and so on, 
you know, everybody can access them, and the auditors themselves will tell people, 
you know, how to improve based on what they’ve seen in other places.  
(Interviewee W10) 
However, this was not a view that was strongly supported by other interviewees. Some 
interviewees felt that there was little to learn from BWI. 
No, there is no knowledge. No look, it's a number of guidelines to be met and you are 
audited against it. So, there is no knowledge. I mean, they say to you “listen, it should 
look like this, it works like this, it should be so and so and so. You meet the criteria or 
you do not meet them.” It's more of a regulation thing than a learning thing. 
(Interviewee W11) 
Interestingly, Interviewee W11 felt strongly about the fact that conserving nature is the right thing to 
do and was evidently more intrinsically motivated to participate in the BWI. 
6.5.4 Market access 
Although BWI as a body has not done much promotion of the BWI brand, there is evidence that 
members and champions of the BWI enjoy access to markets (see Table 6.7) that non-members 
do not (Interviewee N6, W17). Such a strategy entails an element of beyond compliance leadership 
or eco-branding.  
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Eco-branding, as stated in the literature review (Orsato, 2006 & 2009) requires:  
 Uncontroversial and clear information;  
 That it must be hard for competitors to copy; and  
 That consumers must be willing to pay a premium for the environmental benefit.  
Although the first requirement is potentially true through the support of the WWF, more than one 
interviewee referred to the complexity of the BWI certification and difficulty in trying to explain that 
to consumers.  
Table 6.7: Access to markets 
Element of market 
access 
Illustrative quote 
Better access to 
retailers 
Yes, I think some of the people will not accept your product if it is not BWI 
certified. In other words, if we deliver for Woolworths, and you are not BWI 
certified, they can tell you to become certified by them. At this stage they still 
don’t do that, but they can do it. […] You can say they prefer it. If there are two 
wines, but the one is BWI-certified and the other not, they would go with the 
BWI certified wine the BWI. (Interviewee W17) 
Better access to export 
markets 
There is a great deal of sensitivity in most of our off-shore markets, northern 
hemisphere off-shore markets to the manner in which wine is produced, from 
an agricultural perspective, from a labour perspective and so on and so forth. 
(Interviewee J1) 
Access to premium 
segment of the market 
And in the ecological sense or the environmental sense, the presence of the 
BWI label or some indication on the label that the producer is a BWI champion 
or participated in the BWI programme, is going to have traction.  The extent of 
the traction, I have to tell you, I don’t know and I don’t understand, but I know 
that it is clearly an intrinsic factor, and it has to do with the business of the story 
of how wine is made and produced, which is perceived to be a significant 
metric in the marketing context.  And particularly when your wine price starts to 
climb into the middle of a heading towards the premium sector of the market.  
That’s where consumers want to know the story of how the wine is produced, 
and they’re interested and they’re also going to base their decisions on what 
they hear and see.  And in that context, I think BWI is going to – have been an 
intrinsic factor.  To what extent, I can’t quantify. (Interviewee J1) 
More buyers at the 
cellar 
I think it brings more feet in the cellar door. (Interviewee N6) 
 
The second and third requirements are even more easily challenged. There are more than 
200 wine producers with BWI membership (including champions), so it would be hard to argue that 
the strategy is difficult to copy. As for the willingness to pay for the ecological benefit, there is some 
doubt from the interviewees. 
The person does not buy your wine because you are green; he buys your wine 
because he likes it and maybe because he likes the label, the look, the packaging, and 
therefore he likes it. (Interviewee W14) 
The above quote supports the research shown earlier in this study that consumers do not consider 
awards or certification as an important source of differentiation. Cultivar, region and producer are 
more important to consumers than what BWI certification would be (see Table 3.3). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
142 
More than one interviewee expressed scepticism about the ability of BWI certification to swing the 
decision of wine-consumers. 
There is no such thing as buyers who insist, it is not ISO like [International Organization 
for Standardization] and ISO 2000 and HCCP [heating, cooling and process piping] and 
all this kind of stuff we now have in farming. There are markets that ask for this Wine 
Initiative for Ethical Trading, and things like fair trade, you know. There is definitely 
markets that ask for it. But not yet for BWI. We have not yet come to a situation where 
a person says “listen here, I will not buy your wine because you are not BWI certified” 
or something similar. So the fact that we are linked to the World Wildlife Fund and that 
kind of stuff, I think, counts for something – people like it and that’s a plus. I think if 
there are two wines that are the same and you go to the person and say “listen, we do 
this” then you will have the edge. But whether it really swings the buyer's head to the 
extent that you sell more wine, I do not know. (Interviewee W11) 
Yet, without any doubt, it is evident that BWI certification provides access to markets, or more 
accurately, a license to access certain markets (see Table 6.7). BWI can be seen as a reputation 
protection strategy rather than a reputation building strategy. One interviewee elegantly illustrates 
BWI as a beyond compliance leadership strategy: 
On the one level side, IPW – BWI, and I mean, so without a doubt there’s business 
value, but it’s all entry level stuff, I think, it’s not – it’s what you need to just stay on the 
playing field, as opposed to a differentiator...  I think, you know, the one thing is that 
we’ve also always taken the view at [company name] that in this accreditation space, 
it’s so much better to have external accreditations come in and review your practices 
than you going and writing stories about what you’re doing, because that’s just PR 
speak.  (Interviewee W13) 
Table 6.7 further elaborates on different levels of access which BWI certification grants it members.  
Retailers are one of the most important channels for wine producers in South Africa. The 
relationship of one South African retailer, i.e. Woolworths, with BWI and other environmental 
initiatives featured strongly in the interviews. Woolworths is recognised in the South African market 
as an environmentally-responsible retailer. Although not all the wine suppliers of Woolworths are 
BWI members (see Figure 6.9), most of the wine suppliers are BWI members.  
Still, it is clear from the writing on the wall shown in Figure 6.9 that BWI wines enjoy a higher 
regard with Woolworths. BWI affords its members a common benefit in the form of broader market 
access, and a minor source of differentiation in its stores. 
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Despite the availability of the BWI stickers to members and champions, many farms do not take 
advantage of it as described by one interviewee. 
But there is a small sticker that they can put on their wine, that looks like this [shows 
sticker similar to Figure 6.8] … it's just a sticker. So it's about the marketing advantage 
that it entails. … There's not been great buy-in on the stickers. I think the people really 
do these things because they feel passionate about conservation. Many of these farms 
had already been conserving their areas, and BWI just gave them recognition. So, if 
BWI is one day no longer there, I think the project will still – it will still continue 
(Interviewee N6). 
 
Figure 6.9: BWI exposure in Woolworths store 
A number of reasons emerged from the interviews that explain why the sticker is not used so 
much. These are listed in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8: Why wine bottlers do not display the BWI logo 
Generic reason Illustrative quote 
The BWI label, together with other 
labels and information make the label 
too cluttered. 
It is only our Woolworths label which has the BWI logo, so we 
don’t put it onto our other labels, because, as I said, it becomes 
too crowded.  (Interviewee W17). 
The BWI label does not impact on the 
buyer’s decision 
The guy does not buy your wine because you are green, he buys 
your wine because he likes it and maybe because he likes the 
label, the look, the packaging, and therefore he likes it. 
(Interviewee W14) 
Exactly because the BWI seal actually means nothing to most 
people. Even the producers say that they cannot actually see 
how that little effort made any effort to sales or awareness. 
(Interviewee N8) 
They believe it is the right thing to do 
despite not having the benefit of 
reputational gain. 
Many of these farms had already been conserving their areas, 
and BWI just gave them recognition. (Interviewee N6) 
Farmers believe a different 
certification provides a bigger benefit. 
Laibach already has organic certification. As a result, it gives 
them sufficient differentiation from their competitors. Laibach only 
has the BWI sticker on its Woolworths branded products. 
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6.5.5 Innovation 
The last aspect of business value is the innovation that comes from IPW/BWI audit reports: 
And so we’ve been in that space and say how can we rather work with the 
accreditation agencies who will push us, because I think there is also something in that 
space around – okay, so we’ve done an audit and it’s not just BWI, it’s fair trading and 
tourism, it’s – you know, in these spaces, much prefer to have an auditor come in and 
look at all of our processes and say guys, interesting, but you know, there’s an 
opportunity here and how are you going to push this part of what you do, and so for us 
in all of those auditing spaces, personally for my role, I value them enormously, 
because they’re our pushing space.  Or our space just say so what.  So you’re doing 
that, so what.  What’s next?  You know, rather than a tick-tick, you do these things. It 
might not differentiate us, but it’s about at least staying where we should be, because I 
think if we didn’t do that, or others didn’t do that, things could deteriorate quickly in the 
spaces that really need focus.   Not necessarily at [company name], but you know, just 
in general.  I don’t see it as a huge differentiator, but I think it also depends on how you 
use it, and we use it very strongly internally.  Like we pore over our audit reports and 
we really look at where there are opportunities, what else can we do. 
(Interviewee W13) 
6.5.6 Socio-environmental value 
The BWI promotes biodiversity in a sector that historically has had a major impact on the Cape 
Floral Kingdom. The protection of the biodiversity in the wine industry has a number of socio-
environmentally-related benefits. The first benefit stems from the resilience that biodiversity 
provides in an ecosystem (Interviewee W4, N8). 
More natural – indigenous flora, it's no longer a mono-culture, it's much more that – 
since the fynbos has returned, several animals are back. You have more snakes, more 
owls, the whole ecosystem is recovering. You let go under controlled conditions so that 
you can stimulate the natural environment. And now they see a lot more predators 
because of an increase in prey, and it’s in balance. And the vineyards benefit, because 
there is a natural environment that protects itself, in other words you spray less. That's 
the big advantage. It costs you less, you spray less, so you get healthier grapes and 
healthier wine. (Interviewee N8) 
Fynbos forms an intricate part of the attraction of the region. A small forest of silver trees was 
discovered on one of the farms when they removed alien (invasive species) trees. The protection 
of such areas has aesthetic value and many local and foreign visitors to the wine region are 
attracted to the aesthetics of the wine route.  
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6.5.7 The coopetition value matrix of BWI 
The CVM for BWI is relatively densely populated in terms of common economic benefits, but the 
benefits can mostly be classified as reputational protection for the wine industry. As with the 
TGRC, the BWI is not strongly associated with knowledge value that filters down to members, 
although some farms seem to capture value through a pro-active attitude. There was no evidence 
of private benefit from the interviews, which raises an interesting argument about the stability of 
coopetition initiatives. From the literature review it was stated that coopetition initiatives with low 
private benefits experience low or intermediate stability (Dyer et al., 2008:146). In the case of the 
BWI, both private and common benefits are low, but the initiative has remained stable for the last 
ten years. The answer potentially lies in the fact that many farms were doing what BWI required 
even before BWI existed. 
The purpose of this dissertation was not to study the stability of coopetition initiatives, but the 
anecdotal evidence provides an interesting counter-argument. This area of research would be an 
interesting field for future research. 
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Table 6.9: CVM for the Biodiversity & Wine Initiative 
 Value creation 
 Economic value Knowledge value Environmental value 
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BWI provides a differentiator for 
South African wines that are 
exported. (Interviewee W5) 
BWI provides preferential access 
for members in some cases. 
(Interviewee N6) 
Attention is drawn to BWI wines 
in some retailers such as 
Woolworths. This provides free 
marketing value and raises 
awareness about BWI wines. 
BWI serves as requirement for a 
licence to operate. 
(Interviewee W13) 
BWI serves as knowledge hub about 
biodiversity conservation. 
Audit reports provide members with 
areas for improvement. 
(Interviewee W13) 
A benefit accrues to society 
because of environmental 
improvements, but this value 
is non-excludable (i.e. it 
cannot be captured by any of 
the coopetitors exclusively) 
and therefore cannot be 
considered as a common or 
private benefit. For this 
reason this cell is empty in the 
CVM. 
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BWI Champions members can 
potentially gain more exposure 
than ordinary members can, 
although this is not the case it 
seems. 
Wine producers capture value 
from BWI when they use it to 
access markets they otherwise 
may not have had access to. 
Exporting wine producers capture 
the available benefit overseas 
while those that do not export 
lose the potential benefit. 
Members capture knowledge by 
using the knowledge resource and 
gaining insight into areas for 
improvement from audit reports. 
P
ri
v
a
te
 
b
e
n
e
fi
t 
  
P
u
b
li
c
 b
e
n
e
fi
t 
Socio-economic benefit in BWI 
stems from protection of eco-
systems and the promotion of 
biodiversity on wine and grape 
producing farms 
BWI raises awareness about 
biodiversity and informs consumers 
about BWI wines. 
Biodiversity gains mean more 
natural resilience in the eco-
system.  
Increase in ecological 
services such as pest control, 
fire control, support of 
indigenous fauna. 
Aesthetic value of indigenous 
fauna and flora 
 
6.5.8 The end of BWI 
At the time of this study it was announced that the BWI would cease to exist in its current form. 
This brings the BWI to an end ten years after it started. Some interviewees (Interviewee N6, N8) 
felt that the BWI had succeeded in its mandate and that there was no longer a need for a formal 
body.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
147 
The first points on their agenda was naturally to create awareness about the 
conservation of our Cape Floral Kingdom, and secondly to implement it, to physically 
get farmers to buy in and protect it, and not to pull out fynbos or build buildings. And 
now it reached a point where it is so – everyone knows of BWI, while wineries currently 
over-deliver on their targets for conservation. Many of these guys do not need help or 
custodianship any more. (Interviewee N8) 
Other interviewees felt that the BWI was a unique differentiator for the South African wine industry 
and criticised the decision. In all likelihood the BWI certification will be incorporated into the 
“sustainable wines” label, which represents the merging of a number of sustainability aspects. 
Some believe that BWI will continue to exist for champions.  
6.6 THE GREATER SIMONSBERG CONSERVANCY 
6.6.1 Introduction 
The Greater Simonsberg Conservancy is situated along the slopes of the Simonsberg Mountain 
near Stellenbosch (‘Simonsberg’ means Simon’s mountain), an area of great conservation value. It 
is home to fragments of critically-endangered Swartland shale renosterveld (a type of fynbos or 
fine bush biome), Boland granite fynbos and Mountain fynbos. In 2004, only four percent of the 
Swartland shale renosterveld was still in existence (Interviewee W12). 
A big fire in 2000 exposed a small yellow-wood forest on top of Klapmutskop, prompting the five 
founding farms (Delheim, Elsenburg, East Hill, Le Bonheur and Warwick) to establish the 
conservancy in 2004. Initially the conservancy was established as the Klapmutskop Conservancy 
under Cape Nature’s Stewardship Programme. The five founding wine farms are all situated 
around the Klapmutskop (or Klapmuts Hill).  
Figure 6.10 provides an aerial view of the mountain (at the back) and hill (in the front). 
 
Figure 6.10: Klapmutskop (in the front) and Simonsberg mountain behind it 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
148 
Not long after the establishment of the Klapmutskop Conservancy, the conservancy managed to 
secure funding to remove the young invasive alien plants that were starting to grow after the fire. 
Alien invasive plants are associated with a number of ecological impacts. Table 6.10 provides a 
summary of ecological impacts of alien plants in the fynbos biome. 
Table 6.10: Ecological impact of alien plant invasion 
Alien invasive species Disruption 
Acacia longifolia (tree) ↑ litterfall  
↓ diversity of ground-living invertebrates 
↓ streamﬂow 
Acacia mearnsii (tree) ↓ diversity of ground-living invertebrates 
↓ streamﬂow 
Acacia saligna (tree)  
 
↑ biomass 
↑ litterfall 
Change in nutrient chemistry in lowland fynbos  
Change in seed dispersal dynamics size and distribution of fuel 
↓ moisture content = ﬁre regime 
Attrition of seed banks of native plants with time in dense stands 
Eucalyptus spp. (tree) ↑ water repellence and soil erosion 
Hakea sericea (woody shrub) ↑ biomass  
Change in size and distribution of fuel 
↓ moisture content = changed ﬁre regime 
↑ biomass; results in very intense ﬁres when felled plants are burnt 
(water-repellent soils - erosion) 
Dense stands limit options for ﬁre management 
Change in vegetation structure  
↓ abundance and diversity of native birds 
Change in arthropod community structure (some taxa ↑; some ↓) 
↓ leaf retention and % seed set in native Proteaceae 
Lantana camara (woody shrub) ↓ diversity of ground-dwelling invertebrates 
↓ suppresses regeneration via allelopathy 
Poisons livestock (R1.7 million/year) 
Pinuspinaster (tree) Out-competes native plants 
Dense stands limit options for ﬁre management 
↓ streamﬂow 
Sesbaniapunicea (tree) ↓ access,  
↑ bank erosion, 
↓ streamﬂow 
Poisoning of livestock 
Source: Adapted from Van Wilgen, Richardson, Le Maitre, Marais & Magadlela, 2001. 
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Two of the most mentioned impacts of alien plants in this dissertation are reduced water availability 
and fire risk. Fire risk increases because of the drier environment.  Alien plants also typically 
increase the fuel loads in case of a fire, burn at higher intensity and grow in dense growths, making 
firefighting very difficult (Van Wilgen & Richardson, 1985). Overall, alien plants therefore increase 
the probability and costs of large veld-fires, while making the control of the fire more difficult.  
Much of the natural environment has been restored through sponsorship and support from the 
landowners. Because of the impact of alien invasive trees and shrubs, a large focus in the 
conservancy (today known as the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy) is on the suppression of alien 
growth through mechanical removal. The members of the conservancy are actively involved in 
conservation efforts and in this way collaborate with each other.  
In 2009, a full-time conservation officer was appointed to manage the conservancy. The 
conservancy has since grown to thirty-two members in 2015 (Interviewee W12).  
Table 6.11 shows the interviewees who were interviewed regarding the Simonsberg Conservancy. 
Table 6.11: Interviewees: Greater Simonsberg Conservancy 
Interviewee Description of organisation or 
person 
Position Date of 
interview 
Duration of 
interview 
(hours) 
W4/W15 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Sustainability 
manager 
13 Jul 2011  1:23 
W11 Wine producer, part of Greater 
Simonsberg Conservancy, BWI 
Champion. Is a farm under the 
control of Distell. 
Wine maker 29 Jan 2015 0:46 
 
W12/N5 Wine producer, part of Greater 
Simonsberg Conservancy, BWI 
Champion. Person interviewed is 
a coordinator of the conservancy 
and therefore plays a dual role. 
Conservancy 
manager 
12 Feb 2015 1:18 
W14 Wine grower/producer CEO/Owner & 
Conservancy 
manager 
10 Mar 2015 1:08 
W17 Organic wine farm. Stellenbosch 
region 
Managing director 29 Apr 2015 0:38 
N4 Environmental organisation Project manager 24 Jun 2014  1:18 
N6 Environmental multinational 
NGO. Local initiative in the wine 
industry 
Project manager 16 Feb 2015  0:48 
J1 Journalist working in the wine 
industry 
Journalist 23 Apr 2015 0:30 
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6.6.2 Common benefits 
The Greater Simonsberg Conservancy affords its members a number of benefits such as 
environmental legitimacy, reduced costs, reduced risk, as well as access to financial and 
knowledge resources (See Figure 6.11).  
Cooperation to form 
conservancy affords 
access to government funds
Alien clearing
Snake training
Fire training
More water/lower risk
BWI eligibility
Lower fire risk
Less damage to 
grapes because of mice
Increase in predators 
(owls, caracal)
Access to more/faster
information
Coordination of activities
such as firefighting, alien 
clearing
Voluntary environmental 
Initiative (VEI) provides 
legitimacy to farms
 
Figure 6.11: Benefits of cooperation in the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy 
The benefits in Figure 6.11 could only be acquired through the conservancy, i.e. only by working 
together do they manage to create a benefit for everyone.  
If that thing – that vehicle was not there, we would not today have had so many farms 
together. To belong to the conservancy is good because of fire protection, insurance 
risks, security, social networks, access to information and the training courses. 
(Interviewee W14) 
Asked by the interviewer if such an initiative could have worked at a dyadic level, the same 
interviewee responded as follows: 
…a farmer working with a farmer to address environmental issues hasn’t worked in our 
situation. And it would never have worked if it were not for the conservancy. And I think 
it flowed from there that everyone said “I want to be part of the Simonsberg 
Conservancy because it's an identity I can belong to”. And from that you get some 
benefit. (Interviewee W14) 
The power of the bigger collective was also evident from the interview with Interviewee W12. 
Because the farmers collectively created a separate entity to govern the initiative, it allows for 
easier access to funding.  
Not only does the central body facilitate access to government funding, but also makes 
information and knowledge more accessible to member-farms. (Interviewee W12) 
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Interviewee W14 also elaborated on this aspect: 
But now it's just easier to provide that type of conservation service to your members. 
They do not need a secretary to have to call around and about in order to find out 
where to get an owl house or where to get this or that. They can call one place and we 
already have that network and we can help them with that, or if we do not, we can get 
it. So you get to know the needs of your people. (Interviewee W14) 
The clearing of alien invasive plants like black wattle, pine and gum trees is a key activity of the 
conservancy as such aliens presents a threat to water supply, fire management and conservation 
of biodiversity in the area.  
Because you know, to clean a block in the mountain and to transport the cuttings from 
there, is a lot of man-hours. Some of those blocks are steep and all that. So, that's an 
expensive option, or an expensive situation, but there are definitely many advantages. 
It is a huge water issue. I mean, there is a scarcity of water – that we all know. And I 
think water is our primary objective, and it is about the resilience of the farm. 
(Interviewee W11) 
Over 478 ha of alien invasive plants have been removed because of funding from LandCare. 
“LandCare is a community-based and government supported approach to the sustainable 
management and use of agricultural natural resources” (Landcare, 2016). 
Although farmers pay a membership fee, the financial benefit they gain through cooperation far 
exceeds the membership cost. 
So we are very grateful for the assistance. I would necessarily have applied for such 
external funding as an individual, but because they are part of this group, and we are a 
non-profit organisation, it is easier for us to apply on behalf of the group and then to 
spend it at grassroots level. (Interviewee W12) 
The collective action provides farmers with a substantial economic benefit. More water translates 
to potentially more hectares that can be planted, increased yield per hectare, lower drought risk 
and lower risk of fires.  
The value attached to reduced risk of veld-fires is extremely hard to quantify, as the cooperation to 
fight fires may prevent the fire from reaching a particular farmer, in which case the potential loss is 
impossible to estimate. 
A number of interviewees gave example of increased water, not only on their own farms but also 
on other farms (W12, W11, W14, N6). In essence, the removal of invasive trees increases the 
resilience of farms. 
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I have photographs here of places where there was never water. We started cutting 
down trees and as you progress up the gorge, the water starts running at the bottom. 
You know, they say that a eucalyptus tree that a grown man can put his arms around, 
uses 960 litres of water a day. So you can think for yourself (Interviewee W11). 
While cooperation is required to access government funding, farmers do not cooperate in the alien 
removal activity.  Alien clearing is coordinated centrally and the worst areas enjoy priority. As a 
result, bigger farms and farms that have more invasive trees capture a bigger component of the 
benefit associated with clearing (Interviewee W12). Because there is a limited pie of funding every 
year, the capturing of the benefits flowing from the clearing of invasive species can be considered 
a zero-sum game. 
A last economic benefit of alien clearing is BWI-eligibility. As mentioned before, BWI requires 
farmers to preserve a certain percentage of their farms for indigenous flora. When farmers remove 
alien vegetation, it naturally opens up space for the natural vegetation to return and therefore 
makes BWI certification easier to attain. 
While alien clearing may be a zero-sum activity, snake training is a positive-sum activity. 
Interviewee W17 explained the economic value that flows from increased knowledge value 
(awareness). 
…you know, people, when they see a snake, they want to kill it. The guy who received 
snake training will think twice about killing it... the snake captures all the mice in the 
vineyards. And we sometimes have problems with mice. In other words, if there are 
enough snakes, there will not be mice, or there will be far less mice. 
The conservation of snakes (indicative of biodiversity) therefore provides farms with ecosystem 
services in the form of natural control of pests, in this case, mice.  
Outside of the tasting area of Laibach, one of the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy members, is a 
sign that declares its membership of the conservancy (see Figure 6.12). Such a declaration of 
membership provides legitimacy to member-farms. The sign provides an example of where 
environmental coopetition is close to consumers.  
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Figure 6.12: Greater Simonsberg Conservancy membership at Laibach wines 
The sign in front of the tasting room in Figure 6.12 arguably provides a stronger association 
between environmental action and the wine producer than the BWI does. The conservancy is more 
exclusive, and is potentially easier for consumers to understand than the BWI. 
6.6.3 The coopetition value matrix for the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy 
The Greater Simonsberg Conservancy turned out to be one of the richest case studies in terms of 
the common benefits at both economic and knowledge level. In the view of the researcher, this 
may be related to the fact that the locus of control of the conservancy lies very close to the 
member-farms. It also relates to the fact that the partners are all very close in terms of social, 
cognitive and geographic proximity. All the farmers experience the same problems and therefore 
the cooperation is more meaningful than an industry-wide initiative (like the BWI) or a supra-
industry wide initiative (like the TGRC). 
The CVM in Table 6.12 reflects the richness in common benefits, as well as in socio-environmental 
benefits. 
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Table 6.12: CVM for the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy 
 Value creation 
 Economic value Knowledge value  Environmental value 
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Easier and more efficient 
access to government 
funding for alien clearing 
(positive-sum logic) 
Removal of alien trees 
(zero-sum logic) 
Access to more water 
(positive-sum logic) 
Less fire risk (positive-sum 
logic) 
Snake & fire awareness 
training (positive-sum 
logic) 
Brand protection from 
Voluntary Environmental 
Initiative (positive-sum 
logic) 
Snake & fire awareness 
training (positive-sum logic) 
Coordination of fire-fighting 
efforts provides an 
opportunity to respond faster. 
(positive-sum logic) 
Conservancy office serves as 
an information and knowledge 
source (positive-sum logic) 
 
Socio-environmental value 
is per definition value that 
accrues to society and a 
public good. It therefore 
implies that it cannot be 
captured by the 
coopetition parties. 
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The farmer with the 
highest infestation of alien 
trees receives the biggest 
benefit from government 
funding for alien clearing. 
Yet, this also translates to 
lower risk for other 
farmers.  
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Reduced fire risk benefits 
the immediate community. 
The conservancy runs various 
education programmes for 
school children and farm 
workers around conservation. 
(Interviewee W12) 
Removal of alien 
species allow natural 
habitat for fauna & flora 
Return of animals such 
as caracal, owls, 
snakes, mice. 
More water 
 
As was the case with BWI, there was no indication of private benefits. This may not be an entirely 
accurate reflection, as the next case tells about one particular initiative that was embedded in the 
geographic space of the conservancy. However, the researcher decided to separate the case 
study as it represents a smaller collaboration effort that started and runs separately from the 
conservancy. 
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6.7 CONTROL OF MEALYBUG USING NATURAL PREDATORS 
6.7.1 Introduction 
Laibach organic wine was one of the first wine producers in the Stellenbosch region and in South 
Africa to farm organically. The wine producer is well known for the Ladybird brand (see a marketing 
pamphlet of Laibach in Figure 6.13).  
 
Figure 6.13: Marketing pamphlet of The Ladybird wine brand 
The ladybird refers to the ladybird as a natural predator of the vine mealybug (Planococcus ficus), 
a major problem pest for wine farmers.  Mealybugs feed on plant juices and sap, and secrete 
honeydew that is a growth medium for sooty mould fungus (Jonker, 2014). The ability to 
photosynthesise, especially in younger plants, may be affected negatively by the fungus and can 
lead to poor yield or the death of the vine. Premature leaf drop may happen as a result of the 
mealybug’s toxic saliva. Figure 6.14 shows the typical signs of mealybug infestation.  
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Figure 6.14: Evidence of vine mealybug 
Mealybugs rapidly become resistant to pesticides. The application of broad-spectrum insecticides 
can lead to outbreaks as the insecticide would kill the predators and potentially allow the mealybug 
population to boom instead (Jonker, 2014).  
Laibach was the first among its peers to make use of perminutus wasps and cryptoleamus bugs to 
control mealybug numbers. Its neighbours followed suit and, at the time of this study all Laibach’s 
neighbours made use of natural predators to control mealybugs. The cooperation is weak, and one 
could even question whether this should be seen as cooperation at all. As a respondent 
(Interviewee W16) in a different conservancy noted: “to go to church together is not coopetition”. 
Yet there are definite signs that knowledge is transferred between farmers, either through the 
breeder of the insects or between farmers themselves:  
Yes, it's a fairly loose cooperation, you know. What happens is that Braam Jonker, the 
guy who deliver the predator insects for us, says “but listen, at Koos this is happening, 
over there something else is happening.” and then I will see Koos at an Agricultural 
Society meeting or at the cooperative. It's not explicitly said “listen here, you do that 
block or you do that block or you do this block”. It is every guy doing his bit on his farm. 
And he runs his farm in order to make economic sense for him. We all try, every guy is 
trying. You start with your worst affected spots and so you move out. 
(Interviewee W17) 
Interviewee W11 also confirmed that farmers often exchange knowledge about natural predators, 
but made it explicit that the cooperation is not at a conservancy level, but rather between farms: 
It's one of those type of things that if I do it alone, it will not make a dent. If you are not 
doing it as a group, it does not help to do it on an isolated farm, as the populations are 
just too big. And now we are at a stage where the whole spot here all work together, 
that's us and Laibach and [wine farm X] and [wine farm Y] and [wine farm Z]. All of us 
in this area release these natural enemies, predators of mealybugs. It's been a few 
years now and it works. At this point there is very limited use of pesticide for mealybug. 
(Interviewee W11) 
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6.7.2 Common benefit and privately captured common benefit 
Exchanging knowledge (common knowledge becomes privately captured common knowledge) 
about the control of mealybug creates a common economic value for all the farmers by reducing 
the cost of controlling mealybug numbers.  
Laibach is the only organically certified wine producer among the cooperating farms. Without the 
cooperation from their neighbours, Laibach would not be able to control mealybugs as effectively. 
They [our neighbours] also no longer spray insecticides, or 90% of them [our 
neighbours] no longer use insecticides. Because we can control the mealie bug 100% 
in an organic way. …if everyone uses the parasites, you understand, then there will be 
very few mealybugs. And if one guy sprays, you understand, he will kill all the 
predators. But like I said, everyone around me uses parasites. So it actually works very 
well.  
6.7.3 Private benefit 
Laibach has done exceptionally well on the strength of the Ladybird brand. In the words of the 
respondent: 
Yes. Look, we are doing very well. Our Ladybird brand is doing very very well. We 
started in 2000 with it, and with only six acres at the time; we did not have much then. 
But every year we converted more and more to organic, so in 2010 the whole farm 
became certified as organic. We were one of the first organic farms in Stellenbosch. 
And when we started 5% of our production went into the Ladybird brand, and today it’s 
at 80%.  
In 2015, Laibach’s 2014 Chardonnay was recognised as one of the top organic white wines in 
South Africa by the Nedbank Green Wine Awards (see Figure 6.15). Because Laibach is the only 
organically certified farm in the group of coopetitors, they are able to generate private economic 
benefits that non-organic farms do not have access to. This would include increase in brand value 
because of the Nedbank wine awards, and the potential increase in wine sales. 
 
Figure 6.15: Laibach acknowledged by the Nedbank Green Wine Awards 
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6.7.4 Distance to consumer 
In response to the question “How important is it for you to tell the client about the environmental 
activities that you do?”, the interviewee responded as follows:  
No, it's important, you understand, because people know Ladybird is an organic 
product and they want to know why; why it is organic. But at least the guy can ask, you 
follow? And then; it is nice for the consumer then. It is interesting for him to hear about 
the ladybirds and the things that we do.  
The quote above accentuates the importance of raising awareness of the result of the coopetition 
initiative, but not so much raising awareness of the details of the cooperation between competitors. 
Thus, the case shows that the coopetition initiative and activities may not be marketed explicitly, 
but the results are marketed as part of an eco-branding strategy. 
6.7.5 The coopetition value matrix for the Mealybug 
The CVM of the mealybug initiative is somewhat different to the ones from previous case studies. It 
is the first case where a private benefit is generated by one partner because of exclusive access to 
a market – in this case the organic wine market. Farmers do not seem to be convinced that there is 
a cost saving, but most interviewees believe it will reduce costs in the future as the ecosystem 
builds up resilience. 
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Table 6.13: CVM for the Mealybug case study 
 Value creation 
 Economic value Knowledge value  Environmental value 
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Brand value is available to 
all participants 
Natural pest control may 
reduce operational costs in 
the long term. 
Farmers exchange knowledge 
from time to time, but not in a 
coordinated way.  
Socio-environmental value 
is per definition value that 
accrues to society and a 
public good. It therefore 
implies that it cannot be 
captured by the coopetition 
parties  
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Laibach generates most of 
the brand value by using 
the ladybird in its marketing 
and raising awareness 
about the control of pests 
using natural predators of 
mealybugs. The ladybird 
acts as an eco-label. 
All the farmers have 
reduced expenses because 
of natural pest control. 
Farmers learn from each other 
and the supplier of mealybug 
predators. 
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Laibach is the only 
organically certified wine 
producer amongst the 
group of wine producers in 
the immediate vicinity. 
Because of its neighbours 
using natural pest control, 
Laibach’s attempts are also 
more effective. 
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Less herbicide and 
pesticide spraying in the 
region is healthier for the 
immediate community. 
The ladybird brand and 
marketing around brand raises 
awareness of natural pest 
control. 
 
Increased biodiversity in 
vineyards. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
160 
6.8 ORGANIC FARMERS ASSOCIATION 
6.8.1 Introduction 
Three of the farmers (see Table 6.14) who were interviewed participate in a semi-formal 
cooperation between organic farmers.  
Table 6.14: Interviewees: Organic Farmers Association 
Interviewee Description of organisation or person Position Date of 
interview 
Duration of 
interview 
(hours) 
W17 Organic wine farm/ Stellenbosch region Managing 
director 
29 Apr 2015 0:38 
W18 Biodynamic wine farm/ Stellenbosch region Owner 12 May 2015 1:06 
W20 Organic farmer, supplier of grapes to 
organic wine producer W18 
Owner 15 Sep 2015 0:41 
 
Although the group is still in an informal structure, talks are in place to formalise an association of 
organic farmers. Interviewee W18 relayed the origins of the group: 
So, each time, you know, you only have one chance a year, and you have one harvest 
a year. So, this thing very quickly became very rough. So that’s when we realised, you 
know, it will benefit all of us if we can work together.  
It started with a phone call. (Interviewee W17) or Willie or whoever asked “what do you 
do with “kweek” (Cvnodon dactylon or Bermuda grass), or what do you do with weevils 
or what do you do with this, or whatever.” And it happened so often that we thought 
“let's get together and then we drink a cup of coffee and talk about it”. And then we 
discovered, you know, that (Interviewee W17) farms differently to Willie, who farms 
differently to me or Piet or Sannie or whoever. And then we started to take turns to go 
to each other's farms, and this thing has grown and it continues to grow. I think it was 
only informally, we were three or four, five. Now we are close to 15. As recently as last 
week, I again received a call from someone who wants to be part of the group. 
(Interviewee W18) 
6.8.2 Knowledge value 
The primary purpose of the cooperation between farmers, as the above quote illustrates, comes 
from a need to share knowledge and best practice: 
About four times a year we get together on another person's farm, and we discuss the 
work for that season, whether its fall or spring or summer or winter. And it's very 
interesting, because every guy has a different opinion, but we can at least hear why 
people do what they do and why they think as they think. And I think we all learn and 
grow quickly in this process, and we have learnt a lot. You know, rather than every guy 
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repeating the same mistakes, we very quickly started to share with each other certain 
pitfalls and things that happened. And I think, as a whole, the group benefitted, and 
individual farmers went ahead faster than when every farmer tries to figure it out on 
their own. (Interviewee W18) 
The collective knowledge in the group is a common benefit that increases with a positive-sum 
logic. As farmers share their experiences, everyone gains from it. The knowledge gained in the 
group helps farmers to reduce the risks of pests and crop failure, and therefore reduce the costs. 
As it happens, Interviewee W20 learned from Laibach about how to deal with mealybugs, even 
though they are not part of the neighbour-network around Laibach that was discussed earlier in this 
chapter. 
I cannot remember if it was at Laibach, but one of the guys told me that's what they do 
with mealybugs, yes. We have no problem when we need advice. We went to Laibach 
exactly on such a day and he showed us what they are doing there. (Interviewee W20) 
The common knowledge is therefore captured by each farmer when they learn from other farmers. 
6.8.3 Economic value 
Once the knowledge from the group is applied on individual farms, it leads to economic value in the 
form of lower risks, lower costs and/or higher yields than would be possible in the absence of 
coopetition.  
There is absolutely a wish in the wine industry to farm more biologically because it 
makes economic sense. It uses less electricity. The less you irrigate, the less you need 
to pump and the less money you spend. So many of these biological things make good 
economic sense, and that's why they do it. (Interviewee N6) 
The above quote is also a good illustration of how collaboration with competitors is different to 
collaboration with other entities. Organic farmers would not be able to learn much from 
conventional farmers, and vice versa. It makes sense to share knowledge with competitors that 
experience the same problems. 
But there are also other economic benefits stemming from the cooperation between organic 
producers. The cooperation between farmers started out as a knowledge-sharing initiative, but has 
since grown to other forms of cooperation. By cooperating with competitors through knowledge 
sharing, the members of the organic farmer group have identified other opportunities to cooperate, 
such as joint stands at wine shows. 
… let’s say we go to a wine show, then we book as an organic body, so then all the 
organic farms stand together. So in other words, if someone is looking for organic wine, 
he doesn’t need to search for you among all the other where you would disappear. 
Thus we form a group that is differentiated from the rest of the market, but compete 
with each other. (Interviewee W17) 
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One of the farms in the Organic Farmers Association is Reyneke Wines. (More focus is placed on 
Reyneke Wines in Section 6.9. The reason that it is covered here is because the examples below 
relate well to the structure created by the Organic Wine Association). 
Reyneke Wines provides a very tangible example of economic value that flows from the Organic 
farmer group:  
I cannot comment on other people's businesses, but if I just look for example Reyneke 
Wines, we have what they call an estate wine, in other words, wine from grapes 
produced on this farm. We very quickly realised there was not nearly [enough] – we 
cannot meet the demand. Thus, the wine was all sold out on allocation and it started to 
cause problems, because you know, if you are listed at a restaurant and you cannot 
supply the wine, the restaurant takes you off the list and you will not be listed again. 
As other farmers started to convert their farms to organic, let me say a little later than 
us, they delivered very good grapes, but not long enough to establish their own brands. 
For them it was difficult because they had taken on all the risk, they had worked very 
hard and did everything right, but they could only use 20 or 30% of their production, 
and then they would need to sell the rest at conventional prices to conventional 
wineries. And we thought well, there is an absolute synergy, we can offer them a 
premium and we can grow our brand. 
So, we now have three series; we have a biodynamic series from grapes of this farm 
only, and then we have a range of organic wines and we have a Vine Hugger series. 
The organic and the Vine Hugger series are made from grapes from our farm, but we 
have in the group of fifteen maybe two or three farms, you know, that can supply good 
quality, and we buy bulk wine or grapes from them and label the wine as Wine of 
Origin: Western Cape or whatever. 
[…] we just saw this thing grow, and if we work together, individually we can actually 
achieve more than if we each try alone. 
As the quote suggests, Reyneke Wines buys organic grapes from other farmers in the Organic 
Farmers Association, of which some are his neighbours. This allows Reyneke Wines to meet the 
increasing demand for its wines in the market, an economic benefit that Reyneke captures for itself 
(i.e. a privately captured common benefit) because of its brand and access to market. 
A neighbour of Reyneke Wines, makes reference to three big advantages of converting his whole 
farm to organic production with the help of Reyneke:  
i) The price for organic grapes are roughly double that of conventional grapes; 
ii) The operation costs are lower, and  
iii) The market is guaranteed. At the time of the interview, the full harvest of organic wine grapes 
was sold to Reyneke Wines. 
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Although the yield of an organic vineyard is lower, the higher price, lower costs and less market 
risk makes the conversion to organic production worthwhile. 
Apart from buying organic wine from producers, Reyneke Wines also reciprocates by providing 
resources to wine producers that they buy from:  
I received a call the other day from one of the guys who has been given an opportunity 
to provide wine. But he did not have enough wine, so we were able to tell him, okay, 
here's a few thousand litres, now you can go ahead again. I mean, you help us every 
year with your grapes, and here you now have an opportunity. (Johan Reyneke) 
As can be seen from this section, there are multiple economic benefits for the members of the 
Organic Farmers Association. The case study up to now could have been any initiative that 
involves knowledge sharing. However, what makes this example environmental coopetition is the 
socio-environmental value that is created in the process. 
6.8.4 Socio-environmental value 
By sharing best practice between farmers, more farmers convert and apply organic or biodynamic 
practices. The conservation and restoration of a natural eco-system represents socio-
environmental value. Such improved eco-systems provide resilience against pests, diseases and 
droughts: 
You do not use synthetic fertilisers, everything is natural fertiliser. In other words, the 
soil cannot salinate or get polluted, and we don’t use insecticides that kill everything, 
and we don’t use herbicides or synthetic fungicides. (Interviewee W17) 
The socio-environmental benefit is deliberate, and the sharing of best practice is deliberate as 
explained by Interviewee W18: 
I think all of us, especially the guys in the beginning, took risks because we thought it 
was the right thing to do, rather than perhaps the most financially beneficial thing. I am 
of the opinion that it is not healthy for me or my family or my natural environment to 
spray these herbicides, pesticides, fungicides and stuff the whole time. So, do I now 
want to keep my trade secrets to myself and watch as the rest of the place is destroyed 
around me? Or would I rather say “come guys, it's not that difficult, it's completely 
possible. If you're not sure whether you want to or not, become part of our group and 
take a cautious approach. Discuss your fears and your risks and your stuff with us and 
you will see it is quite feasible.” (Interviewee W18) 
It is difficult to see any financial benefit for an organic farmer to encourage other farmers to farm 
organically. Although the demand and market for organic wine was and is growing fast, there is no 
apparent strategic benefit in sharing ‘trade secrets’. One can therefore argue that there is a moral 
driver present rather than a legitimacy or business case for doing so.  
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The Organic Farmers Association is far from consumers. Nowhere is there any evidence of 
certification or marketing material that makes mention of it. As a result, there is no brand value for 
the common benefit or any of the members individually. 
6.8.5 The coopetition value matrix for the Organic Farmers Association 
The Organic Farmers Association is a good example of how a coopetition initiative evolves over 
time. The Association started informally (and was still somewhat informal at the time of the 
interviews) as a vehicle to share knowledge. With time, it evolved to include economic transactions 
that benefit both the more-established farms like Laibach and Reyneke Wines through increased 
access to grapes, and the less-established wine-grape growers through higher prices for their 
grapes.  
Table 6.15: CVM for the Organic Farmers Association 
 Value creation 
 Economic value Knowledge value  Environmental value 
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Cooperation around wine 
fairs to share expenses 
and form an organic cluster 
so that organic wines are 
easier to find. 
Higher prices for organic 
wine and grapes.  
Farmers meet every 
quarter on a different farm 
to exchange best practices.  
(Interviewee W17, W18, 
W20) 
 
Socio-environmental value 
is per definition value that 
accrues to society and a 
public good. It therefore 
implies that it cannot be 
captured by the coopetition 
parties  
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Each producer may 
experience increased sales 
at fairs because the 
farmers have a joint exhibit.  
By helping other farmers 
convert, the farmers with 
stronger presence in the 
market is able to source 
more grapes, while the 
producers of the grapes 
attain a higher price. 
(Interviewee W18, W20) 
Farmers learn from one 
another and apply the 
knowledge on their own 
farms. One example is 
interviewee W20 who 
learnt from Laibach how to 
deal with mealybugs. 
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t A healthier environment for 
the direct community.  
Healthier wines for 
consumers. 
 Natural yeasts control 
harmful yeasts and mites 
(Setati, Jacobson, Andong 
& Bauer, 2012). 
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The CVM for the Organic Farmers Association illustrates how value is created for different 
stakeholders. None of the interviewees referred to any value that could be regarded as private 
benefit. What is also evident is the absence of public knowledge value. Such value would reflect 
public awareness, and it would be worthwhile for the member farms to reflect about whether this is 
a deliberate decision. 
6.9 REYNEKE ORGANIC WINES  
6.9.1 Introduction 
Reyneke Organic Wines is situated in the Stellenbosch wine region. The farm was first established 
as Uitzicht in 1863. In 1988, the Reyneke family bought a part of the farm and a number of years 
later bought the remainder. Since 2000, the farm has been following principles of biodynamic 
farming. In 2006, Vinimark approached the owners because they had identified a niche market for 
environmentally-friendly wines. As a result, Reyneke Wines sold 50 percent of the ownership in the 
Reyneke Wines label. As with Laibach, Reyeke Wines won an award as one of the top organic 
wines in South Africa in 2015 in the Nedbank Green Wine Awards (See Figure 6.16). 
 
Figure 6.16: Reyneke Wines won award as best organic red wine in South Africa in 2015 
This case study revolves around the value that is created through the collaboration of Reyneke 
Wines with its direct neighbours. One economic component of the collaboration was already 
discussed in the previous case as both Reyneke Wines and the particular neighbour are part of the 
Organic Farmers Association. 
Three interviews (W18, W19, W20) mainly dealt with Reyneke Wines and the collaboration with its 
neighbours, although some of the other interviewees (W10, W14, W17, N6, N8) directly referred to 
Reyneke Wines in the interviews. 
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Table 6.16: Interviewees: Reyneke Organic Wines 
Interviewee Description of organisation or 
person 
Position Date of 
interview 
Duration of 
interview 
(hours) 
W10 Wine producer, Stellenbosch 
area, known for pro-active 
environmental initiatives, does not 
cooperate much apart from BWI. 
Wine maker 21 Jan 2015 0:34 
W14 Wine grower/producer. CEO/Owner & 
Conservancy 
manager 
10 Mar 2015 1:08 
W17 Organic wine farm/ Stellenbosch 
region. 
Managing director 29 Apr 2015 0:38 
W18 Biodynamic wine farm/ 
Stellenbosch region. 
Owner 12 May 2015 1:06 
W19 Ultra-premium wine producer, 
small bottling capacity, 
Stellenbosch region. 
Owner 11 Sep 2015 0:39 
W20 Organic farmer, supplier of grapes 
to organic wine producer W18. 
Owner 15 Sep 2015 0:41 
N6 Environmental multinational NGO. 
Local initiative in the wine 
industry. 
Project manager 16 Feb 2015  0:48 
N8 Wine body Communications 
manager 
13 May 2015 
19 May 2015 
 
0:48 
 
Johan Reyneke, owner of Reyneke Wines, related the story of why he and other organic farmers 
started to exchange experience and knowledge. 
This is not a family farm that has come through many generations; […] I tried to farm 
under the bank as far as they let me, and they basically told us they are sailing close to 
the wind with us, “we will not actually allow you to take on more risk by farming 
organically”.  
I did manage to persuade them to allow me to farm a quarter of the 11 ha as organic at 
the time, and the first year was a nightmare. I had every pestilence, plague, disease, 
whatever you can get in viticulture in South Africa here in this little block of Pinotage; it 
was terrible. Our harvest fell to two tons a hectare, which as you know, is not 
sustainable.  
Reyneke realised that there was a lot of risk in farming organically and that he could potentially 
lose the farm. It was at this point that Johan Reyneke started to engage with other organic farmers 
as relayed in the previous case study.  
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6.9.2 Knowledge value 
In the case study of the Organic Farmers Association (discussed in Section 6.8), it is evident that 
Reyneke participates in knowledge sharing in other networks. As already pointed out, Reyneke 
also began collaborating with his direct neighbours. Reyneke helped some of his neighbours to 
convert to organic practices and some of these neighbours have subsequently become members 
of the organic farmers group. 
In the case of Interviewee W19, a wine producer who is not a member of the Organic Farmers 
Association, there is a two directional flow of know-how between the owner and Johan Reyneke: 
Johan and I talk a lot about many different things. He will knock on my door to discuss 
finance, for advice, for strategy. And we knock on his door to talk about biodynamic 
farming, organic stuff, how he does his things because we want to learn from him and 
apply it here with us. His overall marketing is based on it, but we want to do it in order 
to control and improve the environment. (Interviewee W19) 
The closer collaboration with neighbouring farmers has had significant spin-offs for Reyneke Wines 
itself, but also for its neighbours. 
6.9.3 Economic benefits 
What is interesting in the case of the cooperation between Reyneke Wines and its neighbours is 
the symbiotic nature of the benefits that are generated. Because of different foci, the different 
entities all benefit without necessarily impeding on each other. In the previous section dealing with 
the Organic Farmers Association, mention was made of the value to Reyneke to convert other 
farmers to organic, as some are its neighbours (like Interviewee W20) mentioned. It was also 
mentioned that the neighbour benefits in a symbiotic way by attaining higher prices for their grapes 
in a guaranteed market. 
Another neighbour, Interviewee W19, chose not to convert completely to organic farming, but does 
apply many of the principles. Interviewee W19 provided an example of how they cooperate with 
Reyneke Wines in the production of compost because of physical barriers they experience.  
We had a compost pit right above our borehole, but IPW [Integrated Production of 
Wine, an industry body] came to us and said you cannot have a compost heap above 
your water source. So we had to decide to either stop making compost or do something 
else. Then we said “why don’t we talk to Johan, let's take all our compost and we will 
make our compost with his compost and then we divide it there.” So in that way we will 
work together again.   
There is seemingly very little benefit for Reyneke Wines in jointly producing compost, but they do 
so anyway. 
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Another example of cooperation between Reyneke and a neighbour provides another case of 
environmental coopetition. As part of its biodynamic practices, Reyneke Wines use cattle to fertilise 
the soil rather than other forms of fertilisation. When he did not have enough feed for his herd, 
Johan Reyneke asked his neighbour if his cattle could graze in the neighbour’s vineyard. Reyneke 
tells the story: 
I have a herd of cattle here, I started with two cows, I now have more than 60, and the 
farm is only 37 ha. So, there is no way there is enough food for all the cattle. So these 
guys allowed me to put some cattle on their land. I pay them, they get the dung of the 
cattle, they get additional income, some are making compost and, you know, are now 
far less dependent on primary input and production costs to keep their business going. 
[…] There is a growing demand for organic wine and those are my cattle. It's like a sub-
business that grew from this that nobody planned.  
Reyneke mentioned that biodynamic farmers are not subjected to exchange rate moves when it 
comes to fertiliser prices. Reyneke’s neighbour supports this view: 
He [meaning Johan Reyneke] is a pioneer; so many of the things he has tried and saw 
what works and what does not work. Part of organic farming is that you use cattle and 
Johan has herds. So he and I work together regarding the cattle. He brought his cattle 
here, so his cattle graze on my farm. A big thing with it is that you can make compost 
for example, it's very important. And oh, you know, we saw now, we have allowed the 
cattle to graze in the vineyard this year. So, previously we used machinery to cut the 
grass. Now the cattle eat the grass. You do not pay the cattle to keep the grass short. 
Both Reyneke Wines and the neighbouring farm benefit economically from the cooperation, but in 
a synergistic way.  
As with Laibach in the mealybug case study (in Section 6.7), Reyneke benefits directly from 
converting his neighbours to organic farming because he suffers fewer losses from potential 
herbicide and pesticide drift from his direct neighbours. The neighbours realise that they cannot 
farm with conventional methods while Reyneke Wines does not. 
Well, if he is biodynamic on his own island and he may not spray and we spray, then 
the pesticides may affect his vineyards. His pests, because he would have more pests, 
and I'm talking about insects and such things, can come to us again. So, we are 
starting to work together and saying “okay, let's make this whole hill almost organic. 
You can go certify, we’re not going to certify, but it's much better for the environment”. 
(Interviewee W19) 
Interviewee W19 estimated that there is a negligible difference in cost between farming organically 
and conventionally. They adopt some of the practices from Reyneke, but do not follow the rules 
strictly. Table 6.17 summarises the synergistic value appropriation between the farms. 
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Table 6.17: Synergistic value appropriation between Reyneke Wines and its neighbours 
 Reyneke Wines Neighbouring farms 
Conversion to organic 
farming 
Access to more resources 
Increased production due to more 
organic grapes  
Increased sales 
Access to organic grapes  
Diversification of supply 
Less drift from neighbouring farms 
Increased brand visibility 
Higher prices for grapes 
Guaranteed market 
Cattle grazing on 
neighbour’s farm 
Access to more feedstock 
Able to grow herd size and sell cattle 
Reduced costs of keeping grass 
short 
Cattle fertilise vineyard 
Reduced use of pesticide 
and herbicide 
Greater biodiversity in natural 
aromatic and biocontrol yeasts.  
Greater biodiversity in natural 
aromatic and biocontrol yeasts. 
Source: Researcher 
Reyneke Wines can increase their brand value as biodynamic vineyard. In a number of the 
interviews for this study, Johan Reyneke would be mentioned as a pioneer in the wine industry. 
I know Reyneke is [collaborating] – you know, when they talk about environmentally 
aware, Reyneke is always like one of the most important places, but they’re one of 
those sort of top biodynamic producers in South Africa.  But I mean, it’s very much a 
guy with his passion for biodynamic and he tells the story well, you know, Johan 
Reyneke. (Interviewee W10) 
Lastly, the conversation of brand value again returns to the issue of distance to consumer. 
Reyneke Wines gain considerable brand value as a leading organic farm. One respondent felt that 
Reyneke has an opportunity to market the cooperation of surrounding farmers to increase the 
capacity for organic and biodynamic wine producing in the immediate region. 
He [Reyneke], out of that cooperation agreement, can use it in his marketing and say 
look, it's rubbing off on our neighbours, and they are now starting to improve, because 
once again, an organic biodynamic guy cannot be an island. He has to rally his 
neighbours around him. (Interviewee W19) 
6.9.4 Socio-environmental value 
A resilient eco-system holds economic value for wine producers through reduced costs, healthier 
grapes and wines, and ultimately higher prices for the wines. A study done by the Institute for Wine 
Biotechnology at Stellenbosch University (Setati, Jacobson, Andong & Bauer, 2012) evaluated the 
impact of different farming systems (viz. conventional, integrated and biodynamic viticulture 
practices) on grape associated yeast diversity. Part of the study was conducted in the vineyards of 
Reyneke Wines, as well as some of its neighbours.  
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The study reported that higher number of yeasts with biocontrol potential were isolated from the 
biodynamic vineyard. M. geulakoningii, for instance, is a mite-associated yeast that causes 
100 percent mortality in different species of mites, e.g. carmine spider mite and citrus rust mite, 
and which could be effective against other mites that are found in vineyards (ibid.). The authors 
concluded that: 
…the unique diversity could be due to the poor phytosanitary condition associated with 
the biodynamic vineyard, but it could also reflect the establishment of the natural 
enemies of different pests in the absence of pesticide application (ibid.: 6).  
Apart from biocontrol, yeasts and other microorganisms contribute significantly to the final aromatic 
properties of wine (ibid.: 1). 
The same study also reported that there could be limited cross-transfer of yeasts from one 
vineyard to another (ibid.: 9), supporting an earlier view that biodynamic farming requires the 
cooperation of neighbours, but furthermore, that it also benefits its neighbours. 
Apart from micro-organisms, other forms of biodiversity are also impacted by conventional farming 
techniques. Herbicides, pesticides and fungicides have a negative impact on multiple trophic levels 
(a term referring to the place in the food chain).  
You know, in our original days when we had mealybugs, you would come in and you 
spray this vineyard for mealybug, but with the mealybug, you also spray the ladybirds 
and all the other good insects, killing the chameleons. (Interviewee W19) 
Interviewee 19 further explained the positive impact of organic farming on natural predators on his 
farm: 
So, our owl population is growing. Our hawk population is growing. Our chameleons 
are starting to come back. We now see ladybirds. We are even seeing small buck in 
the vineyards. (Interviewee W19) 
A visible increase in biodiversity affords Interviewee W19 an opportunity to tell visitors (physical 
and on their website) about the conservation of the natural wildlife. While Reyneke Wines uses its 
biodynamic methods as a strong differentiator in the market, it rather serves as a reputation 
protection tool for Interviewee W19:  
We want to see that nature returns. And yes, we talk a lot with people. You know, part 
of our tour, when we go through here, we show them “there is an owl”. “Oh, you've got 
owls? What do you do with owls?” And we explain, “you know, if you poison the mice in 
the vineyard and the owl eats a dead mouse, he eats the poison and then the owl also 
dies”. And that's the kind of thing that we can convey. That we are firstly working with 
nature, and secondly, that we are carbon neutral producers. And we do it again in a 
different way, not by saying we're going to use small thin bottles or not going to export, 
but rather planting plants around the vineyards. (Interviewee W19) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
171 
However, there is also appreciation among the farmers for the intrinsic value of the environment:  
In other words, if you look at a person; let's say you work in a company and you earn X 
amount, it's hard to think of yourself as the sum total of value X. You'd like to think 
there is a bit more to you than what you earn. Now, biodynamic farming feels strongly 
that people deserve that respect, but so do animals and plants. I would almost say 
everything, soil microbes, fungi, all life in the soil, everything deserves that respect. In 
other words, when you walk in the vineyard and you see a little weed, you don’t look at 
those plants and say “you compete with food and water for my vineyard, so I will kill 
you”. I seek a greater harvest. You will manage it, but you don’t assume that if you 
cannot make money out of something, that it is completely worthless. Thus, the effect 
or impact on your management style is that you follow a bit of a ‘live and let live’ 
approach. So, you know certain things, you understand certain things, and you respect 
it. But you also know that there are certain things that you don’t know and that you 
don’t understand, and you respect that.  (Interviewee W18) 
6.9.5 Public benefits 
The absence of herbicides and pesticides results in wines that are considered healthier 
(Interviewee W18). One could translate healthier wines to mean less illnesses or allergies, 
meaning an economic benefit to society. 
Awareness around the benefits of organic wine would be considered public knowledge. As far as 
the case is concerned, there is little effort from Reyneke Wines to raise awareness about organic 
wines and its benefits. However, raising awareness about organic wine would benefit all organic 
farmers, implying free-rider behaviour. Raising awareness would therefore be something which the 
Organic Farmers Association should be responsible for.  
Because these public benefits did not feature strongly in the interviews, these blocks (see 
Table 6.18) were left unpopulated. It serves as a good example of how the CVM can indicate 
potential areas for expanding coopetition efforts. 
6.9.6 The coopetition value matrix for Reyneke Wines 
The CVM for Reyneke Wines is one of the most complex. What makes it an interesting CVM is that 
much of the value is synergistic. The value is created through coopetition and would not have been 
created if it was not for the competitors working together. But because of the different roles played 
by the different collaborators, not all the value is available to all partners.  
The synergistic coopetition described in this case creates privately captured common benefits. For 
instance, an increase in organic grapes means increased economic value for both Reyneke Wines 
and its neighbour. Reyneke Wines can increase its presence in the market because of increased 
production. Reyneke’s neighbour would not be able to capture that value, because they do not 
have the same brand, i.e. attractiveness in the market. At the same time, Reyneke’s neighbour 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
172 
claims the value of the difference in price between conventional grapes and organic grapes. They 
do so because they own the land. Because the created value is related to the agreement, it 
represents common benefits, even though the role of each puts certain value out of reach of the 
other partner. 
Table 6.18: CVM for the Reyneke Wines: Collaboration with neighbours 
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Increased production 
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Access to quality grapes 
Increased brand value 
Farmers share 
knowledge (know what 
& know how); the 
overall knowledge 
stock increases. 
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definition value that accrues to 
society and a public good. It 
therefore implies that it cannot be 
captured by the coopetition parties  
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Greater biodiversity in natural 
aromatic and biocontrol yeasts, 
resulting in better wines. 
Reduced costs of keeping grass 
short. 
Cattle fertilise vineyard.  
Access to organic grapes. 
Increased production due to 
more organic grapes. 
Increased sales because of 
increased availability. 
Less risk of stock-out. 
Less drift from neighbouring 
farms. 
Increased brand visibility. 
Able to grow herd size and sell 
cattle. 
Neighbours 
Higher prices for grapes. 
Guaranteed market. 
Johan Reyneke learns 
about finance and 
strategy from a 
neighbour, while the 
neighbours learn more 
about organic farming. 
The sharing of 
knowledge happens in 
positive-sum logic.  
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A healthier environment for the 
direct community.  
Healthier wines for consumers. 
 Less herbicides/pesticides and 
natural fertilisers result in: 
Higher diversity in yeasts with bio-
control characteristics resulting in 
resistance against mites. 
Healthier, resilient soils sustaining 
life such as earthworms. 
More diverse animal eco-system 
(owls, snakes, chameleons, 
ladybirds, etc.) resulting in more 
natural control of pests such as 
mice, grasshoppers, etc. 
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Another example of synergistic value is that of Reyneke’s cattle grazing on a neighbouring farm. 
Reyneke claims the value of the feed that his cattle eat, while the neighbour claims the value of 
reduced operational costs and the value of the fertilisation done by the cows. The value is created 
because they collaborate, but the value is not available to both parties. 
A great deal of the economic and knowledge value is very similar to the kinds of value you would 
find in conventional coopetition cases. What makes this an interesting case of environmental 
coopetition is that much of the increase in the pie relies on the creation of the socio-environmental 
benefit. 
6.10 WINE INDUSTRY NETWORK FOR EXPERTISE AND TECHNOLOGY (WINETECH) 
6.10.1 Introduction 
The South African wine industry in the early to mid-nineties was fragmented and characterised by 
internal politics and rivalry (Boshoff, 2013: 35). The nature of the industry at the time was largely as 
a result of the disbanding of KWV as the single buyer of wine in South Africa, the lifting of 
sanctions, the resulting access to new markets, and unhealthy competition between wine 
producers (Interviewee W5). At the time, calls were made for a shared vision, clear objectives for 
the industry, and to coordinate research, rather than conduct research on an ad hoc basis 
(Boshoff, 2013: 35). One of the interviewees pointed out the logic of a coordinated research 
programme for the industry: “Because all of us face the same problems with glass and cork and 
cartons and run-off and water use. Everybody has the same problems” (Interviewee W3).  
Winetech was created in 1996 in response to this need. Winetech’s primary purpose is to build a 
strong and healthy South African wine industry through cooperative (participative) R&D initiatives. 
Winetech describes its core function as the “facilitation and oversight responsibility for sustainable 
and responsible natural resource usage” (Winetech, 2014a). Table 6.19 shows a list of 
interviewees who spoke about the initiative.  
According to the constitution of Winetech (2009): 
The Association is financed by gifts, contributions, levies or grants of any nature made 
to the Association by any person, including the state or province, provided that the 
conditions, if any, stipulated by the donor or contributor fall within the framework of 
Winetech’s objectives. 
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Table 6.19: Interviewees: Winetech 
Interviewee Description of organisation or 
person 
Position Date of 
interview 
Duration of 
interview 
(hours) 
W2  Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, medium sized in 
bottling capacity. 
Communications 
executive 
8 Jul 2011  1:27 
W3  Manager: Strategic 
initiatives 
  
W4/W15 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Sustainability manager 13 Jul 2011  1:23 
W15 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Sustainability manager 13 Apr 2015  0:54 
 
Members of Winetech are obliged to cooperate with any form of assistance that is required:  
Each member undertakes and is obliged to provide his full cooperation by means of 
structure, assistance and support in order to ensure that the objectives of the 
Association are strived for and attained and that all rules enacted by the Association 
are complied with.  All members are obliged to bona fide endeavour to have all 
research which is generic in nature and in the broad interests of the industry done by 
the Association (sic). (Winetech, 2014a). 
The biggest component (66% in 2014) of Winetech’s revenue comes from the research and 
development levy to the wine industry (Winetech, 2014a: 38). Table 6.20 shows the components of 
the levy in 2015 for different parts in the value chain, i.e. wine, grape juice concentrate, spirits and 
grapes. Grape and wine producers therefore collectively fund research in the wine industry.   
Table 6.20: Components of the levy to Winetech from the wine industry2 
 2015 2016 2017 
Wine 2.61c/liter 2.81c/liter 3.02c/liter 
Grape juice concentrate for the production 
of wine 
2.61c/liter 2.81c/liter 3.02c/liter 
Distilling wine and wine spirits 2.25c/liter @ 
10% alcohol 
2.42c/liter @ 
10% alcohol 
2.60c/liter @ 
10% alcohol 
Grapes intended for the production of 
wine 
R18.27/ton R19.67/ton R21.14/ton 
Source: Winetech, 2014b: 37. 
                                               
2 The Winetech levy increased by 7.5% per annum between 2013 and 2017. 
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6.10.2 Knowledge value 
The core objectives of Winetech are shown in Table 6.21. All of the benefits flowing from the 
objectives listed could be regarded as common benefits. 
Table 6.21: Core objectives of Winetech 
Objective Outcome  
To support the wine industry with 
expertise 
This will enable it to be cost effective while producing quality 
wines and other grape-based products through the application of 
environmentally-friendly technologies. 
To support the training and education 
of individuals for the industry 
At all levels in terms of skills, knowledge and insight development 
– in order to ensure the practical implementation of the best 
knowledge and most advanced technologies in viticulture, wine 
making and other grape-based products. 
To establish a culture of 
technological innovation 
This will ensure the on-going utilisation of the best technology 
within the industry, and facilitate its dissemination to all the 
sectors of the industry. 
To facilitate the development of 
resource poor and previously-
disadvantaged producers 
This will improve their access to the industry by making 
appropriate cutting-edge technology available to such producers. 
To establish world leadership in 
selected niche areas of the wine 
industry 
This can be facilitated through Winetech's network of scientific 
and technological expertise. 
To commission relevant and 
thoroughly planned research, 
technology development and 
technology transfer 
This will promote the industry's technological capabilities and the 
attainment of the other objectives. 
Source: Winetech, 2014a. 
Some of the research activities funded by Winetech include projects labeled as environmental 
sustainability projects, while some other projects can be considered as environmental projects 
despite not being classified as such. Table 6.22 summarises projects with an environmental focus. 
There is great appreciation for the work of Winetech among farmers (Interviewee W3, W4, W11):  
If you see the research done in the wine industry, I mean, I wonder if the livestock 
industry in South Africa does as many trials as our industry does here at Nietvoorbij 
[a facility of the Agricultural research council] – Vineyard trials, wine testing, all that 
kind of research. It's an industry that gives back. [...] I think it is good, because then 
you can attend information days; trial results are given to you, there is Wynboer 
[a magazine] and technical magazines that are published that we all receive. So, I think 
in a broader context, the whole industry works together, but it doesn’t happen here on 
the ground. (Interviewee W11) 
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Table 6.22: Environmental research projects funded by Winetech 
Project 
number 
Project title & Project leader Classification 
WW 19/15 Composting using spent filter materials from wineries and 
distilleries (R. Mulidzi) 
Oenology: 
Environmental 
sustainability 
CRSES 
201227 
Guidelines for energy management in wineries (A. Brent) Oenology: 
Environmental 
sustainability 
US 2013-27 Anaerobic sequencing batch reactor (AnSBR) technology to treat 
winery wastewater (G.O. Sigge) 
Oenology: 
Environmental 
sustainability 
US ENT 11-
A2 
Development of a habitat management plan to promote 
conservation biological control in vineyards (P. Addison) 
Viticulture: Plant 
protection 
WW 05/06 Mass breeding of natural enemies of mealybug for the application 
of integrated pest control in vineyards. (K. Achiano) 
Viticulture: Plant 
protection 
WW HT 
14/01 
Impact of climate change factors on physiological and vegetative 
growth parameters of young grafted grapevines (H. Theron) 
Viticulture: 
Cultivation 
Source: Winetech, 2014a: 45-50. 
As implied by Interviewee W11, the research results of the studies funded by Winetech is available 
to all stakeholders as the results are often disseminated through public channels. In fact, recipients 
of research funding from Winetech are encouraged to disseminate their research findings.  
Winetech, in collaboration with VinPro, provides information sessions, seminars and workshops in 
the wine industry (Boshoff, 2013: 170). In addition to these, Winetech disseminates knowledge 
through multiple industry and academic magazines and journals including: 
 A section in the Wineland magazine, published by Vinpro. The section is known as Wynboer 
Technical. According to farmers, this section is one of the most important sections in the 
magazine (Boshoff, 2013: 39). 
 The South African Journal of Enology and Viticulture, which is sponsored by Winetech. The 
journal is a peer-reviewed scientific journal. 
 The Winetech Scan, a monthly electronic newsletter that highlights some of the newest 
international research. The objective is to alert industry members of new developments that 
could be implemented in the winemaking process, and to stimulate new research. 
 The Winetech research database (see discussion of Figure 6.17). The research database 
website makes it explicitly clear that Winetech focuses on research of a generic nature and 
makes if available to everyone. 
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Figure 6.17: Common benefit in the form of knowledge available to the wine industry 
Source: Winetech, 2014c. 
The knowledge developed by Winetech represents a common benefit. Once the knowledge is 
processed by farmers, it becomes a privately captured common benefit. The knowledge can 
potentially be converted to economic value at a farm level. None of the interviewees explicitly 
referred to the application of Winetech research in their own environments.  
6.10.3 The coopetition value matrix of Winetech 
It is not surprising that the CVM of Winetech is dominated by common knowledge value. This case 
illustrates the intangible nature of economic benefits at times. While the cost of research is 
relatively easy to determine, the value of that research is extremely intangible. Similarly, the value 
of training would depend on how much of the training can be applied by wine farms. This 
dissertation did not make an attempt to determine the value or the extent of the application of 
Winetech’s research.  
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Table 6.23: CVM for Winetech 
 Value creation 
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Free training days are 
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Winetech provides funding 
for research projects for 
the industry. The results 
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various channels. 
Winetech, in collaboration 
with VinPro, provides 
information sessions, 
seminars and workshops 
in the wine industry 
(Boshoff, 2013: 170). 
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per definition value that 
accrues to society and a 
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  The dissemination of 
sustainability-related 
research reduces the 
environmental impact of 
the wine industry.  
This ranges from guiding 
documents for energy 
efficiency to knowledge 
about how natural 
predators can be used to 
control pests. 
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6.11 EERSTE RIVER COLLABORATORY 
6.11.1 Introduction 
The Eerste River (meaning first river) Collaboratory is a multi-stakeholder collaboration between 
government agencies (such as Department of Water Affairs), environmental groups (such as WWF 
and Living Lands), community organisations, the Stellenbosch Municipality, and users of the river. 
Distell and Spier are the only two wine-producing entities in the collaboratory. 
Table 6.24: Interviewees: Eerste River Collaboratory  
 Interviewee Description of organisation or 
person 
Position Date of 
interview 
Duration of 
interview 
(hours) 
W5  Wine producer. Known as a 
sustainability leader, medium 
sized in bottling capacity. 
CEO 16 Jul 2012  1:17 
W13 Wine producer. Known as a 
sustainability leader, medium 
sized in bottling capacity. 
Sustainability 
manager 
18 Feb 2015 1:13 
W15 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Sustainability 
manager 
13 Apr 2015  0:54 
 
Interviewee W5 explained the urgency of acting on the pollution in the Eerste River: 
It [the pollution in the river] has a direct impact on us. The water is, in its current form, 
unusable. It’s in such a bad state. So if collectively we get this water into, you know 
useable condition, it’s a resource. And at the moment it’s a, it’s an unusable resource. 
So it goes. I think it’s, you know, it’s a key issue. It goes right back to the start point if 
you know, we know as an industry water in South Africa is – people still underestimate 
the importance of our water footprint. People are realising it, but it’s only now that we’re 
starting to say, okay you know, what will it be like in 2052 or 2042? We know, I mean 
statistically, they say we’re probably gonna have to rely on, you know, seventy percent 
less water than we get now for – from the big dams. So we have pumping rights from 
the Eerste River that we don’t even use because the water is unusable. 
(Interviewee W5) 
The Eerste River has been a problem for many years, and remained a problem because of 
bureaucracy. At the time of the first interview at Spier (2012), the interviewee explained: 
It’s starting to happen. It’s not happening because I think, I think the river is an example 
of, you know, a bureaucracy. Because you have to work with various...administrative 
bodies so it’s council, it’s the Department of Water Affairs, it’s the Department of 
Environment. And so you start getting bogged down a bit, you know. So it’s a little bit 
like management by committee. But there are a number of initiatives, including from 
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local authorities to say, listen, we have to do something about this. There’s no one 
person saying alright, I’m laying down the law here’s how it works… that’s why. 
(Interviewee W5) 
The Eerste River Collaboratory grew from an action research study at the University of 
Stellenbosch. The PhD student approached a number of entities and over time, managed to 
facilitate a conversation that grew into the collaboratory.  
6.11.2 Knowledge value 
One of the actions that helped to establish a common vision was a visit by a number of 
stakeholders to problem areas in the river (Interviewee W13). It is therefore evident that the 
initiative creates knowledge about the problem (know-what). But through exploring ways to solve 
the problem, participants also learn about how the problem can be addressed (know-how) 
(Interviewee W13).  
Interviewees from both the wine producers spoke of the complementary knowledge and resources 
that the other entity can bring to the table and how the collaboratory facilitated opportunities to 
exchange knowledge: 
We’ve got such different areas of expertise … so my focus is much more socially 
focused and his is a lot more environmentally focused, and just by nature of the fact 
that we would spend time together, planning for the collaboratory meetings and things, 
we would share know-how and – but I think it’s also because we’re not in the exact 
same space. Maybe if I was strongly environmentally focused, we would be quite 
restricted in our – it might change the dynamic of what we share. And I think it’s also 
probably why there was a more conscious effort for both of us to co-share the 
collaboratory, because there’s this kind of balance, social and environmental, that’s 
important. So I think the structure has enabled that, but trust has been built. 
(Interviewee W13) 
As the quote states, and as was the case with some of the previous cases, interviewees in this 
case reported that environmental coopetition opens avenues for other forms of coopetition. Apart 
from the initiative-related knowledge that is created and transferred in coopetition initiatives, it is 
evident that coopetitors also gain tacit knowledge (know-how) about collaborating with competitors. 
So, we’re just the actual doing space.  So, in that you have Distell and us who actually 
never really spoke to each other before.  I can’t remember we did, but I don’t know of it 
– we didn’t really have any real relationship before the river collaboratory that I know of.  
And now it’s just such a great space actually.  We find many other things that, you 
know, so it’s not in the business space, it’s in the social impact space that we’re able to 
find things that together we can do more with. (Interviewee W13) 
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6.11.3 Economic value 
The most obvious economic benefit from a cleaner river would be better access to 
water – a resource that is scarce and which will become even more so 
(Interviewee W5).  
Secondly, both wine producers are vulnerable in terms of their reputation and/or health and safety 
(Interviewee W13, W15). Interviewee W15 reported that the river smells so bad in summer that the 
staff find it hard to work there. Apart from the opportunity, the polluted river therefore represents a 
risk and embarrassment to both parties: 
How does Distell benefit from cleaning up the river?  How does Spier benefit from 
cleaning up the river?  Hugely. Distell has an issue with dirty water going past 
Bergkelder when they have visitors who have to cross over that river and smell it; it 
impacts their business operations.  In our environment our business operations and we 
were less affected, because by the time the water gets down water, the water quality is 
– it’s not great, but it’s not as terrible as up there.  We equally can have the same 
issues.  We can’t have people jump into the river and have a swim, because you may 
get sick, because the water quality is not good. (Interviewee W13) 
The biggest value of a cleaner river originates from the lower risk (reputation, health & safety). 
When asked about the potential marketing value of the collaboratory, Interviewee W13 responded 
as follows: 
And I don’t think anybody has [attempted to generate marketing value] in the 
collaboratory. In fact, one of our topics on today’s agenda is our collaboratory year-
plan, and so we’ve even taken on a collaborative approach to that so that we have a 
plan as a collaboratory as opposed to individual business or organisations. So, I 
suggested that we bring in a media expert into our fold for a kind of consultation with 
the collaboratory to help us plan how we do this. So that it’s not any one organisation’s 
– because the reality is, between Distell and us, we’ve got more than enough expertise 
to have really run this mill a year ago, you know, started, but it’s not the collaborative 
space. (Interviewee W13) 
The quote suggests a deliberate attempt to keep the marketing benefit as a common benefit, and 
to facilitate learning about media coverage inside the collaboratory. It is evident that both wine 
producers see communication regarding the river as a beyond compliance (i.e. reputation 
protection) strategy rather than an eco-branding (i.e. reputation building) strategy. 
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6.11.4 The coopetition value matrix for the Eerste River Collaboratory 
A number of aspects are interesting about the CVM for the Eerste River Collaboratory. Firstly, the 
knowledge that is created is created at three levels: 
i) Knowledge about the problems around the river (know-what); 
ii) Knowledge about how to address problems in the river and other sustainability issues  
(know-how); and 
iii) Knowledge about how to cooperate better, which can possibly be redefined as coopetition-
experience. 
A second observation is the deliberate attempt to keep the value at the level of positive-sum logic. 
No mention was made by the two respondents from Spier or Distell about private benefits for these 
two entities.  
Table 6.25: CVM for the Eerste River Collaboratory  
 Value creation 
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parties 
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Reduced reputation as well 
as health and safety risk for 
both Distell and Spier. The 
value is relatively intangible, 
but is appropriated in 
positive-sum logic. 
Distell and Spier can 
potentially claim the value of 
their water rights once the 
water is usable. 
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Healthier environment for 
community 
Potable water 
Fewer illnesses from water-
borne diseases 
 Cleaner water & 
environment 
Healthier eco-system 
Aesthetic value 
Recreational value 
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6.12 SOLAMOYO 
6.12.1 Introduction 
The last case study to be presented is a relatively simple example. Technically the case is not from 
the wine industry, but focuses on a project in the brandy industry. Because brandy is based on 
wine, and because of the characteristics of the project, it was decided to include it. Another reason 
to include the case is because the issue it addresses could easily also apply to two wine cellars. In 
this case, it applies to two wine producers, who also produce brandy to partly deal with 
overproduction of wine. 
Table 6.26: Interviewees: Solamoyo 
Interviewee Description of organisation or 
person 
Position Date of 
interview 
Duration of 
interview 
(hours) 
W2  Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, medium sized in 
bottling capacity. 
Communications 
executive 
8 Jul 2011  1:27 
W3  Manager: Strategic 
initiatives 
  
W4 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Sustainability manager 13 Jul 2011  1:23 
W15 Wine producer. Diversified liquor 
company, large sized in bottling 
capacity. 
Sustainability manager 13 Apr 2015  0:54 
 
Both KWV and Distell have distillery facilities in Worcester (in the small Karoo in South Africa) that 
produced effluent that was previously pumped into the river (Interviewee W3). Due to 
environmental regulations from the South African government, the entities are no longer allowed to 
release the effluent into the river.  This aspect makes this case the only one reviewed that was 
driven by a legal license to operate. Some of the other cases were driven by the potential of 
legislation, like the TGRC. 
Because the two distilleries have similar run-off, it made sense for the two companies to build a 
joint facility. In May 2010, the Solamoyo (which translates to solar wind) processing company was 
launched at Klipvlak, a 60 ha section of municipal property, with KWV, Distell and Brenn-O-Kem 
owning 40/40/20 percent respectively of the project.  
At the same time as cleaning the run-off, Brenn-O-Kem recovers substances (such as tartaric acid) 
from the effluent that can be used further or processed further. The project therefore represents 
industrial ecology in the sense that they use a waste stream as input material for a different 
process.  
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6.12.2 Economic value 
The total investment in the facility amounted to approximately R12 million, of which Distell and 
KWV each carried R4.8 million (40%) of the investment (Interviewee W3).  
The most prominent benefit of the project is the joint financing of the project. It would have been 
more expensive for the two entities to separately construct a waste plant each. The cost reduction 
is a common benefit, while the privately captured benefit for each company is represented by the 
difference between building a plant itself, and approximately 40 percent of the total cost of the 
Solamoyo project. 
A second economic benefit would be that the companies could potentially generate income from 
the sales of the beneficiated run-off, in which case profits would be distributed in line with 
shareholding. Again, the total profit represents the common benefit, while the privately captured 
common benefit would be the share each can claim. 
6.12.3 Knowledge value 
The exchange of knowledge between the two entities lies at a superficial level and there was/is 
little exchange of know-how between the entities. Only in the initial stages did the two wine 
producers cooperate at an information (know-what) level. Interviewee W4 provided a description of 
the tension in sharing information and making the project work. 
On the retail side we fight with each other on the product and at the back we work 
together on the run-off. At that point it must have been a funny scenario to be able to 
do it, but what we did find is that you need to be transparent about your future plans. 
You cannot go into such a project in secrecy. Now there are automatically certain 
things you do not want to say to everyone, but there are certain things you must put on 
the table like volume and quality. That's the basis of a project. You also have to give an 
indication of the short and medium-term plans for expansion and so on. 
(Interviewee W4) 
By knowing the quantity of run-off from a plant, it is possible to estimate the production volumes. In 
order to reduce allegations of collusion, Solamoyo is a separate operational entity, and effluent 
volumes are not made public. 
After the effluent plant in Worcester, Distell has proceeded to build a similar plant at its facilities in 
Stellenbosch. It could be argued that the knowledge and experience gained from the Worcester 
plant was applied elsewhere, meaning that Distell generated a private benefit because it had 
applied some of the know-how it had acquired from the Worcester plant. 
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6.12.4 Socio-environmental value 
The Solamoyo case is not a complex one. The underlying drivers for the project were regulatory 
and cost reduction. One respondent acknowledged that the situation would probably still be the 
same if it was not for the legislation, but also stated that there was a moral case as one “should not 
mess with the environment like that” (Interviewee W3). What makes the case an example of 
environmental coopetition is that two competitors cooperated to jointly respond to address an 
environmental issue. The socio-environmental value would consist of reduced pollution into a river 
which was impacted by distillery run-off in the past. The waste treatment plant purifies the water to 
a potable level. 
Correct, if you look at the treated run-off, you can now do something with the water and 
possibly plant trees, or whatever the case may be. You currently cannot do that. 
(Interviewee W4) 
6.12.5 The coopetition value matrix for Solamoyo 
What makes the Solamoyo case somewhat different is the absence of a significant knowledge-
sharing component. Instead, the biggest common benefit is the joint cost saving in construction 
and operation. However, the absence of knowledge sharing makes it a rather shallow form of 
cooperation. The environmental benefit was the main objective of the plant, but it was not the 
biggest driver. Table 6.27 shows the CVM for Solamoyo. 
Another aspect in the case of Solamoyo is the absence of public awareness of the initiative. 
Keeping in mind that marketing alcohol prevents the partners from using eco-branding, the 
initiative could still be used as part of a Beyond compliance strategy, which further provides 
reputational risk protection through image-management (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). 
6.13 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided insight into ten case studies of environmental coopetition in order to answer 
the first research question presented in this study, namely what types of value do companies 
create and appropriate in environmental coopetition (RQ1).  
This chapter also illustrated many of the aspects that have been introduced in the dissertation thus 
far, i.e. concepts from extant coopetition literature, concepts from related fields that help frame and 
answer the research questions, and the conceptual model that was developed (i.e. the CVM).  
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Table 6.27: CVM for Solamoyo 
 Value creation 
 
Economic value  Knowledge value  Environmental value 
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treatment plant. 
Potentially reduced 
operational costs of 
dealing with run-off. 
Licence to operate. 
Some knowledge was 
exchanged in the starting 
phase of the project. 
Socio-environmental value is 
per definition value that 
accrues to society and a 
public good. It therefore 
implies that it cannot be 
captured by the coopetition 
parties 
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Benefit for each company 
is represented by the 
difference between 
building a plant itself, and 
approximately 40% of the 
total cost of the Solamoyo 
project. 
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Distell applied private 
knowledge and built a 
similar plant at a different 
site. One can argue that 
the expertise and 
experience that they had 
gained would have 
reduced the risk of building 
another plant, and also 
may have made it easier 
to do.  
Distell learnt from the 
initiative and built a similar 
plant at a different site. 
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Less illnesses & sick-days 
due to the community 
using polluted water 
 
Potable water 
 Reduced effluent flowing 
into the river meaning a 
healthier eco-system and 
better quality water in the 
river. 
 
Even though each of the cases was somewhat unique in its context, we were able to make broad 
observations. This higher-level view firstly provided us with examples of the nine types of value. 
Each case study was mapped on the coopetition value matrix, providing insight into the 
manifestations of each type of value.  
It is evident from the chapter that the previous (or dominant) view of value in coopetition initiatives 
fails to give sufficient attention to a stakeholder view of value. In the process, much value is 
excluded from the total sum of value. As the cases illustrated, significant environmental and socio-
economic value are possible in coopetition initiatives, and should not be disregarded, especially 
when that value can facilitate more value for the coopeting parties. The chapter thus illustrated 
what value is created in cases of environmental coopetition.  
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Figure 6.18: Application of the CVM as diagnostic tool 
As was mentioned in the methodology chapter already, the process of mapping the case studies in 
the CVM led to the realisation of the matrix as a diagnostic tool (see Figure 6.18).  
The CVM is not only a typology of value, but can assist researchers and practitioners alike in 
understanding what value is created and how various stakeholders benefit.  The CVM allows one 
to disaggregate the value that is created for each case and focus on particular value to a specific 
stakeholder. 
The relative significance and importance of different benefits vary between cases. While 
knowledge value was very important to the participants in the Organic Farmers Association, there 
is almost no knowledge value created in the Solamoyo case. The Solamoyo case was driven by a 
need for compliance at the lowest cost, i.e. an economic driver. The Organic Farmers Association 
in contrast had to build knowledge value, and then apply the knowledge in order to create 
economic value.  This realisation motivated the second research question (RQ2), i.e. how the 
different types of value interact (i.e. value dynamics) in environmental coopetition.  
Chapter 7 deals with this question. 
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CHAPTER 7 
VALUE DYNAMICS  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 6 explored manifestations of value within each of the cases. This chapter expands on the 
previous chapter by describing the different ways in which the different types of value may interact 
and impact each other. It therefore addresses the research question (RQ2), how the different types 
of value interact (i.e. value dynamics) in environmental coopetition. Chapter 4 introduced some 
literature that eludes to how different types of value may interact (See Section 4.4.2 for reference 
to Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013; Holmburg & Örne, 2013, De Marchi, 2012; Blanco, Lozano & Rey-
Maquieira, 2009; Limoubpratum, Shee & Ahsan, 2014; Hanoteau, 2009: 39; Orsato, 2006 & 2009; 
Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009; Kendall & Willard, 2015; Wagner & Schaltegger, 2004; Porter & 
Kramer, 2011 and Hart & Milstein, 2003). 
7.2 GENERIC VALUE DYNAMICS 
The CVM simultaneously shows content of value at a specific level (nature of value and to whom 
such value was appropriated) and the process of value creation and appropriation at a generic 
level. In other words, while the content for every coopetition initiative shown in Chapter 6 may be 
unique, the generic patterns of value transfer/appropriation in coopetition initiatives remain very 
similar. Figures 7.1 to Figure 7.3 portray value dynamics that emerged from the ten cases. (For the 
sake of conciseness, the key to the three figures, plus examples from the TGRC case were 
incorporated into Figure 7.1 to 7.3). 
Figure 7.1 portrays some dynamics of value between the economic and knowledge value 
classifications. This dynamic is not so different to the dynamic in R&D environments (See Steinmo 
& Jakobsen, 2013; Holmburg & Örne, 2013, De Marchi, 2012) Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 show the 
interaction of socio-environmental value with respectively economic value and knowledge value at 
different levels of appropriation (comparable literature would include much of the literature dealing 
with sustainability strategies (see Orsato, 2006 & 2009; Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009; Kendall & 
Willard, 2015; Wagner & Schaltegger, 2004; Porter & Kramer, 2011 and Hart & Milstein, 2003). 
The portrayal of these dynamics in the CVM pulls this literature into the coopetition realm. The 
figures also provide selected manifestations of these dynamics as observed in the TGRC case. 
Appendix C provides more examples of the value dynamics that are present in each of the cases. 
Any permutation of the generic patterns may be possible. For example, Figure 7.4 provides an 
overview of how different types of value interact in the case of TGRC. TGRC was used as an 
illustration and not as an exhaustive example of all potential dynamics of value. The figure rather 
should be seen as an illustration of a combination of dynamics in a single matrix. 
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As can be seen from Figure 7.4, the arrows form a number of reinforcing loops. It is also important 
to note that there is a chronological order in some of the patterns. It is safe to assume that there is 
a time delay between a public awareness campaign and an economic benefit for the coopeting 
parties. This would potentially be an interesting topic for further research.  
7.3 GENERIC DYNAMICS 
Figures 7.1 to 7.4 provide an abbreviated overview of some of the basic dynamics at play between 
different types of value in environmental coopetition (See Appendix C1- C13 for the elaborated 
examples). Yet, even distilling the dynamics to the twenty-plus dynamics shown above still remains 
overwhelming. The researcher therefore searched for a higher level order, which led to the 
identification of three ways by which actions drive the creation, appropriation and transference of 
value: 
7.3.1 Dynamic 1: Action as the cause of value  
(See Tables C.1, C.4, C.7, C.8, C.9 in Appendix C) 
Value can be created from an action without being linked to any other type of value (cell) in the 
CVM. For example, when firms cooperate to jointly market a destination, all firms save on 
marketing expenses, independent of the existence of prior value (Wang, 2008).  
But this dynamic can also be true for more types of value that flow from a single action. Two or 
more types of value may increase simultaneously because of an action, but without being 
relationally linked to each other. For instance, cost savings (economic value) for wine producers, 
as well as socio-environmental value, increase when society recycles. Both types of value increase 
because of the recycling action, but the saving is not related to socio-environmental value or 
vice versa.  
7.3.2 Dynamic 2: Action as the link between different types of value  
(See Tables C.2, C.6, C.7, C.8, C.10, C.12, C.13 in Appendix C) 
Two or more types of value may be causally linked, but requires an action to unlock the dependent 
value. For example, socio-environmental value affords the coopeting parties the opportunity to 
realise some brand value. In order for the brand value to be realised, the initiative must be 
marketed. The economic value is therefore causally linked to the socio-environmental value, but 
via an action. In cases where causality flows both ways, it creates a reinforcing loop. 
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Figure 7.1: Value dynamics of common economic and knowledge value 
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Figure 7.2: Dynamics of socio-environmental value and economic value 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
192 
 
Figure 7.3: Dynamics of socio-environmental value and knowledge value 
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Figure 7.4: A systemic view of the dynamics between different forms of value (TGRC) 
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7.3.3 Dynamic 3: Action-independent value  
(See Tables C.3, C.11 in Appendix C) 
Value can also flow from another type of value without a direct initiating action. Ecosystem services 
would be such an example. As an eco-system recovers (i.e. socio-environmental value increases), 
the value of services it provides (common value or socio-economic value) increases without 
requiring an action. 
The three dynamics can be illustrated as a table (Table 7.1).  
Table 7.1: The underlying logic of the three generic dynamics of value 
 Prior value required 
No Yes 
Action 
required 
No  Dynamic 3 
Yes Dynamic 1 Dynamic 2 
 
In addition to the three dynamics listed above, the analysis of data also presented combinations of 
the dynamics, which can be referred to as patterns.  
7.3.4 Pattern 1: Sequential patterns 
The first pattern can be any sequence of two or more dynamics. For instance, environmental 
coopetition may create biodiversity gains. These gains, in turn, may lead to increased sales for the 
coopetitors through increased market exposure. This common value in turn is appropriated by the 
coopetitors in relation to the relative sales value of each partner.  This sequence may stop at this 
point if the increased profits from higher sales value is retained in the company.  
7.3.5 Pattern 2: Cyclical patterns 
If the increased profits mentioned above is reinvested by the partners to further increase 
biodiversity gains, this may result in a virtuous cycle.  
It should be noted that the destruction of biodiversity can similarly lead to a vicious cycle of value 
destruction.  
7.4 CREATION OF COMMON ECONOMIC BENEFITS  
The CVM distinguishes between nine types of value. 
Each of these types was described earlier (see the 
CVM / Table 4.1), but can further be studied in terms of 
other characteristics. This section looks at each of the 
nine value types individually based on the case studies. 
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7.4.1 Overview 
Broadly, the nature of the economic benefits was categorised according to broad classifications put 
forward earlier (See Table 3.1), namely: 
 Cost reduction; 
 Access to new markets 
 Brand building; 
 Increased revenue (increased price, profit margin or increased sales volume); 
 Brand protection (legitimacy/ licence to operate); 
7.4.2 Generic dynamics 
The creation of common economic value follows positive-sum logic. All three the generic dynamics 
can be identified in the ten case studies. One should observe that different types of economic 
value can be associated with different kinds of dynamics to create it. For instance, regardless of 
previous value, it requires action to build or protect a reputation as is evident in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: The dynamics of common economic benefits 
 Dynamic 1 
(Action with no prior 
value) 
Dynamic 2 
(Prior value via 
action) 
Dynamic 3 
(Prior value but no 
action) 
Brand protection    
Brand building/ 
enhancement    
Increased revenue (Price)    
Increased revenue 
(Volume)    
Cost reduction    
 
Common economic value can be created due to coopetition, and which is not dependent on any 
prior value. In fact, in some instances, an action (such as coopetition) can lead to multiple types of 
value being created. 
What is significant about cost reduction from Dynamic 3 (prior value but no action) is that the cost 
reductions stem mostly from eco-system services. Cost reductions are, by implication, often a 
positive externality of socio-environmental value. 
However, cost reduction can also stem from a number of other sources. In some cases, cost 
reduction is because of resource sharing, for instance joint funding of an administration office 
(Greater Simonsberg Conservancy), or joint funding for research or training (Winetech). Similarly, 
Reyneke Wines sources grapes from surrounding farms that could potentially compete with them. 
By doing so, both Reyneke farms and the neighbours benefit in multiple ways. One if these are 
reduced market risk for Reyneke and their neighbours. Reyneke Wines has less concerns of not 
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being able to meet demand, while the neighbour has less risk that there will not be demand for his 
product. 
As these examples indicate, environmental coopetition does not exclude the benefits that one 
could expect from other forms of cooperation. In previous coopetition literature, only common and 
private value were considered, and only of the economic and knowledge type. Coopetition to solve 
environmental issues typically still deliver such value, but also delivers other public value.  
7.4.3 Distance to the consumer 
The issue of distance to consumer was briefly covered in Chapter 6, but it is repeated here 
because of the interaction between awareness amongst consumers and the brand value that exists 
as a result of the awareness. Environmental coopetition can provide brand protection (i.e. 
legitimacy) as well as an opportunity for brand building. For both protecting and building a brand, 
the coopetition happens closer to the customer, i.e. reputation protection and building are 
associated with raising awareness.  
TGRC is an example of an initiative that provides legitimacy to an industry. On the other hand, the 
fact that Graham Beck can place the Cape leopard on its label and generate additional revenue is 
evidence of brand building at the company level. Even though both examples of reputation 
management (brand protection and brand building) are positive-sum initiatives, the example of the 
Cape leopard on the Graham Beck bottle portrays a greater extent of privately captured common 
benefit. The distance to consumers can vary in proximity to customers. For a private benefit, actors 
need to make their actions very explicit to the target population. For the protection or legitimacy of 
a brand, the distance may be further away. For the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy, one 
member shows a small plaque outside its tasting room. For BWI, this distance is slightly further 
away, with a small logo indicating membership of the BWI.  
The ability to associate the outcome of coopetition with your brand provides a greater ability to 
capture the common benefit. In the case of BWI, the label does not grant any particular brand a 
strong differentiated position in the market and hence only serves as an instrument for legitimacy. 
It was evident in the interviews that some members of the BWI did not grasp this aspect, 
particularly in terms of the expectation of increased sales. 
In the case of the TGRC, the distance is even further, with prominent members being indicated on 
the TGRC website, but not in marketing material. 
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7.5 CAPTURING COMMON ECONOMIC VALUE 
7.5.1 The concurrence of value creation and appropriation 
A number of common economic benefits have been 
identified in the study so far. In this section the 
mechanisms by which common economic value is 
captured are further explored.  
As stated elsewhere in the dissertation, sometimes the 
appropriation and creation of value is a single event, 
meaning that value is created by capturing it. For 
instance, in the previous section, the researcher 
referred to increased sales volume as a common economic benefit. Only when the additional bottle 
is sold can one say that the value was created. At the same time, the value is captured by a 
particular participant in the coopetition initiative. 
7.5.2 Positive-sum vs. zero-sum logic 
When value is appropriated, one can distinguish between positive-sum and zero-sum logic. In 
some instances the common economic benefits are captured in a positive-sum way, meaning that 
if one company captures benefits from the coopetition initiative, it does not diminish the potential 
value available to others. In other instances, this approporiation happens by zero-sum logic. 
An example of a zero-sum benefit is the increased funding that the Greater Simonsberg 
Conservancy enjoys through its centralised office. The appropriation of this money happens in 
zero-sum logic, i.e for every Rand that one farmer receives, the amount available to others 
reduces. 
In contrast, some value is captured without dimishing the potential value for others. For instance, 
the presence of the Cape leopard in a region reduces the number of smaller predators and 
therefore creates a positive-sum logic common economic benefit for farmers that may have 
livestock. In this instance, it is almost impossible for one farmer to gain a larger benefit than his 
neighbour. Of course, this value is a public good and therefore non-excludable.  
The Cape leopard conservation project also affords the participants the opportunity to build a 
reputation. Even though the opportunity exists for all the participants, only one wine producer 
makes use of the leopard in its marketing, albeit as one element of its marketing message. The 
logic that is applied in this instance, is also positive-sum logic.  
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7.6 CAPTURING PRIVATE ECONOMIC VALUE 
7.6.1 Private value vs. privately captured common benefits 
Private economic value does not flow from common 
economic value. This is because it is a very different 
dynamic. Instead, private value seems to flow almost 
exclusively from knowledge that is applied. 
It is in the conversation about private value that it 
becomes clear why it is valuable to distinguish between 
privately captured common economic benefit and private 
economic benefit. These two values together capture the total economic value captured by a firm 
but they are attained by completely different processes and therefore require different 
competencies.  
7.6.2 Private value from knowledge value 
From the cases the researcher observed that private economic value can stem from common 
knowledge, private knowledge or public knowledge (See Table C.6 in Appendix C). When society 
returns reusable bottles, they are simultaneously creating a cleaner environment (socio-
environmental value), reducing costs for Distell (private economic value), and receiving 
compensation in the form of refunds on bottles (socio-economic value).  One could possibly see 
the private value that is created for Distell as a positive externality. The main driver for the reuse of 
bottles is the refund that people receive when returning reusable bottles. The creation of socio-
environmental value and private economic value are therefore externalities. Alternatively, we can 
also see the overall result as an impure public good. 
The distinction between the application of common knowledge in a new context and private 
knowledge is difficult to separate. This study did not explore the cognitive process of converting 
common knowledge into private value. However, the CVM is useful in illustrating these 
alternatives. Private value can be as a result of common knowledge applied in a market out of 
reach of other participants, or it could be private knowledge applied in the existing market. 
7.7 SOCIO-ECONOMIC VALUE 
A significant observation from the creation of socio-
economic value through action is that socio-
environmental value is a co-dependent value (see 
Table C.9 –C.11 in Appendix C).  
In some instances, it is unclear what the most 
significant driver is for the cooperation.  
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For instance, hypothetically, when consumers return reusable bottles and earn a refund, they are 
creating multiple forms of value at the same time, namely socio-economic value, economic value 
for the coopeting firm(s), and socio-environmental value. 
An interesting flow of value is from the common economic block to socio-economic value. One 
instance is where economic benefit from recycled glass may lead to lower costs for society (this 
was not established as a fact in the interviews due to the difficulty in arriving at such a conclusion). 
This link is not explicitly made in the interviews. However, it is possible for cost savings at the 
common level to be transferred into lower costs of products. 
As was the case earlier with common and private economic value, socio-economic value can be an 
externality of socio-environmental value creation. Not surprisingly, the socio-environmental value 
creates common economic value in addition to the socio-economic value. Most of the socio-
economic value created can be considered eco-system services. Even the increased tourism in the 
Robertson area is as a result of an eco-system that attracts visitors. 
7.8 CREATING AND CAPTURING COMMON KNOWLEDGE VALUE 
7.8.1 The nature of knowledge 
The knowledge that is made available through 
coopetition may consist of know-what (information) 
or know-how (transferring of skills). Know-how can 
also be at more than one level. As was illustrated in 
the case of the Eerste River Collaboratory, partners 
learnt from each other how to address certain 
issues, but also gained from growing their 
coopetition competence. 
Knowledge is an intangible value and often difficult to describe in monetary terms. The knowledge 
value from coopetition can, as framed earlier, be described as the increase in knowledge stock 
between and inside companies and participants. 
7.8.2 Knowledge is positive sum 
Knowledge creation and appropriation are always positive sum. In some cases, research is 
collectively funded by coopeting partners (like in the case of Winetech). In other cases, a central 
body is created that becomes a knowledge hub to member firms, as is the case with the Greater 
Simonsberg Conservancy that created a central administrative office. 
7.8.3 Structures to facilitate knowledge transfer 
The formality of structures to transfer knowledge can vary from completely informal to highly 
coordinated. When a farmer learns from other farmers as in the case of the Rooiberg Breederiver 
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Conservancy, it happens in a very organic manner. When farmers in the Organic Farmers 
Association get together to share knowledge, it is somewhat more structured. In the case of 
Winetech, knowledge creation and appropriation happens in a very structured environment. In 
Winetech, the knowledge is disseminated by the Winetech body to its funders through various 
channels such as magazines and training days. 
Knowledge can originate from a single member of the coopetition initiative. The knowledge stock of 
other participants increases when the knowledge is shared. Once again, this illustrates the point 
that value creation and appropriation happens simultaneously.  
7.9 CREATING AND CAPTURING PRIVATE KNOWLEDGE VALUE 
The evidence of private knowledge value from the case 
studies supports extant literature that states that some 
firms are better able to capture knowledge benefits than 
other firms. Further, it is evident that private knowledge 
can be captured through engagement with partner firms 
as well as through engagement with third-party bodies. 
The case studies provide sparse examples of private 
knowledge creation. This may be for two reasons. 
Companies may deliberately withhold such information from competitors to keep the relationship 
stable. The researcher also believes that interviewees may not always see the link with the 
knowledge gained in the coopetition relationship because it may reappear in a different guise.  
7.10 PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE VALUE 
Where initiatives require awareness in order to 
create value for coopeting parties, the initiatives 
happen much closer to consumers. As it happens, 
public knowledge value can also be described as 
public awareness. 
Public awareness has been shown to be central to 
the creation of other forms of value in most of the 
cases that were discussed in this dissertation. Both reputation protection and reputation building 
require awareness from consumers.  
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7.11 PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL (SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL) VALUE 
Socio-environmental value can be created through 
conservation efforts by coopetition partners or by 
actions of the public. Underlying action, regardless 
of who the actor is, is driven by awareness and 
knowledge.  As seen from the cases, socio-
environmental value can consist of many different 
forms, e.g. increased biodiversity, increased water 
availability, better quality water, less waste, less 
resource consumption, increased aesthetic value. 
Apart from the creation of socio-environmental value, conservation actions also create other value 
in the process. For instance, the conservation of the Cape leopard creates other socio-economic 
value such as reduced damages from smaller predators, as well as increased tourism value. These 
are externalities of a cleaner environment.  
Alternatively, the focus of the coopetition initiative could be value of a different kind, while some 
components of socio-environmental benefit could be an externality. The removal of alien trees from 
the Simonsberg mountain is mainly to reduce the fire risk and increase the run-off of water from the 
ravines. While the increased water is a deliberate socio-environmental benefit, the recovery of the 
eco-system in this case is an externality.  
The above two paragraphs describe the creation of impure public goods (simultaneous creation of 
a private and public good) by coopetition initiatives. 
7.13 VALUE AS VIRTUOUS CYCLE 
Figure 3.4 illustrated how value creation and appropriation can form a virtuous cycle. One 
classification of value can be converted or lead to value of a different classification. The second 
classification can in return lead to a further increase in the original classification of value. This 
sequential pattern and reinforcing pattern is not explored in the extant coopetition literature as far 
as the author is concerned. Three particular aspects in Figure 7. 4 develop a mostly static view of 
coopetition rooted in game theory (Brandenburger, Nalebuff, 1996), namely: 
 the sequential pattern of action causing value, and  
 the reinforcing pattern, for instance the loop (in Figure 7.4) connecting coopetitors' actions 
aimed at environment, with awareness raising actions which translate into more value in a 
virtuous circle. 
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 the pattern of value (such as public value) as an externality rather than an objective, and 
hence, not requiring any action. 3 
The above dynamics are very much relevant to the literature of Steinmo and Jakobsen (2013), 
Holmburg and Örne (2013), De Marchi (2012) and others introduced around how environmental 
and societale value can be created by firms through coopetition, and how economic value (such as 
cost savings and brand value) can be created from environmental initiatives (Orsato, 2006 & 2009; 
Peloza & Falkenberg, 2009; Kendall & Willard, 2015; Wagner & Schaltegger, 2004; Porter & 
Kramer, 2011 and Hart & Milstein, 2003). Combining these two directional flows of value leads to a 
virtuous cycle that was made visible in the cases. 
7.14 SUMMARY  
This chapter addressed the second research question of the dissertation dealing with the 
interaction of different types of value. The grey areas in Figure 7.5 show where the conceptual 
contribution of this chapter is positioned. The interaction between different types of value was 
introduced in Chapter 4. This chapter further extended how this can be understood and mapped. 
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Figure 7.5: Aspects emerging from the investigation of how types of value interact 
 
                                               
3 The author would like to acknowledge an anonymous external examiner for these insights. 
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Based on the analysis of each of the nine blocks of the CVM, the researcher identified the different 
prior value and actions that may be required to create a particular type of value. That analysis led 
to twenty-plus paths by which value can flow. A further abstraction of the dynamics of value 
allowed us to identify three broad (or archetypical) patterns (generic dynamics) in the creation and 
appropriation of value. In turn, each of the nine types of value show some selectiveness in the 
dynamics that lead to the creation thereof. 
The interaction of multiple types of value can typically be portrayed as a systems diagram. The 
systems view accentuates the importance of the interaction of different types of value in creating 
even more value. 
The next chapter provides an overview of:  
 The contributions to the existing coopetition body of knowledge;  
 The implication for management practice;  
 The limitations of the study; and  
 Suggestions for further research. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
204 
CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Coopetition in this study is defined as the cooperation of two or more firms with their competition. 
This dissertation answered two research questions using a qualitative case study research 
approach. The two questions were: 
RQ1: What types of value do companies create and appropriate in environmental coopetition? 
RQ2: How do different types of value interact (i.e. value dynamics) in environmental coopetition? 
The two research questions address what Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) referred to as the 
content and process of value creation and appropriation.  
In order to study a broader understanding of value, the cases were all examples of environmental 
coopetition, i.e. initiatives where competitors work together to address environmental issues.  
Figure 8.1 provides a high-level overview of the dissertation. The areas in grey indicate areas 
where distinct contributions were made to the extant literature.  
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Figure 8.1: The contribution of this dissertation 
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This chapter provides an overview of the main findings of the study, how they relate to extant 
theory, what the implications are for management and theory, what the limitations of the study are 
and how they open an agenda for further research. 
8.2 THE CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY 
This study relies on previous works (Dagnino & Padula, 2002; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Garcia-Castro 
& Aguilera, 2014; Ritala & Tidström, 2014; Lado et al. 1997; Park et al., 2014) and extends our 
understanding of value and its dynamics at a conceptual and empirical level.   
Theoretical contributions, regardless of the type of data used, involve findings that change, 
challenge, or fundamentally advance our understanding of a phenomenon. In other words, it 
should make us think differently to what past research would suggest (Bansal & Corley, 
2011: 235).  
Garcia-Castro and Aguilera (2014) stressed that our understanding of value in coopetition is 
“impeded by an incomplete conceptualisation and measurement of value and by scant 
characterisation of the different patterns of stakeholder value appropriation”. Similarly, Ritala and 
Tidström (2014) called for research dealing with value creation and appropriation at both the 
empirical and theoretical level. This is where this dissertation fits in with its particular focus on the 
context of coopetition that generates socio-environmental value.  
The dominant view of value in coopetition is of value created far away from customers for the 
coopeting parties in the form of economic or knowledge value. The study aimed to shift consensus 
from the dominant views in coopetition literature. This section discusses the contributions of the 
study based on Figure 8.1. 
8.2.1 Creation of value 
The practice of coopetition creates more value than competition or collaboration on its own could 
(Lado et al., 1997: 118; Ritala & Tidström, 2014). This supernormal benefit (Dyer & Singh, 
1998: 662) is jointly created by the coopetition parties and can only be generated through the joint 
effort of the parties. Proximity of various kinds are important in such relationships, but it is also 
important that the parties are different (idiosyncratic) enough to complement one another. 
Coopetition also has a dark side in the form of collusion that is characterised by the destruction of 
value for society (Walley, 2007: 16; Dima, 2010: 218; McEachern, 2013: 225). In this study the 
researcher focused his attention on coopetition as a practice that benefits the consumer, or at least 
does not reduce competition in the market. 
The coopetition and collaboration literature historically focused mostly on economic and knowledge 
value that may emerge from coopetition. Most prominent in this respect is the work by Dagnino and 
Padula (2002: 32) which elaborated on the work of Kenworthy (1995). The value creation lens 
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allows for a finer grained analysis of the outcome of coopetition; a lens that can further be 
expanded to other types of collective coopetition initiatives. 
This dissertation makes a contribution by expanding on this view of coopetition to 
incorporate socio-environmental value into the discourse.  
The creation processes of economic and knowledge value are not insulated from one another. 
Knowledge value ultimately translates to economic value when it is applied. This is also the case 
with socio-environmental value. Socio-environmental value can result in economic value in a 
number of ways. By creating value for society and/or the environment, companies can create value 
for themselves. The transfer of value from one type to another may sometimes require an action. 
For instance, environmental initiatives can create value for companies if they market it. It is 
therefore necessary for such initiatives, or the results of such initiatives, to be closer to the 
consumer. In this respect, the study provides an interesting empirical contribution to the 
conversation surrounding distance to consumer (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Rusko, 2011; 
Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013; Lindström & Polsa, 2015; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Orsato, 2009).  
Creation and appropriation of value are dependent processes (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2014). 
Value can only be appropriated if it was created. Conversely, the created value is a function of how 
much value is captured or appropriated. 
8.2.2 Appropriation of value 
The actions of coopetition parties could have both negative and positive impacts for other 
stakeholders, and not considering such impacts is sub-optimal. Apart from the private and common 
benefits that companies could capture from environmental coopetition initiatives, they should also 
take heed of value that can be created for society. This value is non-excludable and hence there is 
little direct economic benefit for companies to participate from a strictly financial point of view.  
The dissertation makes a contribution to the literature dealing with appropriation of value 
by incorporating a broader stakeholder view into the conversation about to whom value is 
appropriated. The seminal literature about value appropriation (Khanna et al., 1998; Janssen 
et al., 2013; Dyer et al., 2008: 138; Ritala & Tidström, 2014; Dagnino & Padula, 2007: 42; Park 
et al., 2014; Rai, 2013) to date described value mostly as either common value or private value. 
This dissertation shows the value of disaggregating common value into the components that are 
captured by each partner. The sum of privately captured common benefit adds up to the total 
common benefit. In addition, the total value captured by any firm is the sum of the 
component of common value (i.e. the privately captured common benefit) that it captures 
and the private benefit that it generates outside of the boundaries of the coopetition initiative.  
The addition of privately captured common benefit therefore allows a clearer articulation of 
value dynamics and represents a contribution in itself. 
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This dissertation also dealt with the conversation of zero-sum vs. positive-sum logic in the 
appropriation of value. Although there are no hard rules, it should be pointed out that socio-
environmental value is a public good and thus automatically follows positive-sum logic. It is also 
apparent that knowledge value always follows positive-sum logic as other players are not 
prevented from capturing the same knowledge, or other knowledge. 
8.2.3 Coopetition value matrix 
An important contribution of this study is the Coopetition Value Matrix (CVM). The matrix provides 
interesting avenues for future research.  
Value creation and appropriation are often dealt with as two independent constructs, while the 
combination of the two holds much potential for understanding value and its dynamics. The CVM 
(Table 4.1) addresses the gap in the literature as identified by Garcia-Castro and Aguilera (2014) 
and Ritala and Tidström (2014) by:  
 Improving the articulating of value creation; 
 Improving the articulation of value appropriation; 
 Allowing a better understanding of the interaction (or dynamics) of the two processes; and  
 Allowing the articulation of potential gaps in value creation or appropriation. 
The CVM provides a powerful diagnostic tool to map both the content aspect of value and the 
process aspect (dynamics) of value. It is important to acknowledge that the CVM was not the main 
aim of this study, but rather emerged through the synergy of 
 the extant literature surrounding coopetition,  
 literature from related fields such as environmental economics and stakeholder theory, and 
 empirical data gathered during the completion of this research.  
Despite the unintentional emergence of the CVM, it became a central tool in answering the two 
research questions posed by this study. 
8.2.3.1 Types of value 
Relating to the first research question posed by this study, the CVM allows the mapping of nine 
classifications of value based on the form of value, i.e.:  
 Economic;  
 Knowledge; and  
 Environmental (Socio-environmental); 
and according to whom the value is appropriated, i.e. 
 The partners collectively (common value); 
 A particular  partner (private value or privately captured common value); 
 Society/community. 
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Through the application of the CVM, it became evident that not all the cases had all nine of the 
classifications of value.  
The CVM therefore can be used to explore the potential to create value that previously was not 
present or was not articulated. The CVM makes it possible to make value explicit, thereby raising 
awareness of the value that is created, and also how such value comes about.  
8.2.3.2 Archetypical value dynamics 
The second research question of the study referred to the dynamics of how different classifications 
of value. Each of the nine classifications of value can be created/appropriated in a number of ways, 
culminating in more than twenty separate flows of value (see Chapter 7). An analysis of the ways 
in which types of value interact indicated a number of patterns. At a generic level, value is created 
in three ways as summarised in Table 8.1.  
Table 8.1: The archetypical dynamics of value 
Dynamic # Description Examples 
Dynamic 1 Action as the 
cause of value 
Coopeting with your competitor can bring about cost savings, risk 
reduction, etc. 
Recycling can create reduction in carbon emissions. 
Reuse of glass generates an economic benefit in the form of rebates. 
Public awareness marketing can raise public knowledge. 
Dynamic 2 Action as the 
link between 
different types 
of value 
Raising awareness about environmental benefits creates brand value. 
Applying knowledge links knowledge value with economic value. 
Dynamic 3 Action-
independent 
value 
Removing alien trees creates socio-environmental value. The economic 
benefit of more water is an externality. 
 
As far as a detailed view of the nine value types is concerned, some values show evidence of all 
three dynamics, while other types of value show evidence of only one of the three generic 
dynamics (see Table 8.2). Appendix C provides a detailed view of the creation and appropriation 
dynamics with examples. 
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Table 8.2: How value is created 
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8.2.3.2 Reinforcing loops 
A further contribution of the study is the identification of re-enforcing loops in the CVM. The 
dynamics shown in Table 8.1 can be combined into a sequence that may involve multiple 
combinations of created value and actions by the coopeting parties and/or other stakeholders. 
Figure 7.4 illustrated such a combination in the case of TGRC.  
As stated earlier, this view of coopetition dynamics moves away from the static modelling approach 
rooted in game theory (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). 
8.2.4 NETWORKED COOPETITION 
Figure 6.1 illustrates a diagrammatic view of coopetitors in a network. The study therefore 
contributes to an emerging body of knowledge dealing with networked coopetition i.e. various 
projects carried out by the same pool of actors (Czakon & Czernek, 2016). 
8.2.5 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY 
Table 8.3 provides a summary of the contributions of the study at the theoretical level. 
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Table 8.3: The theoretical contributions 
Theory building Theory refinement Theory extension 
Expands the value creation 
perspective to include socio-
environmental value. 
Private & common value not 
sufficient as descriptors.  
The dissertation adds privately 
captured common value to the 
typology. 
Applies coopetition theory in a 
new context, i.e. environmental 
coopetition. 
Expands the value appropriation 
perspective to include public 
benefit (stakeholder theory). 
 Applies coopetition theory in a 
relatively unexplored context, i.e. 
the wine industry. 
Defines nine types of value by 
means of the CVM. 
 Expands on the understanding of 
distance to consumer and the 
role it plays in reputation 
protection and reputation 
building. 
Defines three archetypical value 
dynamics. 
 Provides examples of networked 
coopetition in a new context 
Describes how different types of 
value impact each other. 
 . 
Provides a framework (the CVM) 
through which value in 
coopetition initiatives can be 
analysed at a finer resolution 
than before. 
  
Source: Synthesis with Ridder et al., 2014: 381. 
8.3 CONTRIBUTION TO CONTEXT 
8.3.1  ENVIRONMENTAL COOPETITION 
Although environmental coopetition exists, it is a latent phenomenon. A number of studies 
(Steinmo & Jakobsen, 2013; Holmburg & Örne, 2013; De Marchi, 2012; Blanco, Lozano & Rey-
Maquieira, 2009; Limoubpratum, Shee & Ahsan, 2014) focus on issues that may be considered as 
environmental coopetition, but these do not particularly frame the focus in the way this 
sdissertation does. The study made a distinct contribution in its investigation of coopetition to 
protect and create environmental value. 
8.3.2  THE SOUTH AFRICAN WINE INDUSTRY 
This study secondly contributes to the literature (Choi, et al., 2009; Dana, et al. 2013; Granata, et 
al., 2015) focusing on coopetition in the wine industry. It is the first study to explore coopetition in 
the wine industry in South Africa. It therefore contributes to the empirical base of research of such 
studies. 
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8.3.2  NETWORKED COOPETITION 
The cases under investigation in this study can be regarded as examples of networked coopetition 
(Czakon & Czernek, 2016). Although this was not a particular aim, this contribution was kindly 
noted by one of the examiners. 
8.4 CONTRIBUTION TO METHOD 
This dissertation contributes further to the method dimention by describing how cases can be 
analysed using the CVM, providing new insights regarding missed opportunities for value creation 
and how value may interact. 
8.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS 
Whether a company is motivated moral, financial or legitimacy–related drivers, environmental 
coopetition can improve the impact of its initiatives. 
The value dynamics portrayed in this dissertation provides significant opportunity for firms to look 
at value creation and appropriation from environmental coopetition by means of a strong diagnostic 
tool. The matrix clearly portrays the importance of public awareness and public incentives for 
increasing the efficacy of the creation of value for the environment and for the coopetition partners. 
The CVM assists in portraying the systemic interdependence of different types of value. 
Understanding how value is created and distributed can enhance the effectiveness and stability of 
environmental coopetition initiatives and coopetition alike. By mapping coopetition initiatives in the 
CVM, managers can be sensitised about the possibility to maximise stakeholder value. In cases 
where some categories of value are absent in the matrix, or are unintentional, the matrix makes 
such opportunities explicit and could present previously-unidentified opportunities. 
Apart from the private and common benefits that companies can gain from environmental 
coopetition initiatives, they should also take heed of value that can be created for society. This 
value is non-excludable and hence there is little direct economic benefit for companies to 
participate from a strictly financial point of view. However, as was shown in the study, it is possible 
to generate economic value from environmental coopetition initiatives by actively raising 
awareness in the market about the initiative. This implies that the initiative should happen in closer 
proximity to customers than coopetition initiatives that do not aim to manage the reputation aspect. 
Understanding how to use the potential exposure is key to generating common and private benefit 
from the public value that is generated. 
Once managers are aware of the value that they create for society through their coopetitive 
actions, it may become valuable, and ultimately deliberate. One should immediately caution 
against the notion that value must be economic in nature, or even that it must be measurable.  
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Understanding the dynamics of different types of value could help managers to make better 
choices about coopetitive actions. To understand what prior value is required, and what actions 
would potentially facilitate value creation, could strengthen the firm’s ability to create and capture 
value. 
8.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation explored value creation and appropriation in cases of environmental coopetition. 
As with any study, doing in-depth research often leads to new or previously unthought-of research 
topics. Exploration and discussion of a topic with peers also provided hints for areas where a study 
could have been improved.  
8.6.1 From qualitative to quantitative 
Firstly, the dissertation was based on a qualitative inductive approach, and was aimed at 
understanding value creation and appropriation in coopetition initiatives rather than arrive at natural 
immutable laws (Corbetta, 2003: 15). The field of environmental coopetition remains an emergent 
field and more studies such as this one would strengthen the generalisability of the theory. The 
most obvious limitation of this dissertation is that it was conducted in one industry (i.e. the wine 
industry) and studied a particular context of coopetition (i.e. environmental coopetition).  
The researcher believes that the dynamics of value portrayed in this dissertation would hold in 
other contexts as well, but further research is required to corroborate the conceptual contribution of 
this study in a deductive way.  There would certainly be merit in conducting large sample deductive 
studies in order to quantitatively explore the dynamics illustrated in this study.  
8.6.2 The CVM as foundation for future research 
The articulation of value dynamics presented in this dissertation provides grounding for future 
research. The CVM is powerful for both academic discourse and real-life interrogation of value in 
coopetition initiatives. While every instance of coopetition may be different in the specific nature of 
the types of value, the dynamics in the CVM can be considered as generic.  
A further aspect of the CVM as diagnostic tool may be the ability to compare the value captured by 
different stakeholders within the different types. Exploring the privately captured common benefit 
for different partners may yield interesting insights that were beyond the scope of this study. 
8.6.3 Other dynamics 
The researcher does not claim to have identified all the potential dynamics, but the matrix provides 
a robust point of reference for future studies, particularly studies that recognise a wider stakeholder 
view of value. Future research could focus on an exhaustive study of the different dynamics that 
may exist in the CVM. 
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8.6.4 Other contexts 
The structure of an industry manifests itself in the form of environmental coopetition. Fragmented 
industries (such as the wine industry) may find it easier to collaborate unhindered due to a lower 
risk of collusion. In fact, “the environment is probably going to be a bit of a catalyst for cooperation” 
(Interviewee W4). On the other hand, concentrated industries see a potential legal/regulatory risk 
in environmental coopetition.   
The fishing industry experiences a “tragedy of the commons”. The initiatives are therefore in line 
with Ostrom’s eight rules (1990). The wine industry, on the other hand, sees biodiversity as an 
opportunity, while it views water as a risk. But water is not, in the context of this study, a commons 
type problem.   
The South African wine industry is highly fragmented (i.e. competition levels seem to be low), and 
therefore one would not necessarily expect firms in other industries to act in the same way. It is 
therefore likely that other contexts may result in other manifestations of the different types of value 
to what have been presented in this dissertation. For instance, firms in the fishing, forestry or 
mining industries would benefit from the expanded view of value in coopetition as presented in this 
dissertation, but may present other types of environmental coopetition and could potentially exhibit 
different value dynamics.  
There are many instances and situations in which coopetition can be applied, ranging from inter-
governmental to inter-personal level. This is arguably also true for environmental coopetition, 
particularly at the inter-government and inter-industry levels. This aspect was not explored in much 
depth, but represents a vast field for exploration, particularly given the urgency of environmental 
issues at the global level. 
By way of implication, “we can foresee that the coopetitive framework proposed here may be 
extended in the future to a range of analytical levels referring to relationships between other 
market, non-market or extra-market institutions, such as governments, interest groups, unions and 
firms and among entire countries and blocks of countries.”4 
8.6.5 Motivation for environmental coopetition 
Defining environmental coopetition as a deliberate strategy implies that one can investigate the 
motivation for such strategies. In most of the interviews there was barely a mention of the public 
benefit in initiatives, prompting one to be sceptical about the amount of consideration given to a 
wide stakeholder group. Instead it seems most of the initiatives were driven by the interest of the 
firm. This implies that one would have to consider the measures that would incentivise firms to 
collaborate on environmental issues. One such recent example would be emissions trading. 
                                               
4 This was a suggestion by a reviewer of a paper that was based on this dissertation.   
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However, at least one example (see the Cape Leopard case) thus far has found that companies 
may collaborate with competitors despite generating little common or private value from the 
initiative. The purely moral case is therefore present in some instances. 
This dissertation did not focus on this aspect very strongly, but there is certainly merit in exploring 
the underlying driver in future studies. 
As an additional note it should be added that one of the external examiners of this dissertation 
made an interesting request to elaborate on the difference between strong and weak sustainability, 
and to argue in which of these two environmental coopetition would fall. This aspect fell outside of 
the scope to study, and the researcher does not believe coopetition needs to be classified in either 
of the weak or the strong views. The researcher also did not promote any particular stance as the 
study tried to work from the views of respondents. Instead the request represents an interesting 
avenue for future research in that coopetition may appear different under the two views. 
8.6.6 Generic coopetition vs. environmental coopetition 
There seem to be some differences between the traditional view of coopetition (here referred to as 
generic coopetition) and environmental coopetition as it is presented in this dissertation. More 
research is required to better understand the differences and similarities between the two 
constructs, and whether environmental is a special case of coopetition.  
Although the dissertation set out to show that environmental coopetition is a unique construct (see 
Table 8.4), the focus softened somewhat to rather just focus on examples of coopetition with a 
deliberate environmental benefit. 
Table 8.4: Potential differences between generic coopetition and environmental coopetition 
 Generic coopetition Environmental coopetition 
Distance 
to 
consumer 
Mostly far from the consumer. Sometimes close to consumers, especially 
when the company needs to generate brand 
value in order to generate value, although 
some examples are still removed.  
The distance to consumer and the value 
created is closely linked in that it is the lack 
of distance that generates the value in 
environmental coopetition. 
Value 
created 
Knowledge and economic value leading to 
common or private benefit flowing to the 
collaborating competitors. 
In addition to the knowledge and economic 
value, socio-environmental value can be 
created that is neither private nor common. 
In this study it is referred to as public value.  
Capture of 
benefit 
Common and private benefits can be 
captured fully by partners. 
Public benefit outside reach of partners in 
environmental coopetition relationship. 
Motivation Self-interest in increasing shareholder value. Still unclear, though examples do exist of 
pure moral cases. 
Source: Bengtsson & Kock, 2000. 
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8.6.7 Distance to consumer 
The concept of distance to consumer deserves further exploration. As was pointed out, awareness 
of socio-environmental value can boost the image of companies. Sometimes this can be 
collectively, as is the case with BWI, TGRC and membership of the Simonsberg Conservancy. But 
there are also other cases in which the value is at company level, as is the case for Graham Beck 
and the Cape leopard conservation effort, as well as for Laibach wines. Based on the different 
instances of distance to consumer, the dynamics of value may be different. Further research is 
required to investigate this line of thought. 
8.6.8 Collusion 
Collusion was briefly discussed earlier in the dissertation. It is a topic that deserves more exposure 
in the coopetition literature. Even though this study gave it relatively much exposure, there is much 
more room for exploration. For instance, “How do companies avoid colluding while they may be in 
coopetitive relationships?” 
8.6.9 Stability of coopetition 
Figure 2.4 showed stability of coopetition based on private vs. common benefits (Dyer et al., 
2008:146). In the absence of public value, the most stable position is “high common benefits – high 
private benefits”. Anecdotal evidence from the cases presented in this dissertation seems to 
indicate that public benefit may have a stabilising effect on coopetition initiatives (See Figure 8.2).  
Cape Leopard
(stable)
??
Less stable Most stable
Low to 
intermediate 
stability
Intermediate 
stability
Least stable More stable
Private 
Benefits
Common
Benefits
Low High
Low
High
Low
High
Public
Benefits
 
Figure 8.2: Stability of coopetition in a wide stakeholder view 
Source: Researcher. 
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In the case of the Cape leopard project, the position could be described as “low common – high 
private – high public” (indicated by the grey block in the back on the lower left). The initiative has 
been stable for many years, which may not have been the case without the public benefits. 
Therefore, the emerging research question would therefore be: “What impact does public benefits 
have on the stability of coopetition initiatives?” 
8.6.10 The relationship between created and appropriated value 
An aspect that was challenged at a number of occasions during the completion of this research 
was the statement that created and appropriate value are equal (see section 4.2.3 for the 
discussion). Although the researcher has full confidence in this statement and assumption, the 
statement was again challenged during the examination process. One examiner made particular 
reference to the It therefore represents an area that needs clarification and stronger empirical 
substantiation. 
8.6.11 Networked coopetition 
Figure 6.1 shows a diagram of the respondents in the survey and how they interconnect. It 
therefore represents a view of networked coopetition (Czakon, Czernek, 2016). This dissertation 
did not explore this aspect further, but it does provide an opportunity for further investigation. 
8.6.12 Social proximity and reciprocal perceptions of competitors 
An interesting aspect of the study was social and other community-orientated forms of proximity as 
antecedents of coopetition. In most of the cases, coopetition parties were hesitant to refer to their 
partners as competitors. This friendly form of competition fosters coopetition. Whether this 
phenomenon is present in other industries would be an interesting future study, as well as 
understanding what unique characteristics can be identified that fosters such attitudes.  
This particular aspect is an additional argument for defining coopetition through a value creation 
lens rather than overlapping market segments.5 
8.6.13 Dynamics of competition 
One aspect of coopetition that was not covered much is that of the dynamics of competition, i.e. 
aspects such as negotiation, power, bargaining (See for instance Kim et al., 2005 and Bengtsson 
et al., 2010), etc. A vast body of knowledge exists that describe aspects of competitive bargaining 
such as power and influence tactics. 
8.6.14 Common pool resources 
It is apt to conclude the areas for further research with one of the first topics that were introduced in 
the study. This dissertation gave limited coverage of governance of common pool resources 
(CPRs). This was partly because of its limited relevance to the conversation of value. However, it 
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would be of value to align the CVM with examples of CPRs and investigate whether these portray 
any particular idiosyncrasities. 
8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation in essence spoke to the need to widen the perspective on value in coopetition 
research. The findings speak specifically to socio-environmental value and the incorporation of 
stakeholder theory. In doing so, however, the study encourages new thinking about other kinds of 
value too. This study put particular focus on the natural environment and society/communities as 
stakeholders. But it is worthwhile to consider what other value can potentially be created by 
considering other stakeholders and other interpretations of value. 
For instance, social capital refers to trust and goodwill as alternative views of what value may be 
(see Figure 1.2 and the discussion of the five capitals model).  
Some forms of coopetition may generate trust and goodwill, not only in society, but also between 
competitors. And because trust and goodwill are antecedents for successful and stable coopetition 
initiatives, they serve to create a reinforcing loop of more coopetition and more trust. 
Trust, however, can also be at other levels; for instance, between a company and a government. 
Such trust could have value when negotiating new agreements or lobbying for a particular aspect 
of legislation. 
Coopetition may also create cultural value; for instance, it may contribute to the survival of a 
language or cultural artefacts, which may (like the environment) have intrinsic value. 
This dissertation therefore represents a larger movement to recognise value that accrues to 
stakeholders beyond the coopeting partners, but also recognises that such value can translate to 
value for the partners. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
5 My thanks to an external examiner for pointing this out. 
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APPENDIX A: 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AT THE OUTSET OF THE STUDY 
Table A.1: Research design aspects 
Objectives Research questions Design & source 
data 
Define environmental coopetition. RQ1: How can environmental 
coopetition be distinguished from 
“generic” coopetition? 
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
 
Primary data 
Semi-structured 
interviews  
 
Secondary: 
Company reports 
& websites 
 
 
 
Selected 
industries only 
Wine, Fishing, etc. 
Establish the types of initiatives that 
can be classified as environmental 
coopetition. 
RQ2: What are the forms of 
environmental coopetition?  
Establish how competing companies 
typically engage in environmental 
coopetition? 
RQ3: What are the mechanisms by 
which firms engage in environmental 
coopetition? 
Establish the motivation/drivers/ 
enablers of environmental coopetition.  
 
RQ4: Why do companies engage in 
environmental coopetition)?  
 
Establish why competing companies 
may not collaborate with their 
competitors on environmental aspects. 
RQ5: What are the barriers to 
environmental coopetition? 
Determine how context affects 
environmental coopetition. 
RQ6: How does the industry context of 
firms influence the types, methods, 
motivations and barriers of 
environmental coopetition? 
Determine how value is created from 
environmental coopetition activities. 
RQ7: How is value created? What does 
the value constitute of?  
Determine how the value created from 
environmental coopetition is shared 
among stakeholders. 
RQ8: How is the value created from 
environmental coopetition shared among 
stakeholders? 
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APPENDIX B: 
THE INITIAL DISCUSSION GUIDE 
At the start of the study, a flow diagram of question was constructed. After a number of interviews, 
it was evident that such an initial structure is of great value, but that it was too wide. 
 
Explain what 
the study is 
looking at.
For the record, 
state your 
organisation and 
your position.
Do you believe 
companies in your 
industry should work 
together on 
environmental projects? 
Which environmental 
problems do you see as the 
biggest risk to your 
business? 
Please provide an 
example of 
environmental 
collaboration? 
Is your company collaborating 
with competitors in other
respects? Please elaborate.
How has this 
example 
benefited your 
organisation?
What opportunities do you 
see around environmental 
aspects?
Is the company you work 
for collaborating with 
competitors on 
environmental aspects? 
Why?
Y
Can you explain 
when and how 
this example 
came about?
N
Are there any other 
examples you can 
think of?
Are there any competitors 
you prefer to collaborate 
with? Why?
What do you believe would be the 
consequences if you and your 
competitors do not collaborate on 
environmental issues in the future.
Why do you 
believe this is? 
What other 
barriers do you 
see?
What did you 
learn from this 
experience, 
both positive 
and negative?
What are the three 
biggest barriers in 
your view?
Which stakeholders are 
exerting the most pressure 
for you to collaborate?
YPlease provide 
examples.
What role should government 
play in encouraging 
competitors to work together 
on environmental aspects?
What role do other third 
parties play in facilitating 
environmental coopetition
in your industry? 
Y
Under which 
conditions?
N
Why not? 
What other factors would 
increase environmental 
coopetition beyond its 
current level?
N
What do you believe 
drives the level of 
environmental coopetition 
in different industries?0
How has this 
example 
benefited 
society?
 
Figure B.1: Initial flow diagram of questions for interviews 
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APPENDIX C: VALUE DYNAMICS 
Table C.1: Common economic value creation through action 
Case Common benefits Nature of economic value Action Co-dependent 
TGRC TGRC is a VEI. It affords the member firms legitimacy. Brand protection Raising awareness in society Public knowledge 
Solamoyo Licence to operate Legitimacy Raising awareness  
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy The conservancy is a VEI. It affords the member firms legitimacy. Brand protection Raising awareness in society Public knowledge 
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Increased brand visibility through increased presence in the market Reputation building Assisting other farmers to convert Socio-environmental value 
Common knowledge value 
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Less risk of stock-out Lower risk 
Reputation protection 
Assisting other farmers to convert Socio-environmental value 
Common knowledge value 
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Supplier contract for organic grapes Reduced risk Signing contract  
TGRC Cullet melts at a lower temperature, meaning an energy saving in 
the glass manufacturing process. Some of this saving may be 
passed on to wine bottlers.(Interviewee W4) 
Cost reduction Recycling  Socio-environmental value 
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy Easier and more efficient access to government funding for alien 
clearing  
Cost reduction Create a central office  
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy Snake & fire awareness training  Cost reduction Joint training Common knowledge 
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy Less fire risk. Removing aliens reduces both the cost and 
probability of a big fire. 
Cost reduction 
 
Removing alien trees Socio-environmental value 
Organic Farmers Association Cooperation around wine fairs to share expenses and form an 
organic cluster at wine shows so that organic wines are easier to 
find. Coopetition allows lower costs for wine producers. Each farm 
can spend fewer resources to attract people to their stand. 
Cost reduction  
 
Joint marketing  
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Sharing cattle: Reduced costs of keeping grass short Cost reduction Sharing cattle  
Winetech The cost of research & development is spread between the industry 
players. 
Cost reduction Joint funding of research Common knowledge 
Winetech Free training days to wine and grape producers Cost reduction Joint training Common knowledge 
Solamoyo Shared expenses for constructing a waste treatment plant. Cost reduction Joint construction of facility  
Solamoyo Potentially reduced operational costs of dealing with run-off Cost reduction Joint operation of facility  
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Cattle fertilise vineyard/  Healthier soil Cost reduction Sharing cattle Socio-environmental value 
Organic Farmers Association Cooperation around wine fairs to share expenses and form an 
organic cluster at wine shows so that organic wines are easier to 
find. Because the organic group is easier to find and more visible, it 
is likely that they will have higher sales. 
Increased revenue Joint marketing  
Organic Farmers Association By helping other farmers convert, the farmers with stronger 
presence in the market is able to source more grapes. 
Increased revenue (volume) Assisting other farmers to convert Socio-environmental value 
Common knowledge value 
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours By helping other farmers convert, Reyneke Wines is able to source 
more grapes. 
Increased revenue (volume) Assisting other farmers to convert Socio-environmental value 
Common knowledge value 
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Less drift from neighbouring farms. Reyneke loses less of its 
harvest from pesticide drift. 
Increased revenue (volume) Assisting other farmers to convert Socio-environmental value 
Common knowledge value 
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Able to grow herd size and sell cattle Increased revenue Sharing cattle  
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Table C.2: Common economic value creation from other value via an action 
Case Common benefits Nature of economic 
value 
Prior value Value dynamics Action 
Cape leopard 
case 
The Cape leopard conservation effort affords 
coopetition partners a collective brand value. 
(Interviewees F1, N7) 
Brand value Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
Socio-environmental value creates economic value through brand 
exposure of the environmental initiative.  
 
It could have been positive-sum logic if the Rooiberg Breederiver 
Conservancy kept the value common, as is the case with the 
Eerste River Collaboratory. 
Marketing of the initiative 
 
Raising public knowledge 
 
Certification & labelling 
BWI BWI provides a differentiator for South African wines 
that are exported. (Interviewee W5) 
 
 
Reputation building 
 
Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
BWI is a VEI. Socio-environmental is a prerequisite for 
membership, which in turn creates economic value.  
 
Internationally it seems to provide some differentiation for South 
African wines. 
Certification & labelling 
BWI Attention is drawn to BWI wines in some retailers such 
as Woolworths. This provides free marketing value 
and raises awareness about BWI wines. 
 
Brand exposure Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
Socio-environmental value leads to BWI, leading to preferential 
exposure in Woolworths. 
 
BWI works because of public awareness, so an element of its 
success is connected to public knowledge value. Orsato talks of 
stakeholder management. 
Certification & labelling 
Mealybug 
project 
Brand value is available to all participants Reputation building Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
Socio-environmental value allows for eco-branding, and potentially 
consumers would be willing to pay more. 
Raising awareness 
BWI BWI provides preferential access for members in 
some cases. (Interview N6 ) 
 
Legitimacy Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
BWI is a VEI. Socio-environmental is a prerequisite for 
membership, which in turn creates economic value.  
 
Locally BWI does not seem to provide differentiation in the market, 
except in a retailer like Woolworths.  
Certification & labelling 
Greater 
Simonsberg 
Conservancy 
Brand protection from Voluntary Environmental 
Initiative  
Legitimacy Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
Belonging to the Greater Simonsberg Conservancy provides 
members with legitimacy.  
Raising awareness 
Eerste River 
Collaboratory 
Reduced reputational risk  Legitimacy Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
See BWI Raising awareness 
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Table C.2: Common economic value creation from other value via an action (continued) 
Case Common benefits Nature of 
economic value 
Prior value Value dynamics Action 
Cape leopard 
case 
The Cape leopard conservation effort affords 
coopetition partners a collective brand value that leads 
to increased sales. (Interviewees F1, N7) 
Increased revenue 
(Volume & price) 
Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
Socio-environmental value creates economic value through brand 
exposure of the environmental initiative.  
 
It could have been positive-sum logic if the Rooiberg Breederiver 
Conservancy kept the value common, as is the case with the 
Eerste River Collaboratory. 
Marketing of the initiative 
 
Raising public knowledge 
 
Certification & labelling 
BWI BWI provides a differentiator for South African wines 
that are exported. (Interviewee W5) 
Increased revenue 
(Volume & price) 
Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
BWI is a VEI. Socio-environmental is a prerequisite for 
membership, which in turn creates economic value.  
 
Internationally it seems to provide some differentiation for South 
African wines. 
Certification & labelling 
BWI BWI provides preferential access for members in 
some cases. (Interview N6 ) 
 
Increased sales 
(Volume) 
Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
BWI is a VEI. Socio-environmental is a prerequisite for 
membership, which in turn creates economic value.  
 
Locally BWI does not seem to provide differentiation in the market, 
except in a retailer like Woolworths.  
Certification & labelling 
BWI Attention is drawn to BWI wines in some retailers such 
as Woolworths. This provides free marketing value 
and raises awareness about BWI wines. 
 
Increased sales 
(Volume) 
Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
Socio-environmental value leads to BWI, leading to preferential 
exposure in Woolworths. 
 
BWI works because of public awareness, so an element of its 
success is connected to public knowledge value. Orsato talks of 
stakeholder management. 
Certification & labelling 
Reyneke 
collaboration 
with 
neighbours 
Greater biodiversity in natural aromatic and biocontrol 
yeasts, resulting in better wines 
Increased revenue 
(price) 
Socio-environmental 
 
Public knowledge 
Using less pesticides encourages biodiversity, which in turn 
provides ecological services 
 
Organic 
Farmers 
Association 
Higher prices for organic grapes.  Increased revenue 
(price) 
Socio-environmental Some wine producers buy grapes from other organic farmers. 
These farmers (for now) decided not to compete with their own 
brand, but rather to sell grapes to wine producer. 
 
Reyneke 
collaboration 
with 
neighbours 
Higher prices for organic grapes. Increased revenue 
(price) 
Socio-environmental Organic grapes are considered to be healthier. Consumers are 
also willing to pay for the ecological benefit of organic farming. 
Because of this, there is value in terms of eco-branding. 
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Table C.3: Common economic value creation from other value (no action) 
Case Common benefits Nature of economic value Prior value 
Cape leopard 
case 
The presence of the leopard (an apex predator) reduces the losses due to smaller predators such as 
jackal and caracal. Farmers therefore experience fewer losses of small livestock. (Interviewee W7, N7) 
Risk reduction Socio-environmental 
Eerste River 
Collaboratory 
Reduced health & safety risk 
 
Lower risk Socio-environmental 
Cape leopard 
case 
The presence of the leopard (an apex predator) reduces the losses due to smaller predators such as 
jackal and caracal. Farmers therefore experience fewer losses of small livestock. (Interviewee W7, N7) 
Cost reduction Socio-environmental 
Greater 
Simonsberg 
Conservancy 
A strong underlying driver for removing alien trees is the economic benefit of more water. More water is 
both a socio-environmental benefit and an economic benefit. 
 
Cost reduction Socio-environmental 
Mealybug project Natural pest control may reduce operational costs in the long term.  
Socio-environmental value is created, and the economic value flows from the ecological services. 
Cost reduction 
 
Socio-environmental 
Eerste River 
Collaboratory 
Access to cleaner water for production and/or irrigation purposes Cost reduction Socio-environmental 
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Table C.4: Common economic value appropriation through action 
Case Common benefits Nature of economic value Action 
Cape leopard case The Cape leopard conservation effort affords coopetition partners a 
collective brand value. (Interviewees F1, N7) 
Brand value 
 
Value is captured through marketing or branding by a particular wine 
producer, for instance Graham Beck. 
Reyneke collaboration with 
neighbours 
Increased brand visibility through increased presence in the market Reputation building Value is captured by putting Reyneke branded wine in the market. The value 
is equal to the additional profit generated by Reyneke. 
BWI BWI provides a differentiator for South African wines that are 
exported. (Interviewee W5) 
Reputation building 
 
Value is captured by exporting wines. 
Mealybug project Brand value is available to all participants Reputation building Value is captured by raising awareness of a farms involvement.  
BWI Attention is drawn to BWI wines in some retailers such as Woolworths. 
This provides free marketing value and raises awareness about BWI 
wines. 
Brand exposure Value is captured by taking advantage of available shelf space and/or 
exposure. 
BWI BWI provides preferential access for members in some cases. 
(Interview N6) 
Legitimacy Value is captured by taking advantage of available shelf space and/or 
exposure. 
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy Brand protection from Voluntary Environmental Initiative  Legitimacy Value is captured by raising awareness of a farms involvement. One of the 
ways is to display a membership sign as was shown earlier. 
TGRC TGRC is a VEI. It affords the member firms legitimacy at an industry 
level. 
Brand protection The creation and appropriation of value happens simultaneously. This is an 
intangible value and is hard to value accurately. 
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy The conservancy is a VEI. It affords the member firms legitimacy. Brand protection The creation and appropriation of value happens simultaneously. This is an 
intangible value and is hard to value accurately. 
Eerste River Collaboratory Reduced reputational risk  Brand protection Value is captured by raising awareness of farm-level involvement. 
Reyneke collaboration with 
neighbours 
Less risk of stock-out Brand protection The value captured is equal to the avoided reputational damage and loss of 
sales of a stock-out. Value is captured by putting Reyneke branded wine in 
the market. 
Reyneke collaboration with 
neighbours 
Less risk of stock-out Reputation protection The value captured is equal to the avoided reputational damage and loss of 
sales of a stock-out. Value is captured by putting Reyneke branded wine in 
the market. 
TGRC Cullet melts at a lower temperature, meaning an energy saving in the 
glass manufacturing process. Some of this saving may be passed on 
to wine bottlers.(Interviewee W4) 
Cost reduction Value is captured by users of glass when they procure glass at a reduced 
cost. It is hard to determine what the reduction in cost is, and if there even is 
a cost reduction. 
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy Easier and more efficient access to government funding for alien 
clearing  
Cost reduction  
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy Snake & fire awareness training  Cost reduction Member firms capture value by sending staff for training. 
Winetech The cost of research & development is spread between the industry 
players. 
Cost reduction The value to each participant is the difference between the cost of funding 
similar research, and the actual cost of the research. 
Winetech Free training days to wine and grape producers Cost reduction Member firms capture value by sending staff for training. 
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy By helping other farmers convert, the farmers with stronger presence 
in the market is able to source more grapes. 
Increased revenue (volume) The farmer buying the grapes capture value through buying the grapes and 
increasing production. 
Reyneke collaboration with 
neighbours 
By helping other farmers convert, Reyneke Wines is able to source 
more grapes. 
Increased revenue (volume) Reyneke Wines capture value through buying the grapes and increasing 
production. 
Reyneke collaboration with 
neighbours 
Greater biodiversity in natural aromatic and biocontrol yeasts, 
resulting in better wines 
Increased revenue 
 
Value is captured by attaining a higher price. 
Cape leopard case The Cape leopard conservation effort affords coopetition partners a 
collective brand value. (Interviewees F1, N7) 
Increased revenue Value is captured through marketing or branding by a particular wine 
producer, for instance Graham Beck. 
BWI BWI provides a differentiator for South African wines that are 
exported. (Interviewee W5) 
Increased revenue Value is captured by exporting wines. 
BWI BWI provides preferential access for members in some cases. 
(Interview N6) 
Increased sales 
 
Value is captured by taking advantage of available shelf space and/or 
exposure. 
BWI Attention is drawn to BWI wines in some retailers such as Woolworths. 
This provides free marketing value and raises awareness about BWI 
wines. 
Increased sales 
 
Value is captured by taking advantage of available shelf space and/or 
exposure. 
Organic Farmers Association Higher prices for organic grapes.  Increased revenue (price) Value is captured by attaining a higher price. 
Reyneke collaboration with 
neighbours 
Higher prices for organic grapes. Increased revenue (price) Value is captured by attaining a higher price. 
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Table C.5: Common economic value appropriation without action 
Case Common benefits Nature of 
economic value 
Action 
Cape leopard case The presence of the leopard (an apex predator) reduces the losses due to smaller 
predators such as jackal and caracal. Farmers therefore experience fewer losses of small 
livestock. (Interviewee W7, N7) 
Cost reduction 
Risk reduction 
 
Eerste River Collaboratory Reduced health & safety risk 
 
Lower risk  
Organic Farmers Association Supplier contract for organic grapes Reduced risk  
Solamoyo Licence to operate Legitimacy The creation and appropriation of value happens simultaneously. 
This is an intangible value and is hard to value accurately. 
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy Less fire risk. Removing aliens reduces both the cost and probability of a big fire. Cost reduction 
 
Difficult to quantify the value of the saving as one would have to 
know what damage would be caused in absence of the removal of 
alien species.  
Greater Simonsberg Conservancy A strong underlying driver for removing alien trees is the economic benefit of more water. 
More water is both a socio-environmental benefit and an economic benefit. 
 
Cost reduction  
Organic Farmers Association Cooperation around wine fairs to share expenses and form an organic cluster at wine 
shows so that organic wines are easier to find. Coopetition allows lower costs for wine 
producers. Each farm can spend fewer resources to attract people to their stand. 
Cost reduction  
 
 
Mealybug project Natural pest control may reduce operational costs in the long term.  
Socio-environmental value is created, and the economic value flows from the ecological 
services. 
Cost reduction 
 
 
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Sharing cattle: Reduced costs of keeping grass short Cost reduction 
 
The farmer who grants access to his farm captures the cost 
reduction benefits. The value is equal to the avoided cost of mowing 
the grass with a tractor. 
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Cattle fertilise vineyard /Healthier soil Cost reduction The farmer who grants access to his farm captures the cost 
reduction benefits. The value is equal to the avoided cost of mowing 
the grass with a tractor. 
Eerste River Collaboratory Access to cleaner water for production and/or irrigation purposes Cost reduction  
Solamoyo Shared expenses for constructing a waste treatment plant. Cost reduction  
Solamoyo Potentially reduced operational costs of dealing with run-off 
 
Cost reduction  
Organic Farmers Association Cooperation around wine fairs to share expenses and form an organic cluster at wine 
shows so that organic wines are easier to find. Because the organic group is easier to find 
and more visible, it is likely that they will have higher sales. 
Increased 
revenue 
 
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Less drift from neighbouring farms. Reyneke loses less of its harvest from pesticide drift. Increased 
revenue (volume) 
 
Reyneke collaboration with neighbours Able to grow herd size and sell cattle Increased 
revenue 
The value for Reyneke Wines as owner of the cows is equal to the 
avoided feeding cost of the cattle. 
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Table C.6: Private economic value creation from other value via an action 
Case Private benefits Prior value Action Co-dependent 
Cape leopard case A farmer (Interviewee W7) used knowledge captured about different plant species in his olive oil business to 
create innovative new products. This economic benefit is outside of the coopetition initiative and not available to 
other wine farmers. 
Private knowledge Applying the knowledge  
Mealybug project Laibach is the only organically certified wine producer amongst the group of wine producers in the immediate 
vicinity. Because of its neighbours using natural pest control, Laibach’s attempts are also more effective. 
Private knowledge Applying knowledge. The context 
makes it private economic value. 
Laibach can leverage more value 
from the initiative because of its 
organic certification. 
Socio-
environmental value 
Winetech 
Applying research from Winetech can represent private benefit. 
Private knowledge Applying the knowledge Socio-
environmental value 
TGRC 
TGRC receives contributions from all glass users. Many glass users contribute funds. The funds are used to 
promote both recycling and reuse of glass, but only one firm reuses glass in  
its “spirits” division. (Interviewee W4, W9). When the public returns reusable bottles, they created value for firms 
that make use of reusable bottles, in this case Distell. 
Public knowledge Knowledge is applied by society, 
leading to a private  economic 
benefit 
Socio-
environmental value 
 
Socio-economic 
value 
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Table C.7: Creating and capturing common knowledge benefits 
 Common benefits Capturing of benefits Nature of knowledge value Prior value Action 
Cape leopard 
case 
Being part of the conservancy affords all the partners 
access to the knowledge of a knowledgeable 
sustainability manager. (Interviewee W7) 
One of the farmers reports the ability to access more of the time of the 
knowledgeable person, and thus captures more conservation related 
and other knowledge value for himself. (Interviewee W7) 
Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate 
through 3rd 
party 
TGRC TGRC serves as knowledge hub to the glass industry 
(Interviewee T1). 
Representation on the board provides some players with a higher 
level of access to information and knowledge. (Interviewee T1, W9). 
Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate 
through 3rd 
party 
BWI BWI serves as knowledge hub about biodiversity 
conservation. 
Members of BWI may draw on knowledge within BWI, but none of the 
respondents made mention of this. 
Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate 
through 3rd 
party 
BWI Audit reports provide particular members with areas for 
improvement. (Interview W13) 
Members capture knowledge by using the knowledge resource and 
gaining insight into areas for improvement from audit reports. 
Know-what  Cooperate 
through 3rd 
party 
Greater 
Simonsberg 
Conservancy 
Snake & fire awareness training  The value is available at very little cost. By sending staff to be trained, 
the value is captured. 
Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate 
through 3rd 
party 
Greater 
Simonsberg 
Conservancy 
Coordination of fire-fighting efforts provides an 
opportunity to respond faster.  
Farmers benefit from lower risk by sharing information. The value is 
captured in reduced damage. 
Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate 
through 3rd 
party 
Greater 
Simonsberg 
Conservancy 
Conservancy office serves as an information and 
knowledge source  
Value is captured by making use of the resource. Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate 
through 3rd 
party 
Mealybug 
project 
Farmers learn from one another and apply the 
knowledge on their own farms.  
One example is interviewee W20 that learnt how to deal with 
mealybugs from Laibach. 
Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate/shar
e best practice 
Organic 
Farmers 
Association 
Farmers meet every quarter on a different farm to 
exchange best practices.  
 (Interviewee W17, W18, W20) 
Farmers learn from one another and apply the knowledge on their 
own farms. One example is interviewee W20 that learnt how to deal 
with mealybugs from Laibach. 
 
Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate/shar
e best practice 
Organic 
Farmers 
Association 
Farmers learn from one another and apply the 
knowledge on their own farms. One example is 
interviewee W20 that learnt how to deal with mealybugs 
from Laibach. 
Johan Reyneke learns about finance and strategy from a neighbour, 
while the neighbours learn more about organic farming. The sharing of 
knowledge happens in positive-sum logic. 
Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate/shar
e best practice 
Reyneke 
collaboration 
with 
neighbours 
Farmers share knowledge (know-what & know-how); the 
overall knowledge stock increases. 
 Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate/shar
e best practice 
Winetech Winetech provides funding for research projects for the 
industry. The results are made public through various 
channels. 
Knowledge is disseminated and captured though different channels. Know-what 
Know-how 
 Jointly fund 
research 
Winetech Winetech, in collaboration with VinPro, provides 
information sessions, seminars and workshops in the 
wine industry (Boshoff, 2013:170) 
Wine producers can read, assimilate and use the knowledge by 
accessing publically available research. Knowledge is appropriated in 
positive-sum logic 
Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate 
through 3rd 
party 
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Table C.7: Creating and capturing common knowledge benefits (continued) 
 Common benefits Capturing of benefits Nature of knowledge value Prior value Action 
Eerste River 
Collaboratory 
Knowledge regarding the problems facing the river eco-
system (know-what) 
Participants learn about problems through their participation. Know-what  Cooperate 
through 3rd 
party 
Eerste River 
Collaboratory 
Sharing of knowledge about related and other matters 
between staff of the two entities. (know-what & know-
how) 
Two participants exchange knowledge about how to address mutually 
problems. 
Know-what 
Know-how 
 Cooperate/shar
e best practice 
Eerste River 
Collaboratory 
Know-how in cooperating with competitors Coopetition partners learn an important skill through their interaction 
with competitors. 
Know-how  Cooperate/shar
e best practice 
Solamoyo Some knowledge was exchanged in the starting phase 
of the project. 
Partners capture knowledge from the initiative, but to a limited extent. Know-what  Share limited 
information 
TGRC TGRC gains knowledge from studying the efficacy of 
recycling initiatives. 
Representation on the board provides some players with a higher 
level of access to information and knowledge. (Interviewee T1, W9). 
Know-what 
Know-how 
Socio-
environmental 
TGRC studies 
impact of 
initiatives 
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Table C.8: Capturing private knowledge value through action (with or without prior value) 
 Private benefits Nature of knowledge value Action 
Cape leopard 
case 
One of the farmers is able to tap into the collective knowledge of the coopetition partners about health benefits of different plants to use in a 
secondary business. (Interviewee W7) 
Know what Engaging with other members 
TGRC Distell adopts knowledge that it gained in its involvement with the TGRC into areas that its competitors do not operate. Know what 
Know how 
Engaging with 3rd party 
 
Table C.9: Public economic value (socio-economic) value from action (no prior value) 
 Private benefits Action Co-dependent value 
TGRC Glass is recycled and reused, meaning reduced cost to society for waste disposal and landfills (Interviewee W9, T1). Recycling Socio-environmental 
 The bulk of glass recycling is driven by the lower end of the market who earns a living from recycling (Interviewee T1). Recycling Socio-environmental 
Greater 
Simonsberg 
Conservancy 
Reduced fire risk benefits the immediate community. Alien tree removal Socio-environmental 
Mealybug 
project 
Less herbicide and pesticide spraying in the region is healthier for the immediate community. Less herbicide and pesticide 
spraying 
Socio-environmental 
 
Table C.10: Public economic value (socio-economic) value from prior value via action 
 Private benefits Capturing of benefits Prior value Action Co-dependent value 
TGRC The lower cost to the glass manufacturer could potentially translate to lower cost 
of bottled wine. 
 Common economic value 
Private economic value 
Saving is realised by buying wine  
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Table C.11: Public economic value (socio-economic) value prior value (no action) 
 Private benefits Capturing of benefits Prior value Co-dependent value 
Cape leopard 
case 
The community benefits economically from fewer losses from small predators due to the presence of an apex predator. 
(Interviewee W7, N7) 
Public Socio-environmental Common benefit 
Cape leopard 
case 
Bed and breakfast businesses leverage from the increased popularity of the region. (Interviewee W7, F1) Public Socio-environmental Common benefit 
BWI Socio-economic benefit in BWI stems from protection of eco-systems and the promotion of biodiversity on wine and grape 
producing farms 
Public Socio-environmental Common benefit 
Organic Farmers 
Association 
Socio-economic benefit in BWI stems from protection of eco-systems and the promotion of biodiversity on wine and grape 
producing farms 
Public Socio-environmental Common benefit 
Reyneke 
collaboration with 
neighbours 
Socio-economic benefit stems from protection of eco-systems and the promotion of biodiversity on wine and grape 
producing farms 
Public Socio-environmental Common benefit 
Eerste River 
Collaboratory 
Healthier environment for community Public Socio-environmental Common benefit 
Eerste River 
Collaboratory 
Potable water 
 
Public Socio-environmental Common benefit 
Eerste River 
Collaboratory 
Less illnesses from water-borne diseases 
 
Public Socio-environmental Common benefit 
Solamoyo Potable water 
 
Public Socio-environmental Common benefit 
Solamoyo Less illnesses from water-borne diseases 
 
Public Socio-environmental Common benefit 
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Table C.12: Public knowledge value from prior value 
 Knowledge value Prior value Action 
Cape leopard 
case 
The community becomes aware of the existence of the leopard 
and the benefits of having it around. Also about how to conserve 
the leopard. (Interviewee N7) 
Socio-environmental 
value 
 
Community observes & word of mouth 
TGRC The primary mandate of TGRC is to raise public awareness 
regarding glass recycling, glass reuse, and the benefits thereof 
(Interviewee T1, TGRC, 2012). 
Common knowledge Awareness campaign 
BWI BWI raises awareness about biodiversity and informs consumers 
about BWI wines. 
Common knowledge Awareness campaign &  
Labelling 
 
Greater 
Simonsberg 
Conservancy 
The conservancy runs various education programmes for school 
children and farm workers around conservation. (Interviewee 
W12) 
Common knowledge Education 
Mealybug 
project 
The ladybird brand and marketing around brand raises awareness 
of natural pest control 
Common knowledge Awareness campaign 
Organic 
Farmers 
Association 
Labelling and raising awareness about organic wines Common knowledge Awareness campaign 
Reyneke 
collaboration 
with 
neighbours 
Labelling and raising awareness about organic wines Common knowledge Awareness campaign 
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Table C.13: Socio-environmental value 
 Socio-environmental value Number of dynamic Prior value Action Co-dependent value 
TGRC Recycling glass has numerous benefits for the environment in terms 
of a reduction in pollution and resource dependency (Glass producer 
website). 
(21) Dependent on recycling action, which is driven by 
public awareness.  
Public knowledge Recycling action of 
society 
Common economic 
benefit 
Private economic 
benefit 
Socio-economic value 
Cape leopard 
case 
There is intrinsic value (ecosystems value, biological value) in 
maintaining the trophic pyramid by having an apex predator present. 
The leopard holds aesthetic value. (Interviewee W6, W7, W8, N7) 
(17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the individual members of the 
conservancy. 
Common knowledge Conservation effort of 
farmers 
Public knowledge 
BWI Biodiversity gains mean more natural resilience in the eco-system.  (17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the BWI members. 
Common knowledge Conservation effort  
 Increase in ecological services such as pest control, fire control, 
support of indigenous fauna, etc. 
(17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the BWI members. 
Common knowledge Conservation effort  
 Aesthetic value of indigenous fauna and flora (17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the BWI members. 
Common knowledge Conservation effort  
Greater 
Simonsberg 
Conservancy 
Removal of alien species allow natural habitat for fauna & flora (17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the members of the conservancy. 
Common knowledge Conservation effort  
 Return of animals such as caracal, owls, snakes, mice. (17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the members of the conservancy. 
Common knowledge Conservation effort  
 More water (17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the members of the conservancy 
Common knowledge Conservation effort Socio-economic 
Mealybug 
project 
Increased biodiversity in vineyards. (17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the members of the initiative 
Common knowledge Conservation effort  
Organic 
Farmers 
Association 
Other yeasts such as Rh. diobovatum and Cr. laurentii are also 
potential biocontrol agents against B. cinerea. This unique diversity 
could be due to the poor phytosanitary condition associated with the 
biodynamic vineyard, but it could also reflect the establishment of 
the natural enemies of different pests in the absence of pesticide 
application. (Setati et al., 2012) 
(17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the members of the initiative 
Common knowledge Conservation effort  
Reyneke 
collaboration 
with 
neighbours 
Other yeasts such as Rh. diobovatum and Cr. laurentii are also 
potential biocontrol agents against B. cinerea. This unique diversity 
could be due to the poor phytosanitary condition associated with the 
biodynamic vineyard, but it could also reflect the establishment of 
the natural enemies of different pests in the absence of pesticide 
application. (Setati et al., 2012) 
(17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the members of the initiative. 
Common knowledge Conservation effort  
Winetech Knowledge in the industry leads to energy efficiency and other 
environmental benefits. 
(17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the members of the initiative 
Common knowledge Environmental action  
Eerste River 
Collaboratory 
Collaboration to clean the Eerste River creates a healthier eco-
system. 
(17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the members of the initiative 
Common knowledge Cleaning of the river and 
catchment area 
 
 Collaboration to clean the Eerste River from pollution and invasive 
plants provides more and cleaner water to the direct environment. 
 Common knowledge Cleaning of the river and 
catchment area 
 
Solamoyo The joint waste treatment facility creates cleaner run-off water than 
was previously the case. Doing it as a joint project reduces the 
construction cost as well as the operations expenses of compliance. 
(17) Dependent on conservation action, driven by 
knowledge of the members of the initiative 
Common knowledge Construction of the 
waste treatment plant 
Operation of the plant 
Common economic  
benefit 
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